2020 Tesla Model Y
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model Y › 2020
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2020 Tesla Model Y. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
24 recalls name the 2020 Tesla Model Y. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2023 Model 3 and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. The headlight low beams may be too bright and exceed the maximum light output. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment."
Headlight low beams that are too bright can reduce visibility for oncoming drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will replace the headlights, free of charge. Interim owner notification letters explaining the safety risk were be mailed October 3, 2026. Another notice will be sent once the repair becomes available. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-17-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017, 2021-2023 Model 3, 2020-2023 Model Y, 2021-2023 Model S, and Model X vehicles operating software version 2026.8.6. The rearview camera image may be delayed when the vehicle is placed in reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 111…
A delayed rearview image reduces the driver's view behind the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 3, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2024 Model Y vehicles. The hood latch assembly may fail to detect an unlatched hood condition after the hood has been opened.
An unlatched hood can fully open, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 24, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-012.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 Model S, 2020-2021 Model X, 2018-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A factory reset muted the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 141, "Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 27, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2023 Model 3 and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. One or both taillights may intermittently fail to illuminate.
A taillight that fails to illuminate may reduce the visibility of the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed January 14, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-016.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3, 2020-2022 Model Y, and 2021-2022 Model S and Model X vehicles. The window automatic reversal system may not react correctly after detecting an obstruction. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 118, "Power-Operated Window…
A closing window may exert excessive force by pinching a driver or passenger before retracting, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update of the automatic window reversal system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 31, 2032. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-013.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model Y, Model X, Model S, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, including Summon and Smart Summon, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 6, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall supersedes recall 22V-063. Vehicles configured with Summon or Smart Summon and already remedied under 22V-063 will need to have the new remedy software installed.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model S, Model X, Model Y, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed April 5, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall has been superseded by Recall 22V-235. Tesla's number for the new recall is SB-22-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A software error may cause a valve in the heat pump to open unintentionally and trap the refrigerant inside the evaporator, resulting in decreased defrosting performance. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal…
Decreased defrosting performance may reduce the driver's visibility, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-18-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The audible chime may not activate when the vehicle starts and the driver has not buckled their seat belt. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208, "Occupant…
The driver may be unaware that their seat belt is not fastened, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The front and rear suspension knuckles may fracture, causing the suspension links to separate.
Suspension links that separate can reduce vehicle stability and control, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and replace the knuckles as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed January 18, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-31-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 Model S, Model 3, Model X, and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles operating software version 2021.36.5.2. A communication error may cause false forward-collision warning (FCW) or unexpected activation of the automatic emergency brake (AEB) system.
Unexpected activation of the AEB system may cause the car to stop suddenly, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. The recall began October 25, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2021 Model Y and 2019-2021 Model 3 vehicles. The front suspension lateral link fasteners may loosen, allowing the lateral link to separate from the sub-frame.
A lateral link separation could shift the wheel alignment, causing instability and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will tighten or replace the lateral link fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-31-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2019-2021 Model 3 and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles. The brake caliper bolts may be loose, allowing the brake caliper to separate and contact the wheel rim.
Contact with the rim may cause a loss of tire pressure, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and tighten, or replace the caliper bolts as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-33-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2019-2021 Model Y vehicles. One or both fasteners that secure the left and right second row seat belt retractors may not be properly attached.
Improperly attached fasteners may prevent the seat belt retention system from performing as designed, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and replace both fasteners if necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-20-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2020 Model 3 and 2019-2021 Model Y vehicles. One or both fasteners that secure the front seat shoulder belt to the b-pillar may not be properly attached.
An improperly attached fastener may prevent the seat belt system from performing as designed, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and repair both fasteners if necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-20-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020 Model Y vehicles. The bolts connecting the front upper control arm and steering knuckle may have not been properly tightened, allowing the upper control arm to detach from the steering knuckle.
A detached upper control arm can cause the wheels to lean in or out, decreasing the driver's ability to steer and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and dealers will inspect, and as necessary, tighten the bolts, free of charge. The recall began January 15, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-20-31-012.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020 Model Y vehicles equipped with a global rear lamp and tow package configuration. A software error prevents the illumination of trailer brake lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated…
Trailer brake lights that fail to illuminate during braking increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and has released the firmware update over-the-air (OTA) to vehicles as of September 23, 2020. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-20-00-002.
I was driving a 2020 Tesla Model Y with Full Self-Driving (FSD) engaged when another vehicle unexpectedly turned into my path, resulting in a heavy initial collision. However, the most critical safety failures occurred immediately after this first impact: FSD Failure to Disengage: Despite the severe physical impact of the collision, the Tesla FSD system completely failed to detect the crash or automatically disengage. It did not apply the brakes. Instead, the system continued to actively propel the vehicle forward for approximately 5 to 10 meters, steering it directly into a concrete traffic median and causing a severe secondary collision. -Airbag Non-Deployment: Despite enduring two distinct physical impacts—the initial crash and the secondary median collision which resulted in a broken axle—none of the airbags deployed to protect the cabin. -The vehicle was rendered a total loss. It has been inspected by the responding police officer (who cited the other driver for the initial crash) and my insurance company's total loss adjusters. There were no warning lamps or messages prior to the failure. A driver assistance system that continues to independently drive a vehicle after a structural crash, coupled with a complete failure of airbag deployment, poses a severe risk of further injury or fatalities to the occupants and the public. Tesla Customer Service has opened an internal investigation , but I am filing this report directly with NHTSA because a driver assistance system that continues to independently drive a vehicle after a structural crash, coupled with a complete failure of passive safety deployment, represents a catastrophic safety defect. I urge NHTSA to investigate Tesla’s FSD post-collision disengagement protocols and airbag sensor reliability to prevent future fatalities. Sincerely, [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The front suspension bushing has torn prematurely at only 31099 miles. There is no history of external impact, accident, or modifications to the suspension assembly. This vehicle displays the exact premature structural breakdown targeted by the active NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation case number PE26006. It was found out during Tesla service inspection to replace 12 V battery.Tesla Service declined to offer a goodwill repair due to calendar age (6 years), forcing an out-of-pocket replacement. The mechanical part failed silently without triggering any electronic dashboard alerts or system warnings to notify the driver of the safety risk."
The vehicle is experiencing an active, recurring safety hazard caused by a manufacturer software bug that triggers unprovoked alignment parameter and steering angle plausibility resets. This defect directly compromises the vehicle’s primary handling characteristics and stability control systems. This specific firmware vulnerability is officially documented and acknowledged by the manufacturer under Tesla Internal Toolbox Article 8368100. The unprovoked resetting of steering and alignment parameters degrades the vehicle's driving stability, alters steering feedback, and can cause sudden, unexpected disengagements of advanced driver-assistance systems (Autopilot/FSD). This sudden loss of driver assist functionality and changes to steering plausibility while operating at highway speeds pose a severe, immediate risk of a crash or loss of vehicle control. Tesla's standard remedy for this defect is a newer firmware deployment (branch .32 or later). However, due to a severe firmware gap, the vehicle's automated Over-The-Air (OTA) download architecture is corrupted, consistently freezing and failing mid-stream at precise milestones (50%, 67%, and 83%). While non-critical data packets (such as Map and Navigation updates) download successfully, the core safety-critical OS update cannot be processed over the air. Tesla Service has been formally notified of the active safety hazard and the corresponding internal technical article (Toolbox Article 8368100). Because the vehicle's automated OTA path is blocked by a software-induced cache loop, a physical, local hardware tether via Tesla Toolbox is required to bypass the download block. Tesla Service has refused to perform this critical safety patch or tether the vehicle unless the consumer pays an out-of-pocket, mandatory "formal diagnostic fee." Forcing a consumer to pay a fee to resolve a documented, manufacturer-created code defect that compromises steering safety constitutes a failure to remediate a known safety hazard.
The full self driving feature on highways serves within the lane, getting close from line to line similar to how an impaired driver would drive
Critical FSD Lane Change - 2020 Tesla Model Y Software 2026.26.6.5 and FSD v14.1 Lite changed lanes suddenly and violently at freeway speed while entering an express lane with flexible lane delineators between the express lanes and the freeway. The automation made the lane change at the very last second, narrowly avoiding impact with the plastic posts, and swerving back into the left-most freeway lane. The action of the FSD could have caused a loss of control of the vehicle as it compensated for the weight shift caused by suddenly swerving. There was space between the Tesla and other vehicles at the time but this could have been catastrophic with only slight changes to the road condition etc... Reported to Tesla FSD Beta team. No known failures, warning lights or other issues with the car.
2020 Model Y developed a parking-brake/braking system failure. Vehicle displayed "Steering & Braking - Parking brake functions degraded/parking brake may not apply or release." This resulted in the vehicle being unable to drive for extended periods of time. Tesla diagnosed a rear-right brake caliper failure and quoted approximately $886. Tesla acknowledged the condition is not normal wear and tear but declined coverage because the vehicle is outside of warranty and there is no open recall. I am concerned about premature failure of a safety-critical brake/parking-brake component.
Loud intermittent clicking in rear and front wheel at slow speeds driver side. Likely faulty spline. It's been on going for the past three years.
On June 17, 2026, I experienced a severe and life-threatening entrapment inside my 2020 Tesla Model Y. The incident occurred immediately after I finished charging the vehicle for approximately two hours at a charging station under direct sunlight, which left the car extremely hot. After charging, I drove a short distance, parked, and left the vehicle for approximately 20 minutes. Upon my return, my card key failed to unlock the vehicle. After contacting my wife for assistance, I was briefly able to open the door, but I became securely locked inside the cabin as soon as the door closed. The 12V battery had completely failed without any advanced warning or vehicle alarm. All power was lost. The windows were fully rolled up, the climate control stopped, and there was no airflow. The cabin temperature was rapidly rising due to the earlier sun exposure. In a state of panic and facing a dangerously overheating cabin, I called my wife to inform her that I needed to break a window. I struck the windshield to draw the attention of passersby, which cracked the glass but did not shatter it. I then attempted to force a side window outward to establish ventilation and crawled into the back seat to try to open the trunk, but all electronic and external release mechanisms were unresponsive. After regaining composure, I used my phone to look up emergency solutions online and ultimately located the manual mechanical door release. I was able to escape.
We had a terrifying moment today. Low-voltage battery died instantly, leaving the driver locked inside a completely blacked-out car. No electronic door response, phone app & keycards completely frozen. Luckily, we got out safely after calling Roadside Assistance, but this is a serious hazard: No advance warning: The car gave zero indication the low-voltage battery was dying. Counter-intuitive exit: In a panic, 99% of people won't recall where the hidden manual release is. Two urgently needed safety updates: 1. Advanced, explicit warnings days before low-voltage battery failure. 2. Door safety logic that guarantees standard exit hardware works seamlessly even during complete power loss. In hot weather, this corner case can turn fatal in minutes. Please prioritize this safety redesign!
I am reporting multiple safety‑critical incidents involving my Tesla Model Y equipped with FSD (Supervised). The vehicle has repeatedly performed sudden braking in active traffic without any obstacles present, causing physical jolting and creating a risk of collision. These incidents occurred on [XXX] and XXX including a sudden hard brake at approximately 2:18 p.m. on XXX. Additionally, the vehicle has shown lane‑centering instability on the highway. On XXX at approximately 1:51 p.m., the vehicle drifted within the lane and failed to maintain proper centering while FSD was engaged, requiring immediate manual intervention to avoid unsafe movement. Tesla service has stated that no error codes were detected, but also acknowledged known FSD software behaviors affecting Hardware 3 vehicles. This indicates the system may be performing unsafe maneuvers without logging faults. I am reporting these incidents because they pose a direct safety risk to me, other drivers, and pedestrians. I request that NHTSA review these behaviors as potential safety defects in Tesla’s FSD (Supervised) system. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
While my wife was driving on a flat straight road, she heard a loud bang noise from the front of the vehicle. The vehicle made a loud grinding noise. Upon inspection, it was found the bolt securing the front right damper to the suspension had snapped and come loose. The nut fastening the bolt was lost on the roadside.
This is about a 2020 Tesla Model Y, with HardWare3 (HW3) Full-Self-Driving (FSD) feature. The older HW3 FSD-enabled Model Y cars started getting the new "v14 Lite" FSD updates recently - I got mine a few days ago. I immediately noticed a safety concern with the v14 Lite. Previous versions of FSD allowed me to set the maximum speed that the car would drive in the FSD mode - I can adjust it using the "wheel button" on my right thumb on the steering wheel, and the car would not exceed the maximum speed I choose. However, after the update to v14 Lite, the wheel button no longer controlled the maximum speed. Instead, it controlled the "speed profile" ("Sloth", "Chill", "Standard", "Hurry" are the options in my car). Regularly in highway driving, even in the Standard mode, the car would speed up to go well past the speed limit, more than 10mph over the speed limit, seemingly to match the speed of the rest of the traffic (69mph on a 55mph highway). This felt very uncomfortable. I tried to adjust the max speed down like I was used to, but the car instead switched to a different profile, "Chill", and rapidly slowed down to 4mph below the speed limit (51mph in this case=. The speed reduction was so sudden that it also felt dangerous (car behind me would have to break quickly to not hit me), and I didn't want to be driving well below the speed limit (also dangerous). Under "Self Driving" settings menu, there is also a feature called "Speed Limit", that used to allow you to set the "default" speed limit for FSD driving (for instance, +3mph above the speed limit). You can adjust it up and down with the right thumb wheel beyond that, but it set the default basic max speed limit for FSD. After the v14 Lite update, the FSD completely ignores this speed limit, and happily accelerates well beyond that. Not it seems like the "speed limit" feature is simply for warning the driver to not exceed the pre-determined speed limit when controlling the car. FSD simply ignores it.
Seat occupancy sensor failed for the second time. The car will randomly shut off if I am inside because it does not detect a passenger. When I exit the vehicle, the car will stay on for an extended period of time due to failed seat occupancy sensor. This is a widespread issue affecting all makes and models of Tesla. They are aware of the high rate of failure and have not made any attempt to issue a recall. This is dangerous and inconvenient as the infotainment system will not pair with your phone because it does not detect a driver. When moving, the car will also randomly throw itself into PARK at speed if you don’t put on your seatbelt before moving. The first time this happened, I smashed my head on the steering wheel.
The contact's daughter owns a 2020 Tesla Model Y. The contact stated that while driving at various speeds, an abnormal, squeaking sound would emit from the vehicle without warning. The contact called the service center where they gave the contact an estimate for a diagnostic. The contact was also informed that the vehicle may be covered under a goodwill warranty. The vehicle several parts of the front control arm were defective and had caused several other defects related to the control arm. The contact was given an estimate for the repair. The manufacturer had yet to be notified of the failure. The vehicle remained in the service center's possession but had yet to be repaired. The failure mileage was approximately 48,000.
There was a grinding sound coming from the LF wheel. This was progressively getting worse. Car was shaking while driving so dropped it off with my mechanic due to safety concerns. Per the mechanic that fixed the issue: Inspection found LF wheel bearing is loose. A bolt backed out on inside rubbing through axel shaft. Allowed wheel bearing to damage to damaged from moving in place. Axle shaft damaged from rubbing on backed out bolt. Replace LF axle shaft and wheel bearing. Informed by mechanic that wheel could have fallen off while driving. No prior work. Mechanic believes most likely issue was not having the bolts appropriately installed at time of manufactue
Odometer Fraud. The contact purchased a 2020 Tesla Model Y. It was discovered that there was a mileage discrepancy. The vehicle was a dealer sale. At the time of purchase, the vehicle mileage was 78,823, but after driving the vehicle from the dealer's lot, the contact discovered through the vehicle settings that the actual mileage was 80,810. The dealer was contacted, but no resolution was provided. The dealer then updated the advertised mileage on the website.
My Tesla Model Y 2020 (VIN: [XXX] ) is stuck on software version 2023.44.1 for more than 2 years and has four incomplete NHTSA safety recalls: • 23V838 – Autosteer driver monitoring improvements • 24V051 – Brake/Park/ABS warning font size too small • 24V153 – Muted Pedestrian Warning System • 24V554 – Hood not detected as unlatched Tesla Service in the Baltic region and Tesla Service in Warsaw (Poland) both refused to deliver the required OTA safety recall updates. They classified the vehicle as “unsupported” because it is a US-market vehicle located in Latvia. I am unable to bring the vehicle to any Tesla Service Center. Tesla is not fulfilling its legal obligation to provide the free safety recall remedies. Please require Tesla to deliver the updates or provide a proper solution. Attached: screenshots of refusals from Tesla Service (Baltic + Warsaw). INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Vehicle had "front passenger safety restraint system fault" multiple times intermittently. Serviced by Tesla service center in Dublin, CA who confirmed the problem. Documentation on the invoice stated that there was an open service bulletin related to this issue and was related to "the occupancy sensory in the seat was not functioning as expected." Upon inspection by the technician they found "an open connection in the seat harness and seat cover that can cause intermittent alerts." Additional repair notes indicate that this was to "address a service bulletin related to the front passenger seat's occupant classification system. We identified the need for an update to ensure proper functionality. To resolve this, we retrofitted the system in the front passenger seat as per the bulletin requirements." The fact that there is an open service bulletin for this issue indicates that it is not isolated to just this vehicle. An issue with the occupant sensors of a front vehicle seat directly impacts whether the air bags will deploy in a crash, therefore this is a serious safety risk.
A 2018 Ford Explorer, marked police vehicles, was operating with lights and siren when it proceeded through a red traffic light at an intersection. The subject vehicle, 2020 Tesla Model 3, was proceeding through a green traffic light at the intersection and struck the Ford.
The full self-driving (FSD) stopped working although it was fully paid for at the time of vehicle purchase. Along with that, the car stopped receiving/installing over the air software updates, the lane markings in the display disappeared, and the automatic cancelling turn signals stopped working (requiring me to manually cancel them). I took it to Tesla service and was told that the car needs a new computer at a cost of approximately $2,300. To answer the bullet points above: 1. The main vehicle computer malfunctioned. 2. I paid for FSD for the safety it provides - without FSD, the car is simply less safe in traffic. 3. The Tesla service center confirmed that the vehicle computer has malfunctioned. 4. There was no indication of any kind, until suddenly the FSD stopped working and I noticed subsequently that downloading/installing software updates failed, lane markings disappeared, and automatic cancelling turn signals stopped working requiring manual operation.
Observed intermittent center display/infotainment computer (MCU) crashes/reboots where the center display becomes blank and then restarts. In recorded events, when reverse was selected during an MCU reboot interval, the rearview camera image did not display until the reboot completed. Recorded rear camera unavailability during reverse was approximately 10–17 seconds. MCU crash/reboot behavior was observed to be repeatable, including predictable occurrence while the vehicle was in the built-in Service Mode. After a factory reset, repeated/double boot behavior was also observed. Additional observations: - With the turn signal activated, light leakage was observed in the side repeater camera image (glare/bloom present in the camera view). - With each windshield wiper sweep, the forward camera image was observed to briefly flicker to a purple/green distorted state and then return to normal. - During driving, the on-screen message “Auto Lane Change unavailable” was observed. A separate rear camera symptom has also been observed: intermittent freezing/stale frames (image appears not to update). This rear camera freeze behavior has not yet been captured on video. These conditions have been documented by video/screenshots and reported to the manufacturer/service center for inspection/diagnosis. No crash or injury occurred. The vehicle is currently located at the manufacturer’s service center and is available for inspection upon request.
Car was on complete auto pilot on mayland highway 270 and car suddenly took exit with any command and notification. Car was very close , few feet away from the guardrail at 55 mile per hour. This could have been a life threatening event with such decisions made by car. I saved all the dash cam videos of such two occurrence. I no longer have any trust in auto pilot software after too many mishaps with recent updates.
I would hear squeaking/tearing/rattling noises, this was found to be due to malfunctioning/broken nuts and compliance arms and control arms. This happened three times so far, attached are two repairs that was required previously. Per report with Tesla staff, this has been a recurring issue. Per additional Tesla owners, this has been a frequent issue amongst many different Tesla forums. Now I have to get it repaired for the third time. I bought a used Tesla that was certified by Tesla, problems occured at 37876 miles, but car was bought at 34529 miles.
I brought the car to the dealership to work on the recalls that are all done by over the air download. The car is not receiving the updates so I brought the car to the dealership to force the download on their computers. They stated they will not do any work on the car without doing a high voltage inspection due to the car being salvage. The charge for the inspection is almost $1500. The recalls have nothing to do with the high voltage but they are requiring me to pay it before they fix the recalls.
Interior of glass roof - dangerously hot on sunny days, capable of causing burns. This problem has caused several family members including children to yelp in pain due to brief contact with the glass (heads meeting glass surface while placing children in car seat, getting in and out of car seat and hands brushing against glass surface). The temperature inside the tesla also far exceeds other cars I go into. This is easily reproducible on any spring/summer day. I understand there are cars with black paint that can get hot and you try to avoid touching that area. But if there is literally black glass above you in the interior that is not insulated, that is completely unavoidable and a constant hazard. There should be insulation provided standard.
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
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