2013 Tesla Model S
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model S › 2013
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2013 Tesla Model S. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
11 recalls name the 2013 Tesla Model S. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 Model S, 2020-2021 Model X, 2018-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A factory reset muted the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 141, "Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 27, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2018 Tesla Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles with a center display equipped with a NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor and an 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. When the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device for the center display reaches lifetime wear, the eMMC controller will no longer be able to maintain the integrity…
The eMMC controller wear-out condition can cause the loss of the rearview camera display, defrost/defog control settings, and exterior turn signal lighting, reducing visibility and increasing the risk of a crash.
Owners should ensure their vehicles are operating firmware release 2020.48.48.12 or newer, which will alert owners if the eMMC is approaching lifetime wear. Tesla will notify owners, and will replace the VCM daughterboard with one containing an enhanced eMMC controller, free of charge. The recall began March 29, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-21-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2016 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with Bosch steering racks. The aluminum bolts that attach the power steering gear assist motor to the gear housing may corrode and fracture causing a reduction or complete loss of power steering assist.
Loss of power steering assist would require a higher steering effort, especially at lower speeds, which may increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will replace the steering gear mounting bolts and add a corrosion-preventative sealer, free of charge. The recall began May 7, 2019. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-18-32-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling all 2013 Model S vehicles equipped with certain air bag inflators assembled as part of the passenger frontal air bag modules used as original equipment or replacement equipment. In the event of a crash necessitating deployment of the passenger frontal air bag, these inflators may explode due to propellant degradation…
An inflator explosion may result in sharp metal fragments striking the driver or other occupants resulting in serious injury or death.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will replace the passenger frontal air bag modules, free of charge. The recall is expected to begin in March 2018. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-18-20-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016 Model S and Model X vehicles. The electric parking brake calipers have an internal gear that may be improperly manufactured, possibly resulting in the gear fracturing during parking brake application or release.
If the gear breaks during parking brake release, the vehicle will not be able to be moved. If the gear breaks during parking brake application, the parking brake may not adequately hold the vehicle, potentially resulting in the vehicle rolling, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and service centers will replace both the left and right electric parking brake calipers, free of charge. The recall began March 6, 2018. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-17-33-002.
Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain model year 2012-2015 Model S vehicles manufactured May 31, 2012, to November 12, 2015. The affected vehicles are equipped with driver or front passenger seat belts that may be improperly connected to the outboard lap pretensioner.
If the seat belt is not correctly attached to the pretensioner, it may not properly restrain the seat occupant in the event of a crash, increasing their risk of injury.
Tesla will notify owners, and service centers will inspect the driver and front passenger seat belts, correcting their connection, as necessary, free of charge. The recall began on December 14, 2015. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-15-20-002.
Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain model year 2013 Model S vehicles equipped for, and delivered with, certain NEMA 14-50 (240 volt) Universal Mobile Connector (UMC) adapters. During charging, the adapter, cord, or wall outlet could overheat.
An overheated adapter, cord, or wall outlet increases the risk of burn injury and/or fire.
Tesla will notify owners and provide an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Some owners have already received this update. This update allows the Model S on board charging system to detect any unexpected fluctuations in the input power or higher resistance connections to the vehicle. If detected, the onboard charging system will automatically reduce the charging current by 25%. Tesla owners can verify that they have received the updated software (version 5.8.4 or later) by viewing the vehicle's center information screen. Additionally, Tesla will mail owners a replacement NEMA 14-50 adapter that is equipped with an internal thermal fuse. The recall began on March 14, 2014. Owners may contact Tesla Service Center at 1-877-79-TESLA (1-877-798-3752).
Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain model year 2013 Model S electric vehicles manufactured May 10, 2013, through June 8, 2013. An improper method for aligning the left hand seat back striker to the bracket may have weakened the weld between the bracket and the frame of the vehicle.
In the event of a crash, the left hand seat back may not stay mounted, increasing the risk of injury to passengers.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will inspect the left hand second row strikers. Tesla will add additional mounting hardware to ensure a proper joint between the bracket and the frame, free of charge. The recall began on June 24, 2013. Owners may contact Tesla at 1-650-681-5000.
I own a 2013 Tesla Model S. While investigating a knocking noise from the rear of the vehicle, I had a local shop disassemble the affected area and we discovered a crack in the rear subframe near a weld and mounting bracket. The fracture appears clean, with little or no visible corrosion. No previous repairs have been performed in the affected area. Given the location of the failure and the structural function of the component, I request an engineering review to determine the likely failure mechanism and whether similar failures have been documented on early Model S vehicles. My research shows the same failure in NHTSA complaint XXX. Other local shops also describe the same subframe failure on this Model and manufacturing year. Please advise whether any applicable service campaigns, revised replacement components, or goodwill repair assistance are available. I am attaching photographs. My vehicle VIN is [XXX]. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Mileage: Approximately 177,379 miles Location: California Component: Electric parking brake (EPB) / gear selection Description: My vehicle's electric parking brake intermittently locks the car in place when I come to a stop, such as at a traffic light. This has happened 5 times in the last 4 weeks. When it occurs, the car will not shift into gear and will not move at all. The only way I have been able to recover is to keep trying to shift until it eventually releases, or to put the car into Tow Mode and then take it back out of Tow Mode. There is no way to predict when it will happen or how long it will take to clear. This is a serious safety hazard. When it happens at a stoplight, I am stuck in the travel lane while traffic resumes around me, creating a significant risk of a rear-end collision. It could also strand the vehicle in an intersection. I am aware of recall 17V260 (parking brake caliper gear) affecting 2013 Model S vehicles. A VIN lookup on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) website shows no open recalls on my vehicle. I contacted Tesla Service, which recommended a paid diagnostic assessment. I have not yet had the car inspected. I have not been in a crash or injured as a result. I am requesting that NHTSA investigate whether this is a defect affecting other 2013 Model S vehicles, and whether the earlier recall repair was sufficient.
The vehicle has suffered a catastrophic, intermittent low-voltage network crash caused by a failing Body Control Module (BCM), resulting in multiple dangerous safety-critical failure modes. On a previous occasion, the vehicle woke up with severe network faults and automatically forced itself into Neutral. When the driver stepped out to get the child and shut the door, the system crashed entirely and the exterior electronic door handles failed to present, trapping an infant child inside the running vehicle. Most recently, while driving in a rainstorm, the vehicle suffered a complete failure of the windshield wipers, a total loss of the high-beam headlights, a total loss of the horn, and a total loss of electronic communication to the electronic parking brake system. Most critically, the vehicle experienced an uncommanded propulsion hazard where it hard-locked itself in the 'Drive' gear and absolutely refused to shift into 'Park' or 'Neutral,' forcing the driver to physically maintain heavy hydraulic brake pressure to keep the vehicle from creeping forward. Because the horn failed and the parking brake was disabled, the driver was trapped in the driver's seat holding the brakes and was forced to call 911 for emergency first responders to come and physically block the wheels so the driver and infant could safely exit. Tesla Service has diagnosed the issue as a failed central Body Control Module (Part #1010906-00-D), but the cascading network failure modes present an extreme, life-threatening hazard regarding vehicle control and child entrapment.
This issue appears to be related to a known MCU failure affecting early Tesla Model S vehicles. The touchscreen exhibits screen melting/discoloration and eventually goes blank or becomes inoperative. When this occurs, critical functions including occupant detection indicators, seatbelt warnings, and windshield defrost controls may become unavailable. The loss of these functions creates potential safety risks involving visibility, occupant protection, and driver awareness while operating the vehicle."
This issue appears to be related to a known MCU failure affecting early Tesla Model S vehicles. The touchscreen exhibits screen melting/discoloration and eventually goes blank or becomes inoperative. When this occurs, critical functions including occupant detection indicators, seatbelt warnings, and windshield defrost controls may become unavailable. The loss of these functions creates potential safety risks involving visibility, occupant protection, and driver awareness while operating the vehicle."
While driving my 2013 Tesla Model S at normal road speed, the vehicle suddenly lost all propulsion without any warning. I had to coast and maneuver across traffic to avoid being hit before the car came to a stop. After shifting into Park, the vehicle displayed DI_w072 and DI_f072 gate‑drive faults, which indicate inverter/drive‑unit failure and match a pattern reported by other early‑model‑year Tesla owners. This sudden loss of motive power created a serious safety hazard, including risk of rear‑end collision and exposure to oncoming traffic while disabled. • No alerts appeared before the failure • Fault codes appeared only after the vehicle stopped • Vehicle required towing • Incident occurred under normal driving conditions • Tesla has denied responsibility or involvement It was serviced by Tesla a couple days before. During servicing they stated on one side the drive axle was not completely installed upon arrival. They stated they "popped it in for free but the drive unit will likely need replacement soon." Prior to this visit i have had no issues or alerts with these parts or systems, I declined any work to these areas. The next day after receiving my vehicle back, I discovered the coolant reservoir was completely empty. No warning was provided that the coolant system had been left unfilled, and the lack of coolant may have contributed to thermal damage in the drive unit or inverter. They denied any work they did involve these parts and denied any responsibility. They denied my request to have the car towed to their service center and diagnose it unless i paid for it. They also estimated the repair to cost me 6k without any further investigation. I request that NHTSA evaluate whether this failure mode represents a broader defect affecting 2012–2015 Model S drive units/inverter electronics and whether further investigation or recall is warranted.
Vehicle lights turned off while driving home with my family. Pulling over and turning off and on the car reset the problem. When lights turned off I received a warning light identifying a faulty right headlight and faulty left headlight. No accident and vehicle is currently outside manufacture warranty.
The contact owns a 2013 Tesla Model S. The contact stated that the parking brake seized while leaving a charging station, and the vehicle screeched into oncoming traffic and stalled. The parking brake warning light was illuminated. The local dealer was contacted, and an appointment was scheduled. The vehicle had not been charged prior to a snowstorm, and the battery became fully drained. The vehicle was taken to the local dealer, where it was determined that the main battery and 12-Volt battery needed to be replaced before the diagnostic test. The vehicle was repaired, but the failure reoccurred. The vehicle failed to shift into drive or move. The jack mode was disengaged. While driving, the rear wheels were screeching. The contact stated that the failure was related to TSB: SB-21-33-002). The vehicle was towed to another local dealer, Tesla Service Arlington-Glebe Rd (2710 S Glebe Rd, Arlington, VA 22206). The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The battery was at 19 percent. The manufacturer was contacted, but no additional assistance was provided. The failure mileage was approximately 108,000.
I have a 2013 Tesla Model-S, I have so far spent thousands on this car for door handle related problems over its lifetime. And Tesla still keeps charging for any door repairs. As of now, the driver side door doesn't open from outside and this is a serious safety hazard in case of an accident
On [XXX], at approximately [XXX], I was driving my 2013 Tesla Model S (VIN: [XXX] ) on [XXX] in Barrow County, Georgia when the instrument cluster/speedometer display went completely blank while driving. This is an intermittent issue that occurs without warning - the display turns off and sometimes freezes. Because the speedometer was not displaying, I had no way to know my actual speed. I was pulled over by Barrow County Sheriff’s Office and cited for speeding. I explained the instrument cluster malfunction to the officer at the scene and showed him the blank display. I took my vehicle to Tesla Service Center in Duluth, GA (3380 Satellite Blvd) on November 4, 2025 - as soon as I could get an appointment after the incident. Tesla cleared the filesystem caches but did NOT inform me about the existing eMMC recall (SB-21-21-001) that affects my vehicle, nor did they perform the recall repair. My 2013 Model S is equipped with the MCU1 with the 8GB eMMC that is subject to NHTSA Recall 21V-119. This is a known defect that NHTSA determined to be a safety issue because it affects critical displays including the speedometer, backup camera, and turn signal indicators. I have video evidence of the malfunction occurring and the Tesla service receipt documenting the issue. The fact that Tesla’s service center did not notify me of the applicable recall or perform the free recall repair. This defect directly resulted in me receiving a traffic citation because I could not see my speedometer while driving INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
While charging my 2013 Tesla Model S, the vehicle experienced a charging system failure and would no longer charge. Upon inspection, I discovered water intrusion and corrosion on the lower portion of the charging-related electronic circuit board at the bottom of the charging port and right where the High Voltage cables are located as well. The affected electronics are located in an area that is not normally exposed to water and is not owner-serviceable. Later model Tesla Model S vehicles (2014 and newer) include a drain in this exact location, which this vehicle does not have. This design change appears to directly address the same water accumulation issue that caused the failure in my vehicle. The failure results in loss of the vehicle’s ability to charge, rendering the vehicle inoperable. Tesla declined to repair the issue, stating the vehicle is out of warranty, despite acknowledging the design change in later models. This appears to be a latent design issue related to water ingress into critical charging electronics, which presents a safety and reliability concern due to loss of propulsion capability and water exposure to High Voltage parts.
The screen abruptly shuts down and that is a safety hazard. Tesla has refused to fix this issue.
November 20, 2025 To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Office of Defects Investigation Subject: Safety Defect Complaint – Tesla Model S I am submitting this complaint regarding a serious and dangerous safety defect involving my Tesla Model S. Safety Defect Summary: • After the high-voltage battery failed, the vehicle would not enter Neutral. • I had to use Tow Mode in the middle of a street on a hill to avoid blocking traffic. • Once in Tow Mode, the car could not enter Park and the emergency/parking brake would not engage. • The car became completely free-rolling, posing danger to myself, other drivers, and pedestrians. • When Tesla returned the car to my home, their technicians also could not get the vehicle into Park or activate any emergency braking system. • The car is currently stuck in Tow Mode in my driveway with physical objects placed behind the wheels to prevent it from rolling. Why This Is a Safety Hazard: A vehicle that cannot shift into Park, cannot use its emergency brake, and remains free-moving after a failure represents a serious safety defect. This occurred without warning and left the vehicle unsafe to operate or even store. Request: I respectfully request that NHTSA investigate this as a potential safety defect affecting the Tesla Model S when the high-voltage battery fails. A car should never lose all ability to secure itself.
The instrument panel went blank permanently posing a safety hazard due to loss of vehicle function status indicators such as speed, direction, gauges, warnings, and signaling.
2013 Model S VIN [XXX] : 'Voltage sense open detected' poses shutdown risk on May 2021 replacement battery. Tesla claims 4-year warranty vs. standard 8-year; local service redirects without resolution. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Premature HV Battery BMS Failure After Tesla Replacement – Safety Risk of Fire and Sudden Power Loss
- Vehicle accelerated while I was pressing the brake on my 2013 Model S Tesla Car - My vehicle rammed into another vehicle waiting at the traffic light resulting in damage to both the cars as well trauma for the female driver in the other car - I see exact complaints have been filed by many others - Tesla has rejected these complaints and blamed it on the driver - There were no warning indications
Front impact bumper separated from mount on one side due to rust. Noticed a noise from front of car when going over small bumps in the road. If we had been in an accident, the impact bumper would not have provided adequate protection for the passengers or vehicle components near the drivers front where the mount had separated from the bar. No other inspections have occurred. Pictures and info can also be found here: [XXX] Issue found during replacement of upper control arms. (image has an upper control arm that was removed from the same car at the same time with little/no rust) INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Complete engine failure. Car became disabled and unable to move. Upon investigation, this was drive unit failure due to coolant leaking past the seal. A common issue of Tesla Model S and X with the large drive unit. I believe that this is a design flaw and should be a class action type situation. Can you help?
Driver's side rear control arm failure. The outside knuckle of the control arm cracked and is missing a portion. Tesla agrees this is SB-19-31-001 and will not repair without payment, due to the age of the vehicle. Vehicle has been serviced by Tesla multiple times without comment that this should be replaced.
The contact owns a 2013 Tesla Model S. The contact stated that while driving 30 MPH and depressing the accelerator pedal, the vehicle failed to respond as needed. The contact stated that the message "Take to Service" was displayed. The local dealer was contacted, and the vehicle was towed to the dealer by Tesla Insurance to be diagnosed. The contact was informed that the drive unit was rusted and needed to be replaced. The vehicle was not repaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure via email and a letter. The approximate failure mileage was 150,000.
When driving my vehicle the rear axle snapped causing the vehicle to fishtail. When checked by insurance company for repairs they found the Air suspension and rear axle snapped. It took out the air ride suspension, and bent 2 rims. It caused damage to the front fender as well as both interior wheel wells on the driver's side. Due to the suspension issue it caused a rock to come up and cracked windshield. The issue caused my vehicle to leave the road as I could not control the vehicle.
Tesla instrument cluster screens are leaking fluid and eventually failing. The instrument cluster is the only place I can see my speed, thus my car is now unsafe as I can not tell what speed I am driving at.
While driving on the freeway at 70 MPH with 39 miles of range left, the vehicle abruptly slowed down to 20 MPH...cars behind us almost hit us due to the car slowing down despite me accelerating. We pulled to the right shoulder, rest the car and then was only able to go up to 20MPH...range still said 39 miles. Shortly after the car stopped, there was a warning displayed, and the car turned off and could no longer turn back on. I believe the battery failed. The car was towed to Tesla Irvine Barranca Service center and diagnostics confirmed the battery needed replacement. I traded in the car for a new vehicle. Safety of the driver, passengers, and the around us on the freeway were all at risk and we were lucky to avoid any issues. All Tesla told me was the battery died There was a warning that appeared when the car slowed down to 20mph...stating the car was no longer able to be driven
When parked and opening the drivers door or rear passenger doors, the front passenger door will unlatch. Something is setting off the relay to open the front door when other doors open. Does not happen 100% of the time, but 50%+
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation based on forty-three complaints alleging failure of the left or right front suspension fore links in Tesla model year (MY) 2015 through 2017 Model S and MY 2016 through 2017 Model X vehicles. The investigation has identified 426 instances of failure on part number 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links.None of the instances resulted in any loss of vehicle control. One minor crash with no injuries is associated with the 426 instances fore link failures.A majority of the failures occurred between one to fifteen mph while parking in driveways or parking lots.In the eight instances where the vehicle was traveling more than 40 mph and the fore link failed, the vehicle remained controllable with no associated crash or injuries as a result. Tesla issued a consumer satisfaction bulletin (SB-17-31-001) on 10 February 2017, to replace the subject component on a sub-population of vehicles originally equipped with the subject fore links and built between 19 January 2016 and 25 May 2016.This sub population does not cover 75% instances of failures identified in this investigation. Additional damage to other vehicle components will occur if the vehicle is driven with this failed fore link.However no instance has shown that a failure of the fore link in this manner prevented the controllability of the vehicle in testing and reported failures. Based on this analysis,ODI is closing the investigation. ODI recommends that Tesla expand the terms of Bulletin SB-17-31-001 to cover all vehicles equipped with 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links. This does not constitute a finding by the Agency that a safety-related defect is not present; the Agency will take further action if warranted by additional information received. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On November 20, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Engineering Analysis (EA) 20-003 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-18 Tesla Model S and model year (MY) 2016-2018 Tesla Model X vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. During its investigation, ODI learned that the expected usage life rating for the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device is approximately 3,000 “P/E” or Program-Erase cycles, after which the eMMC NAND flash memory device would become fully consumed and no longer be operational, leading to a failure of the media control unit (MCU). At a daily cycle usage rate of 1.4 per block, accumulation of 3,000 P/E cycles would take only 5-6 years. Historically, the expected life of a vehicle generally far exceeds 5-6 years of service. ODI believes that a 5- or 6-year life expectancy for a component integral to providing the driver with safety functions is insufficient. During our review of the data, Tesla provided confirmation that all units will inevitably fail given the memory device’s finite storage capacity. Tesla provided its own statistical model showing the number of projected weekly MCU repairs from 2020 to 2028, estimating that replacement rates for MCU failures will peak in early 2022 and gradually decline until (near) full part turnover has been accomplished in 2028. According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardware will fail when reaching lifetime wear, for which the eMMC controller has no available memory blocks necessary to recover. With this failure mode, the only recovery available is a replacement of the eMMC device, achieved by physical part replacement of either the MCU assembly or visual control module subcomponent. Tesla provided information concerning the effects of MCU failure on vehicle function, which include in loss of rearview/backup camera and loss of HVAC (defogging and defrosting) setting controls (if the HVAC status was OFF status prior to failure). The failure also affects the Autopilot advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) and turn signal functionality due to the possible loss of audible chimes, driver sensing, and alerts associated with these vehicle functions. Based on this analysis, ODI issued a Recall Request Letter (RRL) on January 13, 2021. The RRL was based on ODI’s tentative conclusion that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists in the subject vehicles because the eMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles, after which the MCU fails due to memory wear-out, which constitutes a premature failure of safety-critical part. Tesla responded to the Recall Request Letter (RRL) on January 27, 2021, and disputed the tentative findings of the RRL. Nevertheless, on January 29, 2021, Tesla filed a safety recall (21V-035), recalling (MY) 2012-2018 Tesla Model S and (MY) 2016-2018 Model X vehicles with a center display equipped with a NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor and an 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. In this recall, Tesla is providing a free hardware remedy in addition to the over-the-air (“OTA”) firmware updates that the company had previously implemented. NHTSA will continue to monitor the issue as part of its ordinary processes for overseeing the effectiveness of recalls. However, based on available information, at this time, Tesla’s recall appears to address the unreasonable risk to motor safety presented by the premature failure of the component. Accordingly, the investigation is closed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On June 22, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE20-010 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-2015 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. EMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles. The subject MCU allegedly fails prematurely due to memory wear-out of the eMMC NAND flash. Tesla used the same MCU with the Tegra 3 processor in approximately 159 thousand 2012-2018 Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles built by Tesla through early-2018. In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) for PE20-010, Tesla provided ODI with 2,399 complaints and field reports, 7,777 warranty claims, and 4,746 non-warranty claims related to MCU replacements. The data show failure rates over 30 percent in certain build months and accelerating failure trends after 3 to 4 years-in-service.According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardware can fail when reaching lifetime wear, for which the eMMC controller has no available blocks to recover. With this failure mode, the only recovery available is a replacement of the eMMC device, achieved by physical part replacement of either the MCU assembly or visual control module subcomponent. Tesla provided the effects of MCU failure on vehicle function which result in loss of rearview/backup camera, loss of HVAC (defogging) setting controls (if the HVAC status was OFF status prior to failure.) There is also an impact on the advanced driver assistance support (ADAS) Autopilot system, and turn signal functionality due to the possible loss of audible chimes, driver sensing, and alerts associated with these vehicle functions. There are precedents for addressing defects that result in loss of either backup camera, defogging, or turn signal functions under safety recalls.Tesla has implemented certain Over-The-Air or OTA updates to subject vehicles to mitigate the effects of MCU failure. These updates include firmware changes to reduce memory usage of the subject memory card, improve eMMC error correction and storage management strategies, changing the control logic for turn signal activation, and defaulting the HVAC system to Auto (71.6F) for drives after MCU failure to address windshield defogging. Tesla indicated that the MCU failures are likely to continue to occur in subject vehicles as vehicles continue to operate and use available memory in the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory until 100% of units have failed. This investigation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-003). The VOQs associated with the upgrade of this investigation are identified in the attachment to this resume.
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of SUA in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the Agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints ODI added to its evaluation can be viewed at NHTSA.gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by ODI are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the Federal Register.
In a letter dated September 17, 2019, Mr. Edward Chen petitioned the NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation of certain Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates from Tesla, beginning in May 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and OTA software updates Tesla made to the Battery Management System (BMS) of certain Tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On October 1, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP19-005 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. Information provided by Tesla in response to ODI's information request letter for DP19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain MY 2012 through 2016 Model S vehicles (subject vehicles). The voltage limiting firmware is a dynamic algorithm that is enabled in vehicles with high Supercharging use histories, which contributes to high usage stress to the high-voltage (HV) battery. Tesla sold approximately 61,781 subject vehicles in the United States and, through August 2021, the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in approximately 2,062 vehicles. Through December 2020, ODI identified 59 complaints from consumers alleging reductions in battery capacity (52) or charging speed (7) in the subject vehicles. Log data from these vehicles showed that the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in about 58 percent (30 of 52) of the complaints alleging range loss. Subsequent updates have restored some or all of the battery capacity to vehicles affected by the voltage limiting firmware coupled with updates enhancing BMS battery brick monitoring algorithms. None of the complaint vehicles have reported any thermal incidents or other safety hazards related to the HV battery.The five non-crash fires referenced in the petition include two fires that occurred in China in early 2019 involving vehicles that: 1) had recently completed Supercharging sessions; 2) were at a high state-of-charge (SOC) of the HV battery; 3) were parked with the battery cooling system shutoff; and 4) had histories of high-stress usage for the HV batteries. The three fires that occurred outside China did not involve the same fact patterns regarding vehicle state and charging history. The two fires that occurred in the United States include one involving a vehicle with no Supercharging history that was driving when the fire occurred and another in which the origin of the fire was external to the HV battery. The fifth fire, which also originated external to the HV battery, involved a vehicle in Germany that had been parked at a low SOC for an extended period. To date, incidents of fires involving parked vehicles with recent Supercharging and histories of high-stress use have only been observed in China, where high-stress use factors appear to be more common. NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the absence of any incidents in the United States related to fast charging, and the absence of any such incidents globally since May 2019, it is unlikely that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect would be issued due to any investigation opened as a result of granting this petition. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition, and the potential risks to safety, th
The subject vehicles (SV), model years 2012-2013 Tesla Model S, are emerging technology electric vehicles using a high voltage battery (HVB) to provide propulsion energy. The HVB uses lithium-ion cells combined in 60 or 85 kWh capacities, and a control system that monitors the HVB and its liquid cooling system. The HVB is positioned across the width of the vehicle between the front and rear wheels and lies above a flat aluminum pan that forms the bottom of the SV's chassis. About two thirds of the SVs were manufactured with an air-assisted suspension system that actively controls ride height, including automatically lowering the vehicle at higher speeds.Two separate incidents in 2013 resulted in significant fires involving the SVs, one in Washington (Oct. 13) and one in Tennessee (Nov. 13). Both incidents involved active suspension equipped vehicles operating at highway speeds and reduced ride height running over debris in the roadway. In both incidents, the struck objects penetrated the aluminum pan at the forward area of the battery, damaging the lithium ion cells of the HVB. The SV's information display notified the driver of decreased battery performance and ultimately instructed the driver to stop the vehicle. The SVs were able to travel ~.8 and 1.8 miles after impact respectively. In both cases, smoke appeared shortly after the vehicle stopped and a fire developed in the HVB. Thermal runaway occurred in the HVB cells. The fires destroyed the vehicles but did not result in injuries.In the Tennessee incident, the object struck by the SV was determined to be a three-ball hitch that apparently fell from another vehicle. Tesla performed a series of tests reconstructing this incident and determined that a similar shaped object contacting the forward edge of the HVB could be tripped and potentially penetrate the HVB case. As the object's opposite end digs into the pavement, vehicle momentum causes the object to impart upward force into the case, described by Tesla as a piking effect. Tesla's testing reproduced damage similar to that seen in the Tennessee incident, and also showed that a change in ride height strategy, which was implemented in Nov. 2013 via a telematic software update to prevent the SVs lowering at legal roadway speeds, mitigates the risk of battery compartment penetration when a three-ball hitch is struck.The object struck in the Washington incident was not identified. More severe damage to the incident vehicle and the unknown shape of the object raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of raising the ride height for objects other than a three-ball hitch. In a Mar. 10, 2014 meeting with ODI, Tesla stated it would conduct a free-of-charge service campaign to modify the SVs by adding three new components to the vehicle's undercarriage to protect the HVB. A low-hanging transverse member and an additional underbody plate would be mounted forward of the HVB case and a third plate would overlap the leading edge of the case. Testing conducted by Tesla demonstrated that these modifications improved protection from debris impacts.ODI was aware of two fires stemming from road debris impacts when the investigation began. According to Tesla, the SV fleet had accumulated ~90M miles of service at the time it revised the ride height strategy. No further incidents have been identified, and Tesla reports the Model S fleet has traveled an additional ~90M miles. ODI believes impacts with road debris are normal and foreseeable. In this case, Tesla's revision of vehicle ride height and addition of increased underbody protection should reduce both the frequency of underbody strikes and the resultant fire risk. A def
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
Bars are owner complaints, dots mark years with recalls. Select a year to open its report.