2016 Tesla Model X
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model X › 2016
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2016 Tesla Model X. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
12 recalls name the 2016 Tesla Model X. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016 Model X vehicles. The front and center roof cosmetic trim pieces may be adhered to the vehicle without primer. As a result, one or both pieces of trim may separate from the vehicle.
Trim that separates from the vehicle during use can create a road hazard and increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla service will test the roof trim adhesion and reattach the trim pieces as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed October 14, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-12-008. Vehicles previously repaired under recall 20V-710 will need to have the new inspection and remedy completed.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2018 Tesla Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles with a center display equipped with a NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor and an 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. When the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device for the center display reaches lifetime wear, the eMMC controller will no longer be able to maintain the integrity…
The eMMC controller wear-out condition can cause the loss of the rearview camera display, defrost/defog control settings, and exterior turn signal lighting, reducing visibility and increasing the risk of a crash.
Owners should ensure their vehicles are operating firmware release 2020.48.48.12 or newer, which will alert owners if the eMMC is approaching lifetime wear. Tesla will notify owners, and will replace the VCM daughterboard with one containing an enhanced eMMC controller, free of charge. The recall began March 29, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-21-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016 Model X vehicles. The front and spine cosmetic roof trim may have been adhered to the vehicle without first using primer. As a result, one or both pieces of trim may separate from the vehicle while moving.
Trim that separates from the vehicle during use can cause a road hazard and increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and dealers will test the roof trim adhesion, and, as necessary, apply primer, free of charge. The recall began January 15, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-20-12-005. This recall has been superseded by Recall 24V615 (SB-24-12-008).
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2015-2016 Model X vehicles. The aluminum bolts that attach the power steering gear assist motor to the gear housing may corrode and fracture causing a reduction or complete loss of power steering assist.
Loss of power steering assist would require a higher steering effort, especially at lower speeds, which may increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will replace the steering gear mounting bolts with coated steel bolts, and add a corrosion-preventative sealer to the steering gear motor housing and motor connection bolts. If the mounting bolts are found to be broken or break during removal and cannot be removed, a new steering gear will also be installed. All services will be performed free of charge. The recall began February 15, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2017 Model X vehicles. The left-side, second row, reclining seat backs may not fully latch due to having incorrectly adjusted recliner mechanism cables. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 207, "Seating Systems," and 210, "Seat…
If the seat back moves forward in the event of a crash, it can increase the risk of injury.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla service technicians will correct the cable adjustment for the left-side, fold-flat, second row, seat recliner mechanism, free of charge. The recall began on November 10, 2017. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-17-13-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016 Model S and Model X vehicles. The electric parking brake calipers have an internal gear that may be improperly manufactured, possibly resulting in the gear fracturing during parking brake application or release.
If the gear breaks during parking brake release, the vehicle will not be able to be moved. If the gear breaks during parking brake application, the parking brake may not adequately hold the vehicle, potentially resulting in the vehicle rolling, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and service centers will replace both the left and right electric parking brake calipers, free of charge. The recall began March 6, 2018. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-17-33-002.
Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain model year 2016 Model X vehicles manufactured September 29, 2015, to March 30, 2016. In the affected vehicles, the third row seat back may move forward under load such as in a frontal collision. As such, the vehicles do not conform to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 207, "Seating…
If the third row seat does not remain in its adjusted position, there may be an increased risk of injury to an occupant in the event of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and dealers will replace all affected third row seats, free of charge. The recall began on April 20, 2016. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-844-248-3752 or by email at ServiceHelpNA@teslamotors.com. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-16-13-003
The applique could create a road hazard for other road users and could increase the risk of a crash and injury. We are not aware of any accidents or injuries resulting from this condition, if you experience movements or separation of the front or spine applique from the roof while driving, please pull over safely and contact Tesla Roadside for assistance.
Full self-drive supervised version 14.3Lite. New update pushed to the vehicle by Tesla, unsafely removed ability to control maximum speed of the vehicle while using self-driving features. On this particular five- minute drive, vehicle blasted hold the wheel alerts (Red Warning with critical alarm), no fewer than 12 times, while my hands were still on the wheel, and twice with the standard beep beep and white general notification. On the slowest setting, vehicle proceeded to increase speed to 35 mph in school zone with a posted 15 mph limit when children are present and a normal speed of 25 posted. Vehicle saw the speed sign as indicated on the dashboard. Further, vehicle fully disengaged self-driving features with no advanced warning, multiple times. An automated self-driving supervised, vehicle follows other vehicles at an unsafe distance, regardless of setting. Tesla has removed distance settings, maximum speed limitations, and has increased the number of hold the wheel alerts (While the wheel IS being held) exponentially. Driving performance has also regressed with very jerky side to side motion. in the lane. This is a major regression over previous release, is unsafe and should not be on the road. Tesla provides no way to downgrade back to a safer version of the software and outright refuses to. additionally, when making manual left-hand turns, lane departure warning goes off even though I have it turned off as a feature, and attempts to pull me back into my lane, almost causing a collision, instead of a completed left turn
On September 24, 2026, the vehicle displayed “SEAT UNLATCHED — Occupied seats must be secured while the vehicle is in motion.” Tesla diagnosed an unavailable second-row buckle signal, seat pitch motor encoder errors, and a seat pitch that would not calibrate. Tesla recommended replacing the pitch motor/gearbox assembly and buckle. Service verbally advised us not to put a child in the affected seat until repaired. The invoice records the faults and recommendation, but no repair or written safety clearance. The rear seat-belt concern was already recurring by January 30, 2025. Tesla’s record says both second-row belts had excess slack and would not reel back in, and that this was the third time the issue had been looked at or fixed. The technician wrote that they “do retract but not perfectly every time,” then documented that the locking method passed a test. No repair was made; further testing required customer-pay authorization. The concern remains unresolved. Tesla’s manual says to confirm a second-row seat is locked before driving with a child and that a belt should not hang loose. We need all four rear seats, so we have relied on another vehicle or limited who can use this one. The affected seat and vehicle are available for inspection. Significant problems began within about the first 4,300 miles, including a broken front suspension link that required a tow and repair. We bought directly from Tesla through its pre-owned program for $70,400 plus $2,000 transportation, before taxes and fees. Seat-related recalls exist for this model year, but I do not know whether any apply to this vehicle.
The failure follows the same pattern every time. At first there is a loud noise from the compressor when the car starts. Over time the noise lasts longer. Eventually the compressor can no longer raise the vehicle, and it sits at its lowest ride height, nearly on the ground. In that condition the vehicle cannot be driven, and I have had to have it towed to a Tesla service center. The nearest one is about 2.5 hours from my home. After the first replacement I set the vehicle not to adjust its ride height automatically, to limit compressor use. This has not stopped the failures from recurring on the same schedule. The vehicle has only about 50,000 miles, so I believe this reflects a design or component defect rather than normal wear. I am concerned that other owners are experiencing the same issue, and that a vehicle that suddenly cannot be driven is a safety risk. I am reporting it so NHTSA can look for a pattern.
My 2016 Tesla Model X is subject to NHTSA Recall 24V615000 for detaching roof appliques. The component was previously inspected by Tesla under this campaign. Last week, the center spine applique completely detached and flew off the vehicle at highway speeds, creating an immediate road hazard. The service center finally agreed to dp t h e repair but the Tesla authorized service center failed to properly complete the recall remedy, damaged adjacent water/wind seals with chemical solvents during the process, and is refusing to return the car to a safe, weather-tight condition without charging the me $2,800.
The car was making a grinding and knocking sound which varied with the engine speed. This noise was confirmed to be coming from the rear drive unit by the Tesla technician. The vehicle has approximately 105,000 miles. An internet search revealed it was a common problem. The repair costed $6,502.20. It appears the problem was related to the original part which had a high failure rate and this was corrected with an updated part (ASY, DRIVE, UNIT, 3.0-150, REAR (1037000-00-F)). I understand this the drive unit that would address the coolant-ingress/seal failure of the Model X Large Drive Unit
My 2016 Tesla Model X is subject to NHTSA Recall 24V615000 for detaching roof appliques. The component was previously inspected by Tesla under this campaign. August 30, 2026 the center spine applique completely detached and flew off the vehicle at highway speeds, creating an immediate road hazard. Tesla Service is now refusing to replace the missing component under the recall campaign, claiming a prior inspection absolves them of coverage. The vehicle currently exhibits the exact safety defect intended to be cured by the recall.
I was driving the vehical when something went wrong. The vehicle showed a warning stating "ABS disabled". I was worried by this, when I saw further warnings appear including "Safety restraint system issue" "Power braking assist reduced" and something about steering. The dashboard also showed "Park Brake fault" and a red icon with a seatbelt and another with an airbag. Alarmed, I pulled to the side of the road. I then discovered that I could not use the parking brake or turn on the flashers. There is no manual parking brake, and the car thought it was still driving. I was facing downhill and the only way to keep the car from rolling was to keep my foot on the brake. I had to call 911 and could only safely exit the vehicle, after they had ensured it would not roll. Again, I could not exit the vehicle, or even put on flashers to warn traffic. Tesla attempted to have me reboot the operating system but this also failed -- apparently there is no manual reboot or brake avalible.
I own a 2016 Tesla Model X P100D equipped with the Large Drive Unit (LDU). The component that fails is the rotor coolant seal in the rear drive unit motor. Coolant leaks internally into the motor and inverter, causing bearing wear, corrosion, isolation faults, and eventual complete drive unit failure. The affected drive units are still installed and available for inspection upon request. This defect puts my safety and the safety of others at risk because it can cause sudden loss of propulsion (especially at highway speeds), power reduction, or total drivetrain shutdown, potentially leading to a crash. Coolant in high-voltage areas also raises electrical fault/fire risks. The problem is widely reproduced and confirmed: Tesla service centers are familiar with it and replace failed units with updated “-U” revisions that include a coolant bypass. Independent EV shops confirm the exact root cause (rotor seal failure) via encoder inspections showing coolant intrusion and through disassembly. This is a documented pattern failure in all 2012–2020 LDU vehicles. No police or insurance inspections have occurred yet, as no crash or total failure has happened. Tesla is aware of the recurring issue through service records on similar vehicles. Early symptoms before full failure typically include rear motor whining/grinding (especially under load), reduced power warnings, “Rear Drive Unit Fault” messages, and visible coolant on the speed sensor. These can appear gradually. My vehicles have not yet experienced total failure, but the defect is known to be inevitable. I am proactively monitoring encoder sensors. Because this is a systemic design defect affecting thousands of vehicles with clear safety implications, I request NHTSA open an investigation and require Tesla to issue a recall for free repairs/replacements on all affected 2012–2020 LDU vehicles.
The rack-and-pinion system failed, causing steering to become difficult at low speeds and worsening rapidly over weeks. It was inspected by a mechanic at EV Coastal in Santa Ana, who said it was not the U-Joint or bolt corrosion issue addressed by an earlier NHTSA recall. There were no notifications either visible to me or to the mechanic in service mode. The accident was at low speeds and a partial cause was my daughter's difficulty making a smooth adjustment with the steering wheel. She was pulling out of a parking spot and collided with a car going a little faster than it should have in a parking lot. Fortunately, the damage was limited to a scratch to the passenger side door of the other car (see photo) and scratches to the right side of the front fender of the Tesla.
Coolant heater failure resulting in no regenerative braking .
I don't think Tesla ever did the steering bolt recall per SB-20-32-002 on my vehicle. I had all the bolts fail, with obvious corrosion, and the motor separated from the rack causing a loss of power steering while moving. You can see where the bolt physically failed and the corrosion both on the remainder of the bolt and the entire mating surface of the motor to the steering rack. Going back through my service records, it is only listed once on 9 June 2021 with notes of "Parts not available" hidden in the comments. Tesla is telling me this was done, with comments about a January 2021 visit, but I never took it to them in January (I did in February) and the February visit has no mention of the recall. Regardless, one of two things happened: either Tesla didn't do the recall and I fell victim to the issue or the recall was done and the new, updated bolts still failed due to corrosion and exposure to a corrosive, winter environment. I still suspect the former for the reason that no visible evidence of the protective wax coating required by the TSB could be seen on the motor or steering rack. Perhaps they swapped the bolts but didn't apply the wax, which allowed for continued corrosion? I won't know for sure until they continue with the repair, but I'm worried they are going to toss the parts and sweep this under the rug and foot me with the full bill. Regardless, I want this documented that I had a failure despite the recall so that any other owner with a similar problem can see this record.
The contact owns a 2016 Tesla Model X. The contact stated that while driving during a rainstorm, the power steering assist feature suddenly failed, and the steering wheel became difficult to turn in either direction. The driver was able to forcefully turn the steering wheel and drive the vehicle a short distance to the residence. The vehicle was later towed to the local Tesla Service Center who diagnosed that the steering rack circuit board had failed and needed to be replaced. The vehicle was not yet repaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure, but no assistance was offered. The contact was informed that the VIN was not included in NHTSA Campaign Number: 20V062000 (STEERING). The contact stated that the vehicle had experienced the failure listed in the recall. The failure mileage was 80,000.
2016 Tesla Model X experienced Electronic Parking Brake failure with alerts stating ‘parking brake did not release.’ Tesla is charging for replacement despite known EPB defect and recall affecting 2016 Model X vehicles. This is a safety-related braking issue.
While driving a notification popped up, parking brake may not be applied while driving. This notification appears in rain or snow making me think it is weather related malfunctioning.
Description of Problem: INSTRUMENT CLUSTER COMPLETE FAILURE My 2016 Tesla Model X instrument cluster has completely failed and permanently displays "CAR OFF" regardless of the actual vehicle status, including while actively driving at highway speeds. Critical Information I CANNOT See While Driving: Gear position (P, D, R, N) - I have no visual confirmation of what gear the vehicle is in Vehicle speed/speedometer Warning lights (brake, ABS, tire pressure, etc.) Battery status Any critical safety alerts This is an extremely dangerous condition that prevents me from knowing essential driving information required to operate the vehicle safely. Federal Safety Violations: This defect clearly violates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) No. 101 and No. 102. Gear position indicators must be "permanently displayed in view of the driver" Critical safety information must be accessible to a properly seated and belted driver Instrument panels must provide essential vehicle status information Tesla's Pattern of Similar Recalls: Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for similar instrument cluster issues: 2023 Recall (NHTSA Campaign 23V-404): Tesla recalled 2012-2023 Model S and 2016-2024 Model X vehicles for incorrect instrument panel warning light font size, specifically stating that warning lights with smaller fonts "can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash." 2022 Recall (Multiple campaigns): Tesla recalled Model S and Model X vehicles for touchscreen failures affecting backup camera, window defroster/defogger, and instrument cluster displays.
Problem: Driver door fails to open The door actuator and latch will intermittently fail and the door will refuse to open. In the event of an accident the driver can fail to exit the vehicle possibly leading to death. An independent party/dealer has not produced the problem. No representative has looked at the problem. No warnings of failure appear.
There is a u joint problem that is reported in many model x vehicles especially in the 2016 models. The steering stiffens and make is very difficulty to maneuver .
While driving, the steering suddenly failed — the wheel spun freely with no response from the front wheels. This occurred at a stoplight shortly after exiting the freeway; had it happened minutes earlier at highway speed, it could have caused a serious crash. The vehicle was towed to a Tesla Service Center, which confirmed an under-torqued and stripped bolt on the intermediate steering shaft connecting to the steering rack. The steering column module, shaft, and rack were replaced. This was the second major steering incident in six months. In April, the same part had seized, making the steering extremely stiff. Tesla replaced the intermediate shaft then, but immediately after pickup, the car veered sharply left and triggered a traction control alert. Only after I returned did they perform an alignment and test drive. That means the first repair was released to me without a post-repair safety check. The October failure involved the same component, suggesting negligent workmanship or a recurring defect in the steering connection. Total loss of steering control represents a critical safety hazard that could lead to loss of life. I strongly believe this issue warrants an investigation and possible recall.
The steering is stiff and hard to turn this is the second time this has happened. It happened last year around this same time. I took to Tesla service in New Orleans for repair and they said they cleaned the bolts and reconnected the line. And now the car is experiencing the same issue
Reporting for our Insured: [XXX] . For additional information, please contact Kristen Huff at kristen.huff@countryfinancial.com, phone: 888-248-8973. Date of loss: [XXX] Location: Jesup, GA Our insured [XXX] was driving a 2016 Tesla Model X, and was stopped at a traffic light with traffic ahead. Our insured advised he had his foot firmly on the brake, and without warning the vehicle accelerated forward striking the vehicle in front of him. The occupants of the vehicle that was struck by the Tesla sustained injuries. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
In March of 2025, my steering of the model X became really stiff. As time went on, the problem became worse and no longer able to turn left or right without major force. I made an appointment with Tesla and took it in for servicing. At this time they changed the steering bolts and steering shaft April 23, 2025. This cost $489.70 (I will attach invoice). As soon as I picked up the vehicle my steering wheel was about 30% stuck to the right. I immediately sent a picture to tesla for them to conduct an alignment and fix the issue. They fixed the issue but around May 15th, I had a nail in my tire so I took my car in to fix it. At that time I find out that the tires on my car were exposed to the wire (I will add the picture of the tires). I replaced these tires on March 1st 2025 which is only 2 1/2 months since I replaced it. It was an indication that something is wrong so I make another appointment with Tesla to check it and get another alignment I dropped off car on June 3rd. Tesla tried to perform another alignment to find that they are not able to because the steering gear assembly needs to be replaced. I asked for clarification because I just fixed the steering components in April and they are now wanting $4900 for the steering gear assembly. As I was researching, I find that my model x was produced on May 2016 and there is a recall for Model x produced before Oct 2016 for the steering bolt and steering components if they are damaged. When I tell tesla that there is a recall they say that my vin is not associated with the recall. I am filing a complaint because my car is with in the period of vehicles produces in the recall. There is a huge safety issue if the steering bolt and steering gear assembly is malfunctioning. There were no warning lamps or messages to indicate this. This has put my family and other vehicles at risk and Tesla is aware of this problem but won't honor the recall or admit that the steering issue are all related.
The following is copied from: NHTSA ID Number: 11487520 Incident Date [XXX] Consumer Location SAN JOSE, CA On nine separate documented occasions, the passenger front wheel molding trim piece, in which one of the proximity sensors is mounted, completely detached, causing the proximity sensor to alarm continuously. On two of these nine occasions, the trim piece detached while the vehicle was traveling on the road, and on one of these two occasions, the vehicle was traveling on the highway at highway speeds. On this occasion, after detaching completely, the trim piece was observed through the rear view and side mirrors, shattering on the road and scattering debris across the highway, potentially causing a traffic hazard for the cars following. On this last occasion, the vehicle was also traveling with the assistance of the Adaptive Cruse Control and Forward Collision Warning features, which both caused the vehicle's emergency avoidance systems to activate when the proximity sensor was falsely triggered. If there were other vehicles nearby, this could have caused a high speed accident as my vehicle executed both an emergency braking and collision avoidance maneuver for no real reason. Please note that I have documented reports of the possible safety issues due to the wheel well trim detaching to the Tesla service department for several of the times I've had the vehicle in for repair. In all nine instances, I've been told that my vehicle is the only one that exhibits this problem. A statement I find difficult to believe as I have observed other vehicles of the same make and model driving around without the trim pieces, and just recently captured a photograph of a Model X driving on the highway with the trim piece detaching as the wind was catching it. See the red arrow in the photograph attached below. This report adds two additional photographs of the same issue that have been taken since the original report was filed.
Hi, several alerts have popped up, Regenerative braking unavailable, Park Assist unavailable, Automatic Emergency Braking is unavailable, Traction control disabled, Stability control disabled, ABS (anti-lock braking system) disabled. The odd thing is that the alerts come and go as they please. I can't figure out what it is. Could be software related. Possibly a software update has messed it up?
Sudden and catastrophic shearing of the driver side rear suspension arm (control arm). My understanding is all these cars from Tesla have aluminum suspension arms which causes identical and catastrophic failure of the vehicle during driving due to choice of Aluminum instead of stainless steel(SS). Aluminum has an ultimate tensile strength of only 90 MPa while SS can exceed 500 MPa. Since my car got disabled completely (motor gets disconnected from the wheel) I almost lost my life with vehicles coming at high speed from behind. I saw the same control arm failures with Tesla cars including S and 3 and X (like mine) all over the world. Here is an example of a very similar failure to mine on a model 3 in Norway : [XXX] The failure is so similar that even the wheel tilted inwards to the wheel bay just in my case due to the clean shearing of the aluminum bushing on the control arm. I would like to make sure these failures do not continue with Tesla and people's lives are not at risk and thus this report. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation based on forty-three complaints alleging failure of the left or right front suspension fore links in Tesla model year (MY) 2015 through 2017 Model S and MY 2016 through 2017 Model X vehicles. The investigation has identified 426 instances of failure on part number 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links.None of the instances resulted in any loss of vehicle control. One minor crash with no injuries is associated with the 426 instances fore link failures.A majority of the failures occurred between one to fifteen mph while parking in driveways or parking lots.In the eight instances where the vehicle was traveling more than 40 mph and the fore link failed, the vehicle remained controllable with no associated crash or injuries as a result. Tesla issued a consumer satisfaction bulletin (SB-17-31-001) on 10 February 2017, to replace the subject component on a sub-population of vehicles originally equipped with the subject fore links and built between 19 January 2016 and 25 May 2016.This sub population does not cover 75% instances of failures identified in this investigation. Additional damage to other vehicle components will occur if the vehicle is driven with this failed fore link.However no instance has shown that a failure of the fore link in this manner prevented the controllability of the vehicle in testing and reported failures. Based on this analysis,ODI is closing the investigation. ODI recommends that Tesla expand the terms of Bulletin SB-17-31-001 to cover all vehicles equipped with 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links. This does not constitute a finding by the Agency that a safety-related defect is not present; the Agency will take further action if warranted by additional information received. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On November 20, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Engineering Analysis (EA) 20-003 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-18 Tesla Model S and model year (MY) 2016-2018 Tesla Model X vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. During its investigation, ODI learned that the expected usage life rating for the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device is approximately 3,000 “P/E” or Program-Erase cycles, after which the eMMC NAND flash memory device would become fully consumed and no longer be operational, leading to a failure of the media control unit (MCU). At a daily cycle usage rate of 1.4 per block, accumulation of 3,000 P/E cycles would take only 5-6 years. Historically, the expected life of a vehicle generally far exceeds 5-6 years of service. ODI believes that a 5- or 6-year life expectancy for a component integral to providing the driver with safety functions is insufficient. During our review of the data, Tesla provided confirmation that all units will inevitably fail given the memory device’s finite storage capacity. Tesla provided its own statistical model showing the number of projected weekly MCU repairs from 2020 to 2028, estimating that replacement rates for MCU failures will peak in early 2022 and gradually decline until (near) full part turnover has been accomplished in 2028. According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardware will fail when reaching lifetime wear, for which the eMMC controller has no available memory blocks necessary to recover. With this failure mode, the only recovery available is a replacement of the eMMC device, achieved by physical part replacement of either the MCU assembly or visual control module subcomponent. Tesla provided information concerning the effects of MCU failure on vehicle function, which include in loss of rearview/backup camera and loss of HVAC (defogging and defrosting) setting controls (if the HVAC status was OFF status prior to failure). The failure also affects the Autopilot advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) and turn signal functionality due to the possible loss of audible chimes, driver sensing, and alerts associated with these vehicle functions. Based on this analysis, ODI issued a Recall Request Letter (RRL) on January 13, 2021. The RRL was based on ODI’s tentative conclusion that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists in the subject vehicles because the eMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles, after which the MCU fails due to memory wear-out, which constitutes a premature failure of safety-critical part. Tesla responded to the Recall Request Letter (RRL) on January 27, 2021, and disputed the tentative findings of the RRL. Nevertheless, on January 29, 2021, Tesla filed a safety recall (21V-035), recalling (MY) 2012-2018 Tesla Model S and (MY) 2016-2018 Model X vehicles with a center display equipped with a NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor and an 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. In this recall, Tesla is providing a free hardware remedy in addition to the over-the-air (“OTA”) firmware updates that the company had previously implemented. NHTSA will continue to monitor the issue as part of its ordinary processes for overseeing the effectiveness of recalls. However, based on available information, at this time, Tesla’s recall appears to address the unreasonable risk to motor safety presented by the premature failure of the component. Accordingly, the investigation is closed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On June 22, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE20-010 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-2015 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. EMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles. The subject MCU allegedly fails prematurely due to memory wear-out of the eMMC NAND flash. Tesla used the same MCU with the Tegra 3 processor in approximately 159 thousand 2012-2018 Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles built by Tesla through early-2018. In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) for PE20-010, Tesla provided ODI with 2,399 complaints and field reports, 7,777 warranty claims, and 4,746 non-warranty claims related to MCU replacements. The data show failure rates over 30 percent in certain build months and accelerating failure trends after 3 to 4 years-in-service.According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardware can fail when reaching lifetime wear, for which the eMMC controller has no available blocks to recover. With this failure mode, the only recovery available is a replacement of the eMMC device, achieved by physical part replacement of either the MCU assembly or visual control module subcomponent. Tesla provided the effects of MCU failure on vehicle function which result in loss of rearview/backup camera, loss of HVAC (defogging) setting controls (if the HVAC status was OFF status prior to failure.) There is also an impact on the advanced driver assistance support (ADAS) Autopilot system, and turn signal functionality due to the possible loss of audible chimes, driver sensing, and alerts associated with these vehicle functions. There are precedents for addressing defects that result in loss of either backup camera, defogging, or turn signal functions under safety recalls.Tesla has implemented certain Over-The-Air or OTA updates to subject vehicles to mitigate the effects of MCU failure. These updates include firmware changes to reduce memory usage of the subject memory card, improve eMMC error correction and storage management strategies, changing the control logic for turn signal activation, and defaulting the HVAC system to Auto (71.6F) for drives after MCU failure to address windshield defogging. Tesla indicated that the MCU failures are likely to continue to occur in subject vehicles as vehicles continue to operate and use available memory in the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory until 100% of units have failed. This investigation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-003). The VOQs associated with the upgrade of this investigation are identified in the attachment to this resume.
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of SUA in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the Agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints ODI added to its evaluation can be viewed at NHTSA.gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by ODI are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the Federal Register.
In a letter dated September 17, 2019, Mr. Edward Chen petitioned the NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation of certain Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates from Tesla, beginning in May 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and OTA software updates Tesla made to the Battery Management System (BMS) of certain Tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On October 1, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP19-005 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. Information provided by Tesla in response to ODI's information request letter for DP19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain MY 2012 through 2016 Model S vehicles (subject vehicles). The voltage limiting firmware is a dynamic algorithm that is enabled in vehicles with high Supercharging use histories, which contributes to high usage stress to the high-voltage (HV) battery. Tesla sold approximately 61,781 subject vehicles in the United States and, through August 2021, the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in approximately 2,062 vehicles. Through December 2020, ODI identified 59 complaints from consumers alleging reductions in battery capacity (52) or charging speed (7) in the subject vehicles. Log data from these vehicles showed that the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in about 58 percent (30 of 52) of the complaints alleging range loss. Subsequent updates have restored some or all of the battery capacity to vehicles affected by the voltage limiting firmware coupled with updates enhancing BMS battery brick monitoring algorithms. None of the complaint vehicles have reported any thermal incidents or other safety hazards related to the HV battery.The five non-crash fires referenced in the petition include two fires that occurred in China in early 2019 involving vehicles that: 1) had recently completed Supercharging sessions; 2) were at a high state-of-charge (SOC) of the HV battery; 3) were parked with the battery cooling system shutoff; and 4) had histories of high-stress usage for the HV batteries. The three fires that occurred outside China did not involve the same fact patterns regarding vehicle state and charging history. The two fires that occurred in the United States include one involving a vehicle with no Supercharging history that was driving when the fire occurred and another in which the origin of the fire was external to the HV battery. The fifth fire, which also originated external to the HV battery, involved a vehicle in Germany that had been parked at a low SOC for an extended period. To date, incidents of fires involving parked vehicles with recent Supercharging and histories of high-stress use have only been observed in China, where high-stress use factors appear to be more common. NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the absence of any incidents in the United States related to fast charging, and the absence of any such incidents globally since May 2019, it is unlikely that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect would be issued due to any investigation opened as a result of granting this petition. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition, and the potential risks to safety, th
On May 7, 2016, a 2015 Tesla Model S collided with a tractor trailer crossing an uncontrolled intersection on a highway west of Williston, Florida, resulting in fatal injuries to the Tesla driver.Data obtained from the Model S indicated that:1) the Tesla was being operated in Autopilot mode at the time of the collision; 2) the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system did not provide any warning or automated braking for the collision event; and 3) the driver took no braking, steering or other actions to avoid the collision.On June 28, 2016, NHTSA opened PE16-007 to ?examine the design and performance of any automated driving systems in use at the time of the crash.?The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) analyzed the following subjects as part of NHTSA?s examination of the design and performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system:1) Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system design and performance in the subject Tesla and peer vehicles; 2) human-machine interface issues related to Autopilot operating mode; 3) data from crash incidents related to Tesla?s Autopilot and AEB systems; and 4) changes Tesla has implemented in the Autopilot and AEB systems.NHTSA?s examination did not identify any defects in the design or performance of the AEB or Autopilotsystems of the subject vehicles nor any incidents in which the systems did not perform as designed.AEB systems used in the automotive industry through MY 2016 are rear-end collision avoidance technologies that are not designed to reliably perform in all crash modes, including crossing path collisions.The Autopilot system is an Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) that requires the continual and full attention of the driver to monitor the traffic environment and be prepared to take action to avoid crashes.Tesla's design included a hands-on the steering wheel system for monitoring driver engagement.That system has been updated to further reinforce the need for driver engagement through a strike out strategy.Drivers that do not respond to visual cues in the driver monitoring system alerts may strike out and lose Autopilot function for the remainder of the drive cycle.A safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time and further examination of this issue does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, this investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists.The agency will monitor the issue and reserves the right to take future action if warranted by the circumstances.For more information about the analysis, see the attached report.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
Bars are owner complaints, dots mark years with recalls. Select a year to open its report.