2019 Tesla Model X
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model X › 2019
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2019 Tesla Model X. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
8 recalls name the 2019 Tesla Model X. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 Model S and Model X vehicles. The electronic power assist steering (EPAS) system may experience a loss of power steering assist when driving on rough roads or after hitting a pothole.
A loss of power steering assist can require greater steering effort, especially at low speeds, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update to recalibrate the EPAS system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 31, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-014.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2019 Model S, Model X, and 2017-2020 Model 3 vehicles equipped with Autopilot Computer 2.5 and operating certain firmware releases. The rearview image may not immediately display when the vehicle begins to reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
A delayed rearview camera image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed May 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 Model S, Model 3, Model X, and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles operating software version 2021.36.5.2. A communication error may cause false forward-collision warning (FCW) or unexpected activation of the automatic emergency brake (AEB) system.
Unexpected activation of the AEB system may cause the car to stop suddenly, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. The recall began October 25, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-00-004.
My 2019 Tesla Model X Performance (HW3, Full Self-Driving purchased outright) has experienced repeated, intermittent critical failures of Autopilot/FSD while driving at highway speeds above 60 mph. On multiple occasions, FSD abruptly displayed a RED immediate-takeover warning and disengaged while actively steering, including during curves and lane changes. Immediate driver intervention was required to maintain control. Some incidents involved unexpected acceleration immediately before disengagement. At other times, Autopilot, FSD, and cruise control become unavailable, displaying “Cruise control unavailable.” The problem sometimes disappears without repair. During an active failure, Tesla Service Mode showed Primary Autopilot ECU (A): CRITICAL; Secondary ECU (B): NOMINAL; and Driver Assistance Features: UNAVAILABLE. Recorded fault codes included APS_w135_appCritical, PM_w041_dasMIA, APP_w009_aebFault, and APP_w184_fisheyeCameraStreamExit. Camera previews were unavailable. Tesla Plano Lexington inspected the vehicle in October 2026 at approximately 85,413 miles. Technician logs showed fisheye camera deserializer alerts. Tesla recommended replacing the forward-facing triple camera and coaxial harness but confirmed in writing that the Autopilot ECU has not been proven defective, the cause remains uncertain, and proposed repairs may not resolve the issue. On October 19, 2026, Tesla’s DFW Service Manager also confirmed in writing that these camera/communication faults may impair Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB), Forward Collision Warning (FCW), and other collision avoidance features. Tesla could not confirm these safety systems were unaffected. No crash or injury has occurred. Tesla advised against using FSD/Autopilot until repaired. The malfunction remains unresolved. I request NHTSA investigate the risk of sudden driver-assistance disengagements and potentially unavailable collision avoidance systems.
In 2020 my Tesla started throwing a strange fault. Front Passenger Safety Restraint System Issue. The seat would be empty and sometimes the vehicle threw warnings that seatbelt was unbuckled like someone was sitting in the seat. I reported the problem to Tesla and they sent home service in 2020 and supposedly reconnected a cable. The issue has now returned. When I had my vehicle serviced last week they denied warranty to repair the issue even though I reported it back in 2020 and they failed to fix it. They said the sensor has to be replaced, but they can't replace the sensor and have to replace the entire seat just to fix the sensor. And since they refused warranty, I can't afford to replace an entire seat like that.
My 2019 Tesla Model X has Full Self Driving (FSD) software version 12.6.4, which is the latest version provided by Tesla for my vehicle. While driving with FSD engaged, the car became confused by the yellow centerline road markings and possibly lines of black tar road repair and swerved across the centerline and into oncoming traffic. I had to take manual control over from the FSD software to swerve the car back into my lane to avoid oncoming traffic. It is clear that this FSD software version is faulty and not capable of promised autonomy. There are newer versions of the Full Self Driving software that Tesla is providing to newer Tesla vehicles but not to my older Tesla with AI Hardware 3. I believe the NHTSA needs to investigate Tesla's faulty FSD software.
The contact owns a 2019 Tesla Model X. The contact stated that the passenger’s side rear falcon wing door closed unexpectedly. The door sensor failed to sense the contact’s [XXX] daughter’s leg. The contact’s [XXX] daughter’s leg was fractured. The dealer was contacted, and after having the vehicle inspected, no cause for the failure was found. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The manufacturer was informed of the failure. The contact was informed that an Incident Report would be available within 30 days, but received no additional information from the manufacturer. The failure mileage was approximately 113,000. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Vehicle: 2019 Tesla Model X VIN: [XXX] My horn stopped working, and Tesla Service diagnosed the issue as a “known issue” with the driver airbag module, stating the entire airbag assembly must be replaced. They quoted me several thousand dollars for the repair. A horn failure caused by the airbag assembly is a safety defect, and Tesla has an active NHTSA recall (25V‑172) for Model X vehicles with incorrect driver airbag/horn pad assemblies that cause the horn to stop working. My vehicle is experiencing the same failure mode, but Tesla says my VIN is not included in the recall. Since Tesla acknowledges this as a “known issue” involving a safety‑critical component (airbag and horn), I am reporting this so NHTSA can investigate whether the existing recall should be expanded to include earlier Model X vehicles like mine. The horn is a required safety device, and failure due to an airbag defect presents an unreasonable safety risk. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
On March 6, 2026, at 7:15 PM, the rear lower control arm on my 2019 Tesla Model X Raven catastrophically failed while traveling at 55 mph. The suspension component snapped without warning or impact, causing an immediate and dangerous loss of vehicle stability with my children inside. I was forced to perform an emergency stop on the narrow shoulder of US-395, an unlit one-lane highway with a 65-mph speed limit. Because the vehicle was disabled in a remote, dark area, my family was stranded in a hazardous high-speed traffic zone until 10:30 PM waiting for a tow. This failure matches the casting fracture defect described in Tesla Service Bulletin SB-25-31-002. I am reporting this as a severe safety defect that placed my family in a life-threatening situation. There were no warning lights to advise of the failure. Incident details: Mileage at Failure: 76,980 miles Date/Time: March 6, 2026, at approximately 7:15 PM Speed at Failure: 55 mph (Speed Limit: 65 mph) Emergency Pull-over: Yes
I have replaced several sets of tires with this Tesla Model X 2019. After years of dealing with a front end alignment problem, I finally had the repair done with some assistance from Tesla. When I purchased my vehicle under warranty, I reported problems with steering and pulling to one side, but they repeatedly claimed they couldn't replicate. This was before they allowed customers to drive with the repaid team. I mention the front-end problems as that has coupled with the rear tires. Inner wear is a consistent problem. I went to Costco today to have them look at tires I bought in November of 2024 and they said the tire was balding and unrepairable. In fact the tires were showing wear on both sides and needed to be replaced. A full set costs $1400.00+ and this is the second time I'm having to replace tires for wearing out quickly. There's a fix online from a company "N2itive". On their website they state, "The N2ITIVE SX-2 adjustable rear camber arms are designed to address the common inner tire wear issues that plague the Tesla Model S and X. These arms are available in the Red and Natural Anodized finishes with a 3-Year Warranty or the Black Anodized finish with Lifetime Warranty and work best when used in conjunction with our TSX-2 Toe Arms." External companies are standing up lines of business based on Tesla's failures. This is a problem and someone is going to get hurt, or worse.
The contact owns a 2019 Tesla Model X. The contact stated that a stress crack had developed in the windshield near the forward-facing ADAS camera and sensor. The dealer inspected the vehicle and confirmed there was no sign of an impact to the windshield to cause the stress crack. The vehicle was taken to a dealer and the failure was confirmed. The vehicle was not repaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure. The failure mileage was 26,000.
Vehicle: 2019 Tesla Model X VIN: [XXX] Component: Suspension/Steering/Drivetrain Defect Description: Three concurrent Technical Service Bulletin failures: 1. TSB SB-21-39-001: Front drive unit halfshafts premature failure (manufacturing defect, pre-May 2019 builds) 2. TSB SB-20-32-004: Steering intermediate shaft corrosion due to inadequate road contaminant protection (design defect) 3. Ball joint/control arm water ingress from inadequate sealing (design defect) All three TSBs failing simultaneously at 177K miles. Vehicle purchased April 2019, within affected population for all TSBs. Tesla issued technical bulletins acknowledging these as defects but requires customers to pay full repair cost ($6,337). Local service management admitted not reading TSBs when reviewing goodwill request. After escalation, received 32% cost-sharing. Three concurrent TSB failures suggest systemic design/manufacturing issues warranting recall consideration. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The front passenger seat sensor failed. Without the sensor properly detecting weight, the airbag will deploy no matter the weight of the front seat passenger. Tesla has fixed the sensor placement in newer models as the service tech told us this is a common issue in later models where the only fix is to pay over $5k to replace the entire seat otherwise the airbag will go off no matter what.
After charging, the car threw over 16 error codes and would not drive. Tesla advised the car experienced a High Voltage battery failure. Some the error codes experienced were: GTW_w370 Battery charge level too low Charge now - Vehicle may not wake from sleep BMS_w017 Service is required PULL OVER SAFELY DI_u014 Unable to drive Voltage supply too low MORGANVILLE GTW_W157 Power reduced Vehicle systems shutting down BMS_f017 Service is required PULL OVER SAFELY TAS_a218 Air suspension adjustment unavailable Functionality may be restored on next drive BMS_u018 Maximum battery charge level reduced OK to drive - Schedule service BMS_u008 Acceleration and top speed reduced Performance may be restored on next drive BMS_W107 Vehicle may not restart Service is required BMS_f107
I own a 2019 Model X which I have been driving for six years without any driving issues. I did have a few incidents in which the screen went black while driving. That was scary - driving without controls. These issues reported to Tesla and were addressed by Tesla. Today I was pulling into a parking lot when all of a sudden my Tesla automatically accelerated to high speed. I could not control or stop the vehicle despite applying hard brakes. The car crashed through a metal fence and continued to accelerate through the wall of a building. The only reason it finally stopped was because the back tires got stuck on the ledge of the wall. The Tesla went through the metal gates and walls of the building, but the safety airbag never deployed. The car has been towed away and reported to the insurance immediately after the police report. There was no warning messages or indication prior to the incident.
The contact owns a 2019 Tesla Model X. The contact stated that the Full Self-Driving system was updated in June 2025. Since the update, while idling at red traffic lights, the vehicle was surging forward as if it were trying to run the red light. The contact had to immediately depress the brake pedal to prevent the vehicle from accelerating unintendedly. While attempting to make a right lane change, the vehicle suddenly seize mid-lane-change and returned the vehicle to the original lane. The contact made 2 to 3 attempts before being able to make the lane change successfully. The vehicle also independently attempted to make the lane change as if self-correcting the vehicle. The failure was intermittent. The vehicle was taken to the dealer, and the vehicle suddenly ran a red-light while being test driven. The contact stated that the dealer expressed that it was a known issue after the software update was completed. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The vehicle was taken to another dealer, Tesla (1731 Fourth St, Berkeley, CA 94710); who was unable to diagnose or repair the vehicle. The manufacturer was made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 5,000.
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) – Safety Incident Report: While using the vehicle’s ‘Summon’ feature, the car failed to stop when I released the control button. It continued forward, drove up and over a large curb, struck a signpost, and came to rest with one tire elevated on the curb/grass and the other three tires on the pavement. This “jumping curbs” behavior and collision with fixed objects represents a serious safety hazard. I am extremely grateful that no person was nearby or inside the vehicle at the time, as this failure could have resulted in injury or death. The incident is documented on video. The vehicle is currently pending inspection. Despite my request, Tesla has not responded or addressed the issue, leaving the defect unmitigated. At no point did the vehicle display any warning lights or messages indicating a malfunction before or after the incident. Given the nature of this failure, its potential to cause harm, and the lack of response from the manufacturer, I am submitting this report to alert federal safety authorities and initiate appropriate investigation into the safety of the ‘Summon’ feature and the vehicle’s ADAS systems.
I own a 2019 Tesla Model X. After Tesla upgraded my vehicle from AP2.5 to the FSD hardware module, the front camera view became blurry. I disassembled the camera housing and found that a heated line in the windshield, intended to prevent fog or ice buildup in front of the camera, runs directly through the camera’s field of view. This line now causes noticeable image distortion, which interferes with safety-critical features such as FSD, forward collision warning, and lane keeping assistance. The Tesla service supervisor confirmed this is not my fault. He explained the issue may have been caused by heat from the line gradually affecting the glass, or that the upgraded FSD hardware, which captures clearer images, is now revealing a flaw that was previously less visible. He also mentioned that Tesla redesigned this component in newer Model X vehicles to prevent this issue. However, because my car is out of warranty, they are refusing to replace the windshield. Since the FSD upgrade, I have experienced multiple warning messages while using FSD. On one occasion, while driving on the freeway, the system suddenly disengaged and displayed a message saying the camera had weak visualization and the driver must take over. I believe this is a serious safety issue related to the blurry front camera caused by the heated line in the windshield. Although Tesla acknowledges the problem and that it is not due to misuse, they have declined to offer any resolution. I am now unable to safely use the FSD system I paid over one thousand dollars to install, and Tesla has taken no responsibility. I believe this issue poses a risk to driver and public safety and should be investigated regardless of warranty status.
While driving normally at around 30mph and without warning, the vehicle displayed multiple warning messages related to the HV Battery and lost all motive power in the middle of the road with insufficient time to pull over, creating a safety hazard. Upon inspection by a mechanic independent of Tesla, the HV Battery was found to have multiple voltage sense leads disconnected from the flexible PCB pads that lead to the BMB for each module. One of the 96 bricks had all four sense leads disconnected, resulting in the loss of motive power due to the inability for the BMS to accurately measure the voltage of that brick. In fact, the vehicle displayed module over voltage and under voltage alerts due to this open/high resistance sense harness connection. Out of all 96 bricks, 13 bricks had at least one loose sense lead, and one brick (besides the affected brick) had 3 out of 4 sense leads loose/disconnected from the PCB pad. Any loose leads were only at the PCB pad end, not at the current collector end. These sense leads are ultrasonically welded through the same attachment process as the cells, but the connections to the flex PCB pad are clearly not as robust as the other connections or are exposed to higher vibration over time due to relative motion of the flex. The flex PCB design was introduced in 2015, just before the Gen 2 HV Battery, and in production until the 2021 refresh. The HV Battery did not ever have any visible liquid ingress or physical damage. It is my understanding through various forums such as Tesla Motors Club that this is an increasingly common issue, and that Tesla is experiencing a high rate of this open voltage sense harness issue at their service centers for vehicles that have not been in any prior accidents or incidents (forums generally only have salvage vehicles that are out of warranty). Errors typically are: BMS_f107_SW_Cell_Voltage_Sensor BMS_f177_OpenVshDetected BMS_w129_SW_BMB_VSH_Connector Or their variants (a129, w177, etc.)
I got my suspension replaced on my 2019 Model X (that I bought used from Tesla directly) in June 2023. Tesla was suppose to do a through 140 point inspection before putting the car for sale on their website but after less than 2 years and 15000 miles (after the suspension was replaced). The same suspension same issue came up. Tesla told me that they need to replace the suspension again and will bill me $2100. I have owned multiple cars but I have not have to replace suspension on any of my cars ever. How can a suspension fail first at 35000 miles and then again 15000 miles. This seems like Tesla is knowingly putting faulty parts in the car to keep making money on parts and labor. This should be looked into and investigated by National Highway Safety. And Tesla should issue a recall for these and replace them with good quality parts.
I plugged in a tester into the 7 pin trailer harness that is factory installed and the harness does not work. Specifically, there is no 12V power coming from the harness. I googled the issue and it is very common on 2018 and 2019 Tesla Model X’s, and people say when they went to the dealer they said that the factory wired it incorrectly but that it was a simple fix. I went to my dealer and they wanted to charge me money to fix this issue that has been present but unnoticeable on my vehicle until recently. Not having 12V power to the harness is vary dangerous because if towing a trailer with electric brakes, they will not work, and there is no way to tell this except for using a tester at the harness.
To Whom It May Concern, I am writing to you to emphasize and provide additional details regarding the critical safety issue concerning the Tesla Model X vehicles. My personal experience underscores the severity of this problem: I have had to replace over 8 tires in 3 years due to accelerated inner wall wear. This specific wear pattern is a direct result of improper camber alignment, an issue that Tesla has continuously refused to rectify. This problem is not isolated to my vehicle alone. A growing number of Tesla Model X and Model S owners have reported similar experiences, indicating a widespread and systemic issue. The accelerated inner wall tire wear poses significant safety risks, as it can lead to unexpected and dangerous tire failures on the road, which has happened to me. Very dangerous. Despite the clear evidence and numerous complaints from Tesla owners, Tesla has consistently declined to address this issue adequately. It appears that the company’s reluctance is rooted in the fact that proper repair or recall to fix the camber alignment is not cost-effective from their perspective. However, this cost-cutting measure is putting drivers and passengers at risk. Given the scale and gravity of this issue, I urge the National Highway Safety Institute to take immediate action. It is essential to investigate these recurring problems with both the Tesla Model X and Model S models. The safety of Tesla drivers, passengers, and the general public is at stake, and a thorough investigation could compel Tesla to take the necessary corrective actions. Thank you for your attention to this urgent safety matter. I trust that the National Highway Safety Institute will act promptly to ensure automotive safety and hold manufacturers accountable for their vehicles’ reliability and safety. There have been 4 incidents of this happening with my car. Just putting one date below.
There was a recall on these cars (22V-818) and manufacture said a software update would solve the issue. But the actual issue is the I-shaft, which is not sealed on those cars. Now the manufacture is replacing the I- shaft, with the same issues which they said that was corrected with a software update, by charging customers thousands of dollars with sealed ones. All those cars having the issue which I am facing now. I have escaped a crash narrowly and it is dangerous.
While using Actually Smart Summon to get my Tesla model X out of a parking spot it turned into the car next to mine and proceeded to try exit the space while scraping the doors of the Tesla and bumper of the BMW M5 next to me. Even though I was watching the car I couldn’t stop the crash from happening in time. There was a near miss with another person getting into the car adjacent to the vehicle my car collided with which could have caused serious injury. I also have video of the whole event but can’t upload more than 10MB files, please reach out if you want the video.
To Whom It May Concern, Service bulletin SB-21-39-001 [XXX] ) was issued for the front half shaft repair for model X, S. In my case, the repair work was done but did not address the issue. They only replaced the parts, and after two years the problem still occurs: vibrations at accelerations, etc. I had to pay over $2000 for the same work, which will probably not address the issue in the permanent matter. Tesla, especially, Model Xs has issues with front half shafts, and I want to encourage NHTSA to look into this bulletin and mandate Telsa to repair the vehicle with a more permanent solution and provide reasonable repair costs in doing so. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The suspension is making loud clicking noises when turning or accelerating. The suspension system seems to have an inbuilt design flaw as many people are reporting the issue online.
While I was driving, I got an error on my dashboard that "acceleration and top speed reduced. performance may be restored on next drive". After I got this error, from onwards the car was not slowing down even though I remove my foot from accelerator and sometimes it is accelerating itself even though I was not on cruise control or auto pilot. Luckly brakes were working when it was causing sudden unintended acceleration. After I stopped my car at safe location it did not start, and it got towed to Tesla dealer. My concern is that I felt it is most dangerous and it can cause life threating accident. Could you please take necessary action on this incident which causing sudden unintended acceleration. Thank you, [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Two separate safety issues. The horn and drivers airbag are not functional. Also, the vehicle stops steering when driving at times. According to Tesla, The airbag assembly needs to be replaced at $1200 as well as the steering rack needs to be replaced at $5300. The vehicle is available for inspection. I have had several safety incidences. A couple where I needed to honk my horn and was not able to honk. As well as the steering going out and not being able to continue driving. The problem has been reproduced by the dealership. No one, besides Tesla has inspected the vehicle. There were no warning lamps for the horn and airbag. The steering warnings were steering assist reduced and steering may require increased effort while stuck in the middle of a lane or almost striking another vehicle. I figured out you could reset it by getting out of the vehicle with the key and walking away and coming back. I had to get out in the middle of the road and reset the vehicle by walking away and walking back to it. This has happened several times since I purchased the vehicle nine months ago.
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of SUA in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the Agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints ODI added to its evaluation can be viewed at NHTSA.gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by ODI are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the Federal Register.
In a letter dated September 17, 2019, Mr. Edward Chen petitioned the NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation of certain Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates from Tesla, beginning in May 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and OTA software updates Tesla made to the Battery Management System (BMS) of certain Tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On October 1, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP19-005 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. Information provided by Tesla in response to ODI's information request letter for DP19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain MY 2012 through 2016 Model S vehicles (subject vehicles). The voltage limiting firmware is a dynamic algorithm that is enabled in vehicles with high Supercharging use histories, which contributes to high usage stress to the high-voltage (HV) battery. Tesla sold approximately 61,781 subject vehicles in the United States and, through August 2021, the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in approximately 2,062 vehicles. Through December 2020, ODI identified 59 complaints from consumers alleging reductions in battery capacity (52) or charging speed (7) in the subject vehicles. Log data from these vehicles showed that the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in about 58 percent (30 of 52) of the complaints alleging range loss. Subsequent updates have restored some or all of the battery capacity to vehicles affected by the voltage limiting firmware coupled with updates enhancing BMS battery brick monitoring algorithms. None of the complaint vehicles have reported any thermal incidents or other safety hazards related to the HV battery.The five non-crash fires referenced in the petition include two fires that occurred in China in early 2019 involving vehicles that: 1) had recently completed Supercharging sessions; 2) were at a high state-of-charge (SOC) of the HV battery; 3) were parked with the battery cooling system shutoff; and 4) had histories of high-stress usage for the HV batteries. The three fires that occurred outside China did not involve the same fact patterns regarding vehicle state and charging history. The two fires that occurred in the United States include one involving a vehicle with no Supercharging history that was driving when the fire occurred and another in which the origin of the fire was external to the HV battery. The fifth fire, which also originated external to the HV battery, involved a vehicle in Germany that had been parked at a low SOC for an extended period. To date, incidents of fires involving parked vehicles with recent Supercharging and histories of high-stress use have only been observed in China, where high-stress use factors appear to be more common. NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the absence of any incidents in the United States related to fast charging, and the absence of any such incidents globally since May 2019, it is unlikely that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect would be issued due to any investigation opened as a result of granting this petition. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition, and the potential risks to safety, th
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