2025 Tesla Model Y
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
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Vehicles › Tesla › Model Y › 2025
These records cover every 2025 Tesla Model Y. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
Recalls
3 recalls name the 2025 Tesla Model Y. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2025-2026 Model Y vehicles. The certification label may not have been installed. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 567, "Certification."
Risk and remedy
Risk
Missing weight information provided by the label may lead to unintentionally overloading the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
Remedy
Tesla Service will inspect and install a certification label as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 17, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-19-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024-2025 Model 3, Model S, 2023-2025 Model X, and Model Y vehicles. The computer circuit board may short, resulting in the loss of the rearview camera image. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 111, "Rear Visibility."
Risk and remedy
Risk
A rearview camera that does not display an image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Remedy
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Tesla will also identify any vehicles that experienced a circuit board failure, or stress that may lead to a circuit board failure, and replace the affected computers, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 7, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
Risk and remedy
Risk
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Remedy
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Owner complaints
109 complaints33 involved a crash3 involved a fire16 injuries1 deaths
What owners report most
Latest complaints
- Forward collision avoidance › Warnings · Unknown or other
Subject: Multiple Recurring Issues — 2025 Tesla Model Y Long Range AWD I am submitting this complaint regarding multiple quality and potential safety-related issues with my 2025 Tesla Model Y Long Range Dual Motor AWD, purchased new in January 2025. 1. Persistent HVAC moldy/musty odor The…
Subject: Multiple Recurring Issues — 2025 Tesla Model Y Long Range AWD I am submitting this complaint regarding multiple quality and potential safety-related issues with my 2025 Tesla Model Y Long Range Dual Motor AWD, purchased new in January 2025. 1. Persistent HVAC moldy/musty odor The vehicle develops a pronounced moldy or musty odor from the HVAC system, particularly in hot, humid, or rainy conditions. This raises concerns about possible moisture accumulation, microbial growth, or an underlying HVAC system defect. I have attempted to resolve this issue through Tesla service, including communications with the Randolph and Princeton service centers. I have experienced repeated scheduling difficulties and have not received a clear diagnosis or satisfactory resolution. I also investigated Tesla technical service information concerning HVAC inlet ductwork, including bulletin SB-26-18-002, but have not obtained a satisfactory determination regarding the applicable components on my vehicle. 2. Windshield residue affecting the front camera area I have also experienced an issue involving residue or plastic off-gassing contamination on the windshield in the area of the forward-facing camera system. This raises concerns about visibility through the camera's viewing area and the potential impact on camera-based driver-assistance functions. I have sought clarification regarding cleaning and inspection of this area. I would like this issue evaluated to determine whether the contamination is associated with an underlying vehicle material or manufacturing problem and whether it could interfere with the proper operation of safety-related camera systems. 3. Rear hatch seal and wind noise The vehicle also has a rear hatch area wind-noise issue that may be related to the hatch seal or its fitment. I am concerned about whether the seal is properly installed and functioning as intended. I would like the issue evaluated to determine whether it reflects a component, alignment
- Electrical system
The contact stated that while seated in a 2025 Tesla Model Y taxi cab driving 25 MPH, the vehicle failed to yield or stop while pedestrians were nearby the vehicle. The contact stated that the failure had occurred near a school zone. The contact expressed concerns that the vehicle posed a safety…
The contact stated that while seated in a 2025 Tesla Model Y taxi cab driving 25 MPH, the vehicle failed to yield or stop while pedestrians were nearby the vehicle. The contact stated that the failure had occurred near a school zone. The contact expressed concerns that the vehicle posed a safety risk while driving in school zones or other areas with pedestrian traffic due to the failure to yield or stop for pedestrians. The contact stated that the manufacturer should account for high-traffic areas when manufacturing self-driving vehicles.
- Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking · Forward collision avoidance › Warnings · Lane departure › Warning
While operating my vehicle with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged on Friday, October 16 at 5:12 pm, the vehicle suffered an sudden loss of vehicle control, resulting in a full spinout. Road & Environmental Conditions: Wet roads Approximate Speed: 76 mph Incident Details: Without warning or…
While operating my vehicle with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged on Friday, October 16 at 5:12 pm, the vehicle suffered an sudden loss of vehicle control, resulting in a full spinout. Road & Environmental Conditions: Wet roads Approximate Speed: 76 mph Incident Details: Without warning or driver steering/accelerator input, the vehicle's automated driving system lost traction, causing the vehicle to spin out of the lane. I was forced to intervene to bring the car to a complete stop and prevent a collision.
- Electrical system · Unknown or other
Since a 2026 over-the-air software update, every time I disengage Tesla Full Self-Driving (Supervised) while driving, on any road and at any speed, the center touchscreen shows a large pop-up titled "Why did you intervene?" with four buttons (Navigation, Parking, Critical, Other) and a…
Since a 2026 over-the-air software update, every time I disengage Tesla Full Self-Driving (Supervised) while driving, on any road and at any speed, the center touchscreen shows a large pop-up titled "Why did you intervene?" with four buttons (Navigation, Parking, Critical, Other) and a voice-message option. It covers about a third of the display, including navigation, media controls and, during parking, the camera view. It does not clear on its own while driving; it stays until the driver taps an option or shifts into Park. Photos attached. Disengagements happen at the most demanding moments: correcting the system, avoiding a hazard, merging or parking. This prompt draws the driver's eyes and hand to the touchscreen at exactly those moments, on every disengagement and several times per drive. I believe this creates a foreseeable visual-manual distraction risk and conflicts with NHTSA's Visual-Manual Driver Distraction Guidelines. This is a particular safety concern because I regularly drive this vehicle with young children on board. Any distraction at the moment I take over from FSD puts them at risk. There is no setting to disable this prompt; the only way to avoid it is to stop using FSD, which we paid for. The car is collecting training feedback from drivers in real time at the expense of attention to the road. I request that NHTSA review this and that Tesla make the prompt dismissible, defer it until the vehicle is parked, or make it optional. Reproducible on every FSD disengagement; not inspected by a dealer. Vehicle software 2026.27.11, FSD (Supervised) v14.3.10.
- Lane departure › Assist · Steering
On XXX, I was driving my 2025 Tesla Model Y with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged. While merging onto [XXX] in [XXX], the vehicle veered and crashed into the guardrail. I was not controlling the vehicle at the time — FSD (Supervised) was in control. Both of my child passengers were injured…
On XXX, I was driving my 2025 Tesla Model Y with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged. While merging onto [XXX] in [XXX], the vehicle veered and crashed into the guardrail. I was not controlling the vehicle at the time — FSD (Supervised) was in control. Both of my child passengers were injured; one suffered a wrist fracture. A police report was filed at the scene. The vehicle was totaled in the crash and has not been driven since. Vehicle software at the time of the crash: 2025.45.9.1; Full Self-Driving (Supervised) v14.2.2.4. After the crash, I asked Tesla for the vehicle's driving data/logs to confirm that FSD was engaged at the time of the crash. Tesla did not provide the data. I am concerned that Full Self-Driving (Supervised) failed to safely execute a highway merge maneuver and drove the vehicle into the guardrail, resulting in injuries to my children. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking · Forward collision avoidance › Warnings
On 10/08/2026, while Full Self-Driving (Supervised) software v14.3.10 was engaged in an underground parking garage, the vehicle failed to stop when it should have, causing the left-front bumper to scrape against a concrete pillar. The driver was supervising at the time. No injuries; cosmetic damage to the left-front bumper only.
- Structure › Body
On October 1, 2026, at approximately 5:40 p.m. in the Marina Square Center parking lot in San Leandro, California, the powered rear trunk of my 2025 Tesla Model Y popped up slightly but failed to fully open. I repeatedly attempted to open it using both the touchscreen and the physical trunk button…
On October 1, 2026, at approximately 5:40 p.m. in the Marina Square Center parking lot in San Leandro, California, the powered rear trunk of my 2025 Tesla Model Y popped up slightly but failed to fully open. I repeatedly attempted to open it using both the touchscreen and the physical trunk button without success. When I reached underneath to manually lift it, the trunk unexpectedly began closing under power and trapped both of my hands, injuring six fingers. I remained trapped for several minutes and had to call for help; two bystanders assisted, and repeated electronic and manual attempts were required to free me. Nearly one week later, visible wounds and soft-tissue injuries remain, and I experience intermittent numbness in my fingertips. I have not yet received a medical evaluation. The trunk still does not open reliably and sometimes requires a second activation. I reported the incident and submitted injury photos to Tesla Service, but Tesla declined to proceed with an in-person inspection, said I did not need to attend my scheduled appointment, and has not confirmed whether the vehicle logs were reviewed. I am reporting an unexpected powered-closure action on a trunk that failed to open, which trapped both of the operator's hands and required rescue by bystanders.
- Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking
On [XXX], at about [XXX], I was driving my 2025 Tesla Model Y with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged. I was on [XXX] in Matthews, NC, heading toward Mint Hill, at about [XXX]. There were no vehicles, pedestrians or obstacles ahead of me. With no apparent reason and no warning or alert, the…
On [XXX], at about [XXX], I was driving my 2025 Tesla Model Y with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged. I was on [XXX] in Matthews, NC, heading toward Mint Hill, at about [XXX]. There were no vehicles, pedestrians or obstacles ahead of me. With no apparent reason and no warning or alert, the vehicle suddenly braked as hard as possible. It slowed from about 49 mph to 32 mph within roughly one second, which averages about 0.8 g. I took over from FSD and submitted feedback to Tesla marking the event as critical. It was nighttime and the weather was clear. Fortunately no vehicle was behind me, but if one had been, a rear-end collision would have been likely. The car was running software 2026.27.11 with FSD (Supervised) v14.3.10. I have dashcam footage of the event. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- Unknown or other
When in Full Self Drive (FSD), the car turns (every time) west on [XXX] in [XXX] when existing the XXX High School front driveway ([XXX]). This is a one way street where all traffic is directed east, so having it drive west means it's driving the wrong way on a one way road. Additionally, when…
When in Full Self Drive (FSD), the car turns (every time) west on [XXX] in [XXX] when existing the XXX High School front driveway ([XXX]). This is a one way street where all traffic is directed east, so having it drive west means it's driving the wrong way on a one way road. Additionally, when then traversing the perimeter of the school and then traveling east of the [XXX]/[XXX] intersection on [XXX], the car will drive through the parallel parking spaces instead of the main lane. Both of these are critical safety issues and if the car were fully automated or perhaps a CyberCab, this could be extremely dangerous. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- Back over prevention › Warnings
When self parking in a drive way, Tesla Y hit another car. There was more than enough space on the driveway for 2+ cars. We did the same self-parking tens times before. Tesla generated no alarms after collision. It didn’t stop after colliding with another car. I brought the Tesla to Irvine Tesla…
When self parking in a drive way, Tesla Y hit another car. There was more than enough space on the driveway for 2+ cars. We did the same self-parking tens times before. Tesla generated no alarms after collision. It didn’t stop after colliding with another car. I brought the Tesla to Irvine Tesla dealer and requested that the dealer checke cameras and software. The agents refused. They only checked if the car still self parks. The claimed as no alarms were generated during collision, they are not going to check cameras or anything else. The gave me no paperwork at all. I believe it’s a serious precedent that may affect thousands of Tesla owners and compromises their safety.
- Electrical system · Forward collision avoidance › Warnings · Lane departure › Warning
The vehicle has suffered recurring, critical electronic and low-voltage safety system failures that first began under the original factory warranty and have now resulted in a complete central computer (HW4) failure. History of Defect: 1. Feb 2025 (~7,170 miles): Initial failure of the 16V…
The vehicle has suffered recurring, critical electronic and low-voltage safety system failures that first began under the original factory warranty and have now resulted in a complete central computer (HW4) failure. History of Defect: 1. Feb 2025 (~7,170 miles): Initial failure of the 16V low-voltage network and safety systems. Tesla replaced the VCFRONT body controller and low-voltage battery under warranty. 2. May 2025 (~14,543 miles): Safety equipment failures required replacement of the cabin radar and seat belt buckles under warranty. 3. Sept 2026 (~80,000 miles): Total Hardware 4 (HW4) central computer failure. This resulted in the complete loss of all Active Safety Systems, Forward Collision Warning, Automatic Emergency Braking, Autopilot, backup cameras, and power management features. Safety Risk: The complete failure of the HW4 computer completely disables essential safety functions required for safe vehicle operation on public highways. Tesla has denied warranty coverage for the HW4 replacement despite the issue originating from early low-voltage controller failures during the bumper-to-bumper warranty period. ADDITIONAL CRITICAL SAFETY INCIDENT: During the computer/system failure, I experienced a power steering malfunction accompanied by an on-screen warning. The steering wheel became extremely hard to turn/stiff, making it nearly impossible to steer the vehicle safely.
- Electrical system › Adas
I am reporting a driver-distraction safety concern involving Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD). When I disengage FSD and take manual control, Tesla immediately displays a persistent prompt requiring me to select why I intervened or provide voice feedback. The prompt does not automatically disappear…
I am reporting a driver-distraction safety concern involving Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD). When I disengage FSD and take manual control, Tesla immediately displays a persistent prompt requiring me to select why I intervened or provide voice feedback. The prompt does not automatically disappear and remains on the center display until I respond. I believe this creates a real safety risk. An FSD intervention can occur because the vehicle is not handling a traffic or road situation appropriately. This is exactly when the driver’s full attention should be on taking control, assessing the situation, and safely operating the vehicle. Instead, Tesla immediately presents a persistent interface requesting additional driver interaction. The prompt also blocks access to other functionality, including Grok in my experience, creating additional incentive to interact with the screen while driving. Tesla could eliminate this unnecessary distraction by allowing the prompt to time out, adding a “Dismiss” or “Not Now” option, or delaying the feedback request until the vehicle is stopped. I support collecting FSD intervention feedback, but requiring interaction immediately after the driver takes manual control creates an avoidable distraction during a potentially safety-critical transition.
- Seat belts
The seatbelt broke spontaneously, and Tesla will not cover it under warranty.
- Forward collision avoidance › Warnings · Lane departure › Assist · Lane departure › Warning
Full auto pilot I pay $99 every month and it was on the car decided to take a turn to go over the middle island and hit the tree. The road has yellow line straight but then the yellow line start to be... I think the car decided oh my God it’s not the correct way and decided to take off and run over…
Full auto pilot I pay $99 every month and it was on the car decided to take a turn to go over the middle island and hit the tree. The road has yellow line straight but then the yellow line start to be... I think the car decided oh my God it’s not the correct way and decided to take off and run over the middle island and hit the tree. Totaled the whole car and then the fire or the smokes are to go inside car what I was stuck inside I tried to open the door, but then five minutes later I got out almost died.
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control · Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking · Lane departure › Blind spot detection
On I95 by the Secaucus Train station there is something sending a signal to my Tesla and other Teslas to disable all of its ADAS systems. All of the functionality related to ADAS gets disabled thus making the car very unsafe to drive. Due to this disability it also disables the camera systems in the car. So if an accident were to occur there would be no way to record.
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control · Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking · Lane departure › Assist
On XXX at approximately 8:10 PM CDT, my 2025 Tesla Model Y was operating with Full Self-Driving engaged when the vehicle descended a private boat launch at a marina in [XXX], and entered the river channel connecting Channel Lake and Lake Marie. Two occupants escaped through the windows. The vehicle…
On XXX at approximately 8:10 PM CDT, my 2025 Tesla Model Y was operating with Full Self-Driving engaged when the vehicle descended a private boat launch at a marina in [XXX], and entered the river channel connecting Channel Lake and Lake Marie. Two occupants escaped through the windows. The vehicle was submerged and is a total loss. Lake County Sheriff report #XXX. The vehicle's incident data export confirms FSD was in an active state during the approach. The vehicle is preserved in storage pending inspection. An incident report has been filed with Tesla. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- Unknown or other
The exterior rear door handle on the driver’s side rear passenger door caught the occupant’s finger during normal use, tearing the fingernail partially out of the nail bed and causing bleeding and an exposed nail bed injury requiring medical treatment. The flush-mounted door handle pinched and…
The exterior rear door handle on the driver’s side rear passenger door caught the occupant’s finger during normal use, tearing the fingernail partially out of the nail bed and causing bleeding and an exposed nail bed injury requiring medical treatment. The flush-mounted door handle pinched and trapped the finger while the door was being operated. The component is available for inspection upon request. No warning of any kind preceded the injury — the handle functioned as designed, which is the concern. The injury was treated at an urgent care facility. The problem has not been inspected by the manufacturer, dealer, police, or insurance to date. No warning lamps or messages are applicable. Cause: the flush-mounted rear door handle design creates a pinch point that can trap a finger during ordinary entry
- Steering · Suspension · Unknown or other
While driving straight ahead in my lane on a wet freeway in an active construction zone, the vehicle abruptly and without warning lost traction and spun out of control. I was traveling in a normal, controlled manner with the flow of traffic and was not turning, braking hard, or making any abrupt…
While driving straight ahead in my lane on a wet freeway in an active construction zone, the vehicle abruptly and without warning lost traction and spun out of control. I was traveling in a normal, controlled manner with the flow of traffic and was not turning, braking hard, or making any abrupt maneuver when the loss of control occurred. It was so sudden that I initially believed another vehicle had struck me. I was unable to recover control, and the vehicle left its lane and was involved in a collision that resulted in the vehicle being declared a total loss. This is a nearly new all-wheel-drive vehicle, approximately 17 months old, equipped with electronic stability and traction control. I am an experienced driver with a clean record and had driven this same vehicle through mountain roads the week prior without any issue. A vehicle of this type is not expected to suddenly lose control while traveling straight. The specific component or system that failed is UNKNOWN. No warning lamps or messages appeared before the loss of control. The vehicle data available to me as an owner is limited and does not reflect the full diagnostic logs the manufacturer retains. The vehicle is a total loss but is preserved and available for inspection upon request. The manufacturer has not inspected or responded. A police report was filed.
- Unknown or other
Vehicle has complete Full Self-Driving (Supervised) capabilities. Vehicle was reverse parking on its own but the right side crashed into a wall. Vehicle did not stop reverse upon collision. Driver took over immediately to avoid further crash fatality.
- Back over prevention › Warnings · Unknown or other
Driver selected auto-park in parking area and car tried to self-park in a chosen spot adjacent to a pole and made several attempts to park and in the process hit a pole adjacent to the chosen parking spot. Immediately the incident was reported via Tesla app and photos were uploaded and an…
Driver selected auto-park in parking area and car tried to self-park in a chosen spot adjacent to a pole and made several attempts to park and in the process hit a pole adjacent to the chosen parking spot. Immediately the incident was reported via Tesla app and photos were uploaded and an appointment was given for 8/6/2026 at 2:15pm at Tesla service Aliso Viejo. In reference to the pictures, car tried to park in spot 89 entering from spot 90, and made several attempts and driver expected the auto-park to be aborted giving up control to teh driver, but the car hit the pole and then driver took control to park.
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control · Vehicle speed control
The Full Self Driving software does not allow the user to limit the maximum speed of the vehicle while in use. The car frequently drives 15-20 MPH over the actual limits in typical driving modes with no ability for the user to safely and precisely restrict its speed to a more safe and appropriate…
The Full Self Driving software does not allow the user to limit the maximum speed of the vehicle while in use. The car frequently drives 15-20 MPH over the actual limits in typical driving modes with no ability for the user to safely and precisely restrict its speed to a more safe and appropriate level. The car may begin a journey at an appropriate speed, and continue at that speed for miles, but for no reason that is apparent to the user, the system may begin to accelerate beyond a safe limit. This makes the driving experience while using this software less predictable and compromises the safety of the user and others on the road. The user controlled speed limiting feature was previously available, and worked well, but was removed as part of an update to version 14.x of the software. An alternative that is being used, which is much less safe, is that users can restrict the speed of the entire vehicle such that its speed may never pass a certain level, under any circumstance, even if the accelerator is fully depressed (by the user). Once enabled, this feature cannot be adjusted or disabled while driving. Users are using this vehicle speed restriction feature to more precisely restrict the excessive and unpredictable speeding of the automated system because they are not given the ability to do so safely and precisely via other means.
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control
My 2025 Model Y with stalks creates an unsafe driving condition. Under current software, enabling FSD forces a single-pull lockout that completely disables standard Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC). (Advanced Driver Assistance Sytems) FSD routinely follows vehicles at less than a 1 second gap at…
My 2025 Model Y with stalks creates an unsafe driving condition. Under current software, enabling FSD forces a single-pull lockout that completely disables standard Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC). (Advanced Driver Assistance Sytems) FSD routinely follows vehicles at less than a 1 second gap at 70-80 MPH and attempts unsafe merges with tractor-trailers. Drivers must be allowed to drop to TACC to maintain safe following distances without being forced to entirely disable FSD while parked. Because the software removes the single-pull/double-pull distinction, the driver cannot downgrade the system to standard cruise control on the fly to establish a safe following distance. To stop the dangerous FSD behavior, the driver must completely disengage the system to manual control, as switching the underlying autopilot modes requires pulling over and shifting into Park. Tesla customer support has refused to address this software-enforced safety hazard. Following too closely routinely happens on the interstate at Highway speeds while using FSD. This safety issue occurs consistently during highway driving on major interstates at speeds between 70-80. The inability to seamlessly select a safe cruise control mode increases the risk of a high speed rear end collision.
- Seats
The left back seat actuator engaged twice in the same day and the seat back dropped down unexpectedly on the passenger. It’s done it to my grandchild twice and hurt him. No injuries but the surprise and shock of the seat coming down on him was painful. I've had this with other passengers in the same seat. Tesla inspected it for this problem, but found nothing at the time. The problem is intermittent.
- Forward collision avoidance › Warnings · Unknown or other · Vehicle speed control
Component/Issue Description: Following a recent over-the-air (OTA) software update to the vehicle's Full Self-Driving system, a dangerous user interface defect was introduced. Immediately upon an FSD disengagement—the critical transition window where the operator must resume manual driving…
Component/Issue Description: Following a recent over-the-air (OTA) software update to the vehicle's Full Self-Driving system, a dangerous user interface defect was introduced. Immediately upon an FSD disengagement—the critical transition window where the operator must resume manual driving control—the center touchscreen populates a mandatory, invasive feedback popup menu. This menu causes a severe driver distraction and creates an immediate safety hazard. The popup blocks vital driving visualizations and navigation data on the screen at a high-stress moment. Furthermore, the UI creates a functional touchscreen lockout, demanding manual and visual interaction from the driver to clear the box while the vehicle is actively in motion. Forcing a driver to divert their eyes from the roadway to navigate a touchscreen menu immediately following a system intervention creates an unreasonable and systemic risk of collision. The manufacturer has provided no setting to disable this dangerous distraction.
- Electrical system · Service brakes · Steering
am reporting a serious safety concern involving a 2025 Tesla Model Y, VIN [XXX] . On [XXX], the vehicle was being driven on [XXX] in Columbus, Ohio while the driver was traveling to Columbus Preparatory Academy. During the trip, the steering reportedly stopped responding properly, and the driver…
am reporting a serious safety concern involving a 2025 Tesla Model Y, VIN [XXX] . On [XXX], the vehicle was being driven on [XXX] in Columbus, Ohio while the driver was traveling to Columbus Preparatory Academy. During the trip, the steering reportedly stopped responding properly, and the driver struggled to control the vehicle. Witnesses at the scene reported that the driver appeared to be fighting with the steering and trying to stop the vehicle or prevent it from drifting. The vehicle then lost control, accelerated or continued moving uncontrollably, flipped/rolled over, and sustained major damage. A police report was created by the Columbus Police Department under report number [XXX]. The vehicle involved is a 2025 Tesla Model Y. This was a serious crash involving a possible steering malfunction, loss of control, and rollover. The vehicle is currently located at Pro-Cars, 400 Stimmel Rd, Columbus, OH 43223. Tesla was contacted after the incident, and the representative advised that the vehicle should be taken to a collision center. I am filing this complaint because the incident appears to involve a potential safety defect affecting steering control and vehicle control. I request that NHTSA review this matter as a possible vehicle safety defect. The vehicle has not yet been repaired, and I am attempting to preserve it for inspection. I have supporting materials including the police report, photos/videos, witness information if needed, towing/storage documentation, and communications regarding the vehicle. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Defect investigations
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
- FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway…
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
- Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)"…
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
- Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved…
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
- Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone…
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
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