2015 Tesla Model S
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model S › 2015
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2015 Tesla Model S. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
9 recalls name the 2015 Tesla Model S. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2014-2021 Model S vehicles. The front trunk latch assembly may be misaligned, preventing the secondary hood latch from engaging. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 113, "Hood Latch System."
If the primary latch is inadvertently released and the secondary latch is not engaged, the hood could open unexpectedly, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and reposition the latch assembly as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 18, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-11-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2018 Tesla Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles with a center display equipped with a NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor and an 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. When the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device for the center display reaches lifetime wear, the eMMC controller will no longer be able to maintain the integrity…
The eMMC controller wear-out condition can cause the loss of the rearview camera display, defrost/defog control settings, and exterior turn signal lighting, reducing visibility and increasing the risk of a crash.
Owners should ensure their vehicles are operating firmware release 2020.48.48.12 or newer, which will alert owners if the eMMC is approaching lifetime wear. Tesla will notify owners, and will replace the VCM daughterboard with one containing an enhanced eMMC controller, free of charge. The recall began March 29, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-21-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling all 2014-2016 Model S vehicles equipped with certain air bag inflators assembled as part of the passenger frontal air bag modules used as original equipment or replacement equipment. In the event of a crash necessitating deployment of the passenger frontal air bag, these inflators may explode due to propellant degradation…
An inflator explosion may result in sharp metal fragments striking the driver or other occupants resulting in serious injury or death.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will replace the passenger frontal air bag modules, free of charge. The recall began May 29, 2019. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-19-20-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2016 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with Bosch steering racks. The aluminum bolts that attach the power steering gear assist motor to the gear housing may corrode and fracture causing a reduction or complete loss of power steering assist.
Loss of power steering assist would require a higher steering effort, especially at lower speeds, which may increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will replace the steering gear mounting bolts and add a corrosion-preventative sealer, free of charge. The recall began May 7, 2019. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-18-32-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016 Model S and Model X vehicles. The electric parking brake calipers have an internal gear that may be improperly manufactured, possibly resulting in the gear fracturing during parking brake application or release.
If the gear breaks during parking brake release, the vehicle will not be able to be moved. If the gear breaks during parking brake application, the parking brake may not adequately hold the vehicle, potentially resulting in the vehicle rolling, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will notify owners, and service centers will replace both the left and right electric parking brake calipers, free of charge. The recall began March 6, 2018. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-17-33-002.
Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain model year 2012-2015 Model S vehicles manufactured May 31, 2012, to November 12, 2015. The affected vehicles are equipped with driver or front passenger seat belts that may be improperly connected to the outboard lap pretensioner.
If the seat belt is not correctly attached to the pretensioner, it may not properly restrain the seat occupant in the event of a crash, increasing their risk of injury.
Tesla will notify owners, and service centers will inspect the driver and front passenger seat belts, correcting their connection, as necessary, free of charge. The recall began on December 14, 2015. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-15-20-002.
On October 25, 2026, I was slowly pulling out of a residential parking space in my 2015 Tesla Model S, which has approximately 82,500 miles. Suddenly, I heard a very loud grinding noise, and the vehicle came to an immediate stop. Afterward, the car would not move either forward or backward. I had not hit any potholes, curbs, or other obstacles. There was no collision or external impact. When I inspected the vehicle, I noticed that the left rear wheel was severely tilted and misaligned. The vehicle became completely undrivable. Based on the visible damage, I suspect a serious failure involving the left rear suspension or wheel assembly. However, the exact component that failed and the cause of the failure have not yet been determined. The vehicle has not yet undergone a mechanical inspection. I have photographs documenting the condition of the rear wheel and suspension area. I am very concerned about the safety implications of this sudden failure. Had this occurred at highway speed, it could have resulted in a serious accident. I contacted Tesla regarding the incident. I am reporting this failure to NHTSA as a potential vehicle safety defect and requesting that it be reviewed for similar incidents involving the 2015 Tesla Model S.
In XXX I paid $2,176.50 out of pocket for an MCU (media control unit) replacement at a Tesla service center on this 2015 Tesla Model S (VIN [XXX]). The invoice documents a black screen and internal hardware failure — the exact 8GB eMMC defect later recalled under NHTSA recall 20V710. I filed for reimbursement under Tesla's General Recall Reimbursement Plan in XXX. Tesla acknowledged receipt on XXX (reference XXX), said the request was 'under review,' and promised an update in 2-3 weeks. Tesla never responded again — no decision, no payment — for over four years despite follow-ups. A second vehicle (2013 Tesla Model S) had a similar MCU repair and was included in the same reimbursement request. Under 49 CFR 573.13(g), a manufacturer must act on a reimbursement claim within 60 days. Tesla violated its own reimbursement plan and the regulation. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
In Nov 2019, while driving at night, the center touchscreen (MCU) of my 2015 Model S went blank and would not recover after restarts. I lost access to nearly all vehicle controls. The daytime running lights remained on, but the headlights did not illuminate despite being set to auto, and I had no way to turn them on manually because the headlight control is on the failed touchscreen. Climate control was inoperative and the windshield began fogging, reducing visibility. I could not open the charge port despite a low battery. I avoided the freeway and took local roads home. This is the failure covered by Recall 21V035 (8GB eMMC wear-out). Tesla service confirmed via diagnostic logs an internal fault within the MCU and replaced it with a remanufactured unit. I paid $2,045.47 out of pocket (invoice uploaded). The defect was not remedied. The remanufactured MCU contains the same 8GB eMMC; since the 2019 replacement the screen still goes blank 2-3 times per year, recovering only after 10-15 minutes of holding the reboot buttons. As of Aug 2026, NHTSA's VIN lookup shows Recall 21V035 as "Recall Incomplete": Tesla has never performed the free remedy (64GB eMMC daughterboard). Component available for inspection. In Feb-Mar 2021, Tesla notified me my vehicle was covered and invited a reimbursement claim per its NHTSA-filed plan (49 CFR 573.13). I submitted the claim through my Tesla account within the claim period. Tesla's portal confirms this: it displays "You have already submitted for the reimbursement" and blocks resubmission (screenshot uploaded). The plan commits to a decision within 60 days. Five years later: no decision, no payment. In Feb 2026, Tesla Support confirmed it has no mechanism to check or process reimbursement claims. I am reporting Tesla's non-compliance with its filed reimbursement plan and its failure to remedy this recall.
●Odometer at time of failure: approximately 204,078 miles ●Date of failure: XXX ●Location of failure: Owner's residential driveway, [XXX] Component Suspension — Front — Lower Control Arm / Front Fore Link / Front Aft Link (right side) Description of the Incident On XXX, at approximately 1:00 PM, I began backing my 2015 Tesla Model S out of my residential driveway. The vehicle was moving at less than five miles per hour. There was no impact with any curb, pothole, road debris, or other object. As the vehicle moved rearward, there was an audible pop from the right front, and the top of the right front tire visibly sank inward (negative camber) as the wheel well collapsed. The vehicle became nearly undriveable and had to be moved slowly to a repair facility approximately 7 miles away. No crash occurred. No injuries occurred. No emergency response was required. However, had this failure happened at highway speed rather than in the driveway, the safety consequences could have been significant. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Parking brake on my TESLA MODEL S will not release. My understanding is that this is from a defective parking brake caliper that was under a recall by TESLA. However, TESLA refuses to acknowledge or repair this issue which is a huge safety problem especially if the parking brake does not engage / release when on an uneven surface. Also, from looking at forums and speaking to other owners, this appears to be a very common issue.
The contact owns a 2015 Tesla Model S. The contact stated that while driving approximately 45 MPH, and approaching a red traffic light, the brake pedal was depressed; however, the braking system became inoperable. The vehicle eventually regained braking functionality. During the failure, the regenerative braking and stability control warning lights were illuminated. The dealer was contacted; however, the vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure. The approximate failure mileage was 170,000.
Following a coolant rapid mate replacement performed by an authorized Tesla service center, the vehicle experienced a complete shutdown on a public road the same evening it was returned. The high-voltage cooling system was not properly purged of air following the service. This caused low coolant flow to the rear drive unit during a 63-mile drive in record heat. The fault cascade included a HIGH VOLTAGE ISOLATION FAULT (BMS_f123), drive inverter warning (DI_w126), and multiple battery management warnings. The instrument cluster displayed a red emergency warning: "Vehicle shutting down — PULL OVER SAFELY." The vehicle required towing. The failure was confirmed by the service center's own follow-up invoice, which documented "trapped air pockets in the coolant system following the most recent service" as the cause. The corrective repair was performed at $0 as a Goodwill service — the service center's internal acknowledgment of liability. The service advisor made a written text admission of causation the following day, then retracted it in a recorded phone call. Both are preserved. No post-repair Isolation Resistance test results were provided. The HV isolation fault may indicate latent thermal damage to HV insulation that could cause a safety failure at higher mileage outside any remaining warranty. The vehicle is available for inspection upon request.
This issue involves critical safety systems, including the rearview camera, front camera, and Autopilot/driver assistance features. The vehicle was taken to Tesla for a recall related to the MCU system. Tesla marked the recall as completed, but no effective repair was performed. The rearview camera remains unavailable, the front camera system is not functioning properly, and driver assistance features continue to be disabled. Tesla returned the vehicle without resolving the safety issue. This condition poses a serious safety risk, as essential visibility and safety systems are not operational despite a completed recall.
The outside passenger front door handle stopped working and no longer allows the door to be opened from the outside. The handle does present and retract but does not respond when you pull it. This handle has been replaced once before by Tesla. Now, when the vehicle goes from being locked to unlocked the passenger front door pops open without any user interaction whatsoever.
Parking brake has locked on and cannot be released
Tesla Model S has a notorious back hatch latching failure. It’s a flawed design that every replacement is a “when” and not “if for failure. As an owner its failed be about 4-5 times in 5+ years of ownership. The hatch back latching issue causes cruise control as well as their Autopilot steering navigation feature to be disabled when latch starts acting up or failing to fully close, which are helpful safety components to keep your car on the road going at proper speeds and staying in lane. Reporting this in hopes someone pushes Tesla to do something about this flaw that should be a manufacturers defect.
The contact owns a 2015 Tesla Model S. The contact stated while driving 40 MPH at night, one of the headlights became inoperable. The contact stated that both headlights had become intermittently inoperable, causing the contact to hesitate to drive the vehicle due to safety concerns. Upon investigating the issue online, the contact learned that several other vehicle owners were experiencing similar failures. The manufacturer was not notified of the failure. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The failure mileage was approximately 100,000.
My 2015 Tesla Model S has a serious safety issue where the vehicle suddenly reverts to Park while driving and will not stay in Drive. I had the car serviced at Tesla’s Austin Ridgepoint location, and they documented that the issue was “resolved” and “validated,” but the problem continues exactly the same. Tesla replaced the rear motor speed sensor, performed tests, and charged me $522 for the repair. However, the vehicle still cannot stay in Drive and remains unsafe to operate. After I reported that the repair did not fix the issue, Tesla deleted the entire service appointment and technician notes from my account, removing documentation of the failed repair. This is a critical safety defect involving unexpected shifting behavior and high-voltage component concerns. Tesla has not resolved the issue and has removed evidence of the repair attempt from my service history. I am requesting NHTSA assistance so Tesla properly addresses this safety hazard.
I had been driving in the rain and the battery got wet. This was found to be due to corroded umbrella valves which allowed water to get in. The car had not been submerged or in deep water, simple driving on the interstate. The car gave me a warning "Service is required-car may not restart." I started out for the service center and the car failed after 65 miles. I thankfully was in a safe place when it happened. I had to be towed from Portland, Maine to Londonderry, NH for service. The umbrella valves were replaced at my cost $1,871.12). The umbrella valve problem is occurring on many models and Tesla is repairing them on the newer models, free of charge. They are not calling it a recall (it's a Service Notice) but I think I should be reimbursed for the repair since they should repair this potentially dangerous problem on all models, not just newer models.
My 2015 tesla model with less than 55000 mi had the front suspension broke on [XXX] when i pull out of the driveway. I heard a hard noise from passenger front tire that is scraping on the fender liner.The car was not drivable and had to be towed to a tesla dealership in cherry hill NJ > Quoted bill is $1800 to replace. With the low mileage , I never expected the suspension to brake unless there is a defect on the cars manufacturer front suspension fore link. I read on the NSHTSA that there was an investigation for the several complain for the 2015 - 2017 tesla model S . The service car representative took a picture of the broken suspension fore link that is holding the suspension front tires. I forgot to ask him to forward the picture to me.Maybe I can ask him when I pick up the car. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
was driving Tesla when warning light appeared “ charging declined “ . drove car home battery no longer charging . Tesla stopped working after only 68,000 miles . Tesla wanted $15000 to replace the battery more than the car is worth.
An investigation has been conducted into a persistent and widespread defect affecting the 2015 Tesla Model S and other early models equipped with the first-generation Media Control Unit (MCU1). This defect manifests as the physical degradation and spontaneous leakage of a sticky adhesive substance from the edges of the vehicle's central infotainment screen and instrument cluster. The leaking substance is not merely a cosmetic issue but presents a credible safety risk to vehicle occupants and the vehicle itself. The substance is a source of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), a class of chemicals with a low boiling point that are known to off-gas into the ambient air, a problem exacerbated by high temperatures. Exposure to these compounds can lead to both acute and long-term health consequences, including respiratory irritation, headaches, and in some cases, serious chronic illnesses. Furthermore, the presence of flammable solvents and components within the adhesive, combined with the heat generated by the electronic components of the MCU1, creates a potential fire risk. This report is submitted to the NHTSA to provide a detailed, technical analysis of the adhesive degradation and leakage in the 2015 Tesla Model S. The purpose is to formally document this specific defect as a safety issue that warrants regulatory action, separate from but related to the manufacturer's previous recall for the MCU1's eMMC memory wear. It is essential to demonstrate that the adhesive failure is not a cosmetic inconvenience but a distinct material failure with serious implications for occupant health and vehicle safety. This report aims to provide the necessary evidence and analysis to support a formal investigation and a comprehensive recall that fully addresses this physical defect.
What happened? While driving my 2015 Tesla Model S, the main touchscreen (MCU) began intermittently going black, disabling access to essential vehicle controls, navigation, climate settings, and rear-view camera display. At times when the MCU was functioning, the rear-view camera feed would still display a black screen upon shifting into Reverse, leaving me without any rear visibility. Component or system that failed: Media Control Unit (MCU1) / eMMC memory failure Rear-view camera and/or associated wiring harness Safety risk: The intermittent blackouts of the MCU and loss of rear camera feed created significant safety hazards, especially when reversing or attempting to adjust driving settings while in motion. The loss of rear visibility increased the risk of collision with pedestrians, cyclists, or obstacles. The MCU failure also limited access to defrost/defog controls and turn signal audio feedback. Problem reproduction and confirmation: Tesla Service has confirmed both the MCU1 hardware failure and the rear-view camera malfunction. The problems occurred repeatedly before being inspected. Inspection: The vehicle has been inspected by Tesla Service Center technicians, who diagnosed both the failing MCU1 and the defective rear-view camera. Warning messages or symptoms prior to failure: For MCU: slow system performance, frozen screen, then intermittent complete blackouts while driving. For rear-view camera: black or distorted camera feed when in Reverse, even when the MCU display was otherwise operational. These issues began occurring in June 2025 and became progressively worse until Tesla inspection on July 6, 2025.
A few times the steering control has shut off while I am driving. Steering failure lasts a few seconds and then returns to normal function. The car makes a VERY loud alarm sound when the steering is inoperable. I have not seen any failure messages on the screen or in the Service menu. I took the car to Tesla for service yesterday. They did some sort of remote scan of the fault codes and told me that there is nothing wrong. They told me to continue to drive the car and record when the steering stops working again. This sounds like ridiculously bad advice to me. While the steering control has always returned in just a few seconds, that does not mean that it will in any future failure. I am concerned about driving this car. Tesla wants $275 an hour to investigate the problem, which also seems ridiculous to me. I have seen that there has been a recall for similar problems in newer Tesla Model S vehicles. It seems logical to me that these problems may be related and deserve additional investigation ... at Tesla's expense.
Many air bubbles are appearing towards the bottom of the instrument panel on our 2015 Tesla Model S. This started a couple of weeks ago and the bubbles are increasing in size and number and they are moving upwards. The bubbles don’t presently obscure important driver information such as the transmission mode (drive, park, reverse, neutral), remaining battery range (e.g. 80%), car speed (mph), parking sensor distance, brake light status, car door open, frunk open, tailgate open, time, outdoor temperature, car lights on/off, warning lights, etc. However, the bubbles likely will do so in the future. Much of this information is vital for safe driving (e.g. transmission mode, speed (mph), remaining battery range, brake light status, and warning lights). As such this display should be replaced by Tesla at nominal or no charge to the owner. According to the internet, the cause of these air bubbles is a failed seal around the instrument cluster that allows a lamination fluid between the LCD display and the cover glass to leak out. It is a very common problem with older Model S’s. It is a critical safety problem.
Large drive unit that has previously been replaced by Tesla failed due to coolant ingress leaking through rotor seal. Known issue per 3rd party technicians.
Hi, my trunk won't open when I press the button. This is the second occurrence that jas happend. When inside the trunk compartment the emergency cable to open the trunk is also not responsive and can not open the trunk. I think this is a big safety concern as the safety cord is there for a reason and in both cases id did not worked.
Steering: While driving today (7/5/2025), all of a sudden and without warning, "driver assist" (power steering) became disabled. Steering wheel immediately became heavy in the sense that it was extremely difficult to turn. Motor: Also, on 02/22/2024, while driving on the freeway at freeway speed, all of a sudden and without warning, the rear LDU (large drive unit) failed and the car became inoperable. At that time, the car had approximately 45k miles on it.
Electric power steering stopped working unexpectedly and making it very difficult to steer and drive safely.
I parked my 2015 Tesla Model S and found the rear door on the passenger side would not open from the outside even though the door handle was extended. This is a safety concern as we could not open the door to remove our pet dog from the car. It would also not be possible to open the door from the outside to remove a child in a car seat next to the door or an elderly or disabled person sitting next to the door who is unable to open the door from the inside. This could be life threatening in the case of a car crash. It is a major safety defect that should be repaired at no cost by Tesla for the entire lifespan of the car. The problem persists and is reproducible.
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
From 2000 through 2017, Takata produced millions of air bag inflators using two types of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate ("PSAN") propellant -- propellant 2004 and propellant 2004L. After prolonged exposure to high temperature cycles and humidity, inflators using propellant 2004 can degrade, causing the propellant to burn too quickly when ignited. The rapid burning can cause the inflator to rupture during deployment, potentially causing serious or even fatal injury to vehicle occupants. See 2016 Blomquist Report at www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/expert_report-hrblomquist.pdf.Consequently, all frontal inflators using propellant 2004 that do not contain a "desiccant" (a substance that traps and holds moisture) in US vehicles are under recall. These "non-desiccated" inflators either have been or are required to be replaced.In some cases, the remedy part for these recalled inflators was, or will be, an inflator using either propellant 2004 or 2004L that does contain a desiccant. None of these "desiccated" remedy parts (which were installed in older model year vehicles) are currently under recall for a degradation concern. Certain subsets of desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004 for use as original equipment, however, have been recalled for a degradation concern. All Takata inflators produced with propellant 2004L contain desiccant, and none of these desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L are under recall for a degradation concern. There have been no reported field ruptures in any non-recalled desiccated PSAN inflators.It is understood that desiccants fully saturate at some threshold, at which point any additional moisture will not be captured. This means the degradation process observed in non-desiccated inflators using propellant 2004 may also occur in non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004, assuming additional moisture enters the inflator and high temperature cycling occurs. Based on available information, desiccant saturation can occur within the first five years in the worst environments, and the time required for full saturation is affected by multiple factors. While no present safety risk has been identified, further work is needed to evaluate the future risk of non-recalled desiccated inflators using propellant 2004.Three entities -- Takata (now known as TK Global), the Independent Testing Coalition, and Exponent -- have been studying the long-term behavior of Takata desiccated PSAN inflators using propellant 2004L (as well as 2004) in the presence of moisture and temperature cycling. The research efforts, which include development of predictive modeling techniques and field sample analysis, are ongoing. To date, none of the researchers have identified field evidence showing that propellant 2004L is undergoing a degradation process that leads to aggressive deployment and potential rupture. However, the time in service of such inflators remains short compared to that of the inflators using propellant 2004. Further study is needed to assess the long-term safety of desiccated inflators using propellant 2004L.The Office of Defects Investigation is opening this investigation to examine whether a safety defect related to propellant degradation exists in non-recalled desiccated PSAN frontal inflators manufactured by Takata. This investigation will require extensive information on Takata production processes and surveys of inflators in the field. Lists of recall actions that may have used desiccated PSAN inflators as remedy parts, as well as the makes and models originally manufactured with them, is available with the downloadable version of this document (see nhtsa.gov/recalls?nhtsaId=EA21002 -- note this information is subject to change/revision as the investigation proceeds). This investigation does not supersede EA15-001, which remains open.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation based on forty-three complaints alleging failure of the left or right front suspension fore links in Tesla model year (MY) 2015 through 2017 Model S and MY 2016 through 2017 Model X vehicles. The investigation has identified 426 instances of failure on part number 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links.None of the instances resulted in any loss of vehicle control. One minor crash with no injuries is associated with the 426 instances fore link failures.A majority of the failures occurred between one to fifteen mph while parking in driveways or parking lots.In the eight instances where the vehicle was traveling more than 40 mph and the fore link failed, the vehicle remained controllable with no associated crash or injuries as a result. Tesla issued a consumer satisfaction bulletin (SB-17-31-001) on 10 February 2017, to replace the subject component on a sub-population of vehicles originally equipped with the subject fore links and built between 19 January 2016 and 25 May 2016.This sub population does not cover 75% instances of failures identified in this investigation. Additional damage to other vehicle components will occur if the vehicle is driven with this failed fore link.However no instance has shown that a failure of the fore link in this manner prevented the controllability of the vehicle in testing and reported failures. Based on this analysis,ODI is closing the investigation. ODI recommends that Tesla expand the terms of Bulletin SB-17-31-001 to cover all vehicles equipped with 1041570-00-A or 1041575-00-A fore links. This does not constitute a finding by the Agency that a safety-related defect is not present; the Agency will take further action if warranted by additional information received. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On November 20, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Engineering Analysis (EA) 20-003 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-18 Tesla Model S and model year (MY) 2016-2018 Tesla Model X vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. During its investigation, ODI learned that the expected usage life rating for the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device is approximately 3,000 “P/E” or Program-Erase cycles, after which the eMMC NAND flash memory device would become fully consumed and no longer be operational, leading to a failure of the media control unit (MCU). At a daily cycle usage rate of 1.4 per block, accumulation of 3,000 P/E cycles would take only 5-6 years. Historically, the expected life of a vehicle generally far exceeds 5-6 years of service. ODI believes that a 5- or 6-year life expectancy for a component integral to providing the driver with safety functions is insufficient. During our review of the data, Tesla provided confirmation that all units will inevitably fail given the memory device’s finite storage capacity. Tesla provided its own statistical model showing the number of projected weekly MCU repairs from 2020 to 2028, estimating that replacement rates for MCU failures will peak in early 2022 and gradually decline until (near) full part turnover has been accomplished in 2028. According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardware will fail when reaching lifetime wear, for which the eMMC controller has no available memory blocks necessary to recover. With this failure mode, the only recovery available is a replacement of the eMMC device, achieved by physical part replacement of either the MCU assembly or visual control module subcomponent. Tesla provided information concerning the effects of MCU failure on vehicle function, which include in loss of rearview/backup camera and loss of HVAC (defogging and defrosting) setting controls (if the HVAC status was OFF status prior to failure). The failure also affects the Autopilot advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) and turn signal functionality due to the possible loss of audible chimes, driver sensing, and alerts associated with these vehicle functions. Based on this analysis, ODI issued a Recall Request Letter (RRL) on January 13, 2021. The RRL was based on ODI’s tentative conclusion that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists in the subject vehicles because the eMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles, after which the MCU fails due to memory wear-out, which constitutes a premature failure of safety-critical part. Tesla responded to the Recall Request Letter (RRL) on January 27, 2021, and disputed the tentative findings of the RRL. Nevertheless, on January 29, 2021, Tesla filed a safety recall (21V-035), recalling (MY) 2012-2018 Tesla Model S and (MY) 2016-2018 Model X vehicles with a center display equipped with a NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor and an 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. In this recall, Tesla is providing a free hardware remedy in addition to the over-the-air (“OTA”) firmware updates that the company had previously implemented. NHTSA will continue to monitor the issue as part of its ordinary processes for overseeing the effectiveness of recalls. However, based on available information, at this time, Tesla’s recall appears to address the unreasonable risk to motor safety presented by the premature failure of the component. Accordingly, the investigation is closed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On June 22, 2020, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE20-010 to investigate incidents of media control unit (MCU) failures resulting in loss of rearview camera in model year (MY) 2012-2015 Tesla Model S vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device. EMMC NAND flash devices have a finite lifespan based upon the number of program/erase (P/E) cycles. The subject MCU allegedly fails prematurely due to memory wear-out of the eMMC NAND flash. Tesla used the same MCU with the Tegra 3 processor in approximately 159 thousand 2012-2018 Model S and 2016-2018 Model X vehicles built by Tesla through early-2018. In response to ODI's Information Request (IR) for PE20-010, Tesla provided ODI with 2,399 complaints and field reports, 7,777 warranty claims, and 4,746 non-warranty claims related to MCU replacements. The data show failure rates over 30 percent in certain build months and accelerating failure trends after 3 to 4 years-in-service.According to Tesla, for subject vehicles equipped with the NVIDIA Tegra 3 processor with an integrated 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory device, the eMMC NAND cell hardware can fail when reaching lifetime wear, for which the eMMC controller has no available blocks to recover. With this failure mode, the only recovery available is a replacement of the eMMC device, achieved by physical part replacement of either the MCU assembly or visual control module subcomponent. Tesla provided the effects of MCU failure on vehicle function which result in loss of rearview/backup camera, loss of HVAC (defogging) setting controls (if the HVAC status was OFF status prior to failure.) There is also an impact on the advanced driver assistance support (ADAS) Autopilot system, and turn signal functionality due to the possible loss of audible chimes, driver sensing, and alerts associated with these vehicle functions. There are precedents for addressing defects that result in loss of either backup camera, defogging, or turn signal functions under safety recalls.Tesla has implemented certain Over-The-Air or OTA updates to subject vehicles to mitigate the effects of MCU failure. These updates include firmware changes to reduce memory usage of the subject memory card, improve eMMC error correction and storage management strategies, changing the control logic for turn signal activation, and defaulting the HVAC system to Auto (71.6F) for drives after MCU failure to address windshield defogging. Tesla indicated that the MCU failures are likely to continue to occur in subject vehicles as vehicles continue to operate and use available memory in the 8GB eMMC NAND flash memory until 100% of units have failed. This investigation has been upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA20-003). The VOQs associated with the upgrade of this investigation are identified in the attachment to this resume.
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of SUA in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the Agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints ODI added to its evaluation can be viewed at NHTSA.gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by ODI are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the Federal Register.
In a letter dated September 17, 2019, Mr. Edward Chen petitioned the NHTSA to initiate a defect investigation of certain Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles that received revised battery management software in one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates from Tesla, beginning in May 2019. The petitioner bases his request on vehicle fires that took place worldwide and OTA software updates Tesla made to the Battery Management System (BMS) of certain Tesla vehicles that resulted in loss of available vehicle mileage range and increased charging durations.On October 1, 2019, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP19-005 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. Information provided by Tesla in response to ODI's information request letter for DP19-005 indicated that a firmware update that may limit maximum voltage was installed in certain MY 2012 through 2016 Model S vehicles (subject vehicles). The voltage limiting firmware is a dynamic algorithm that is enabled in vehicles with high Supercharging use histories, which contributes to high usage stress to the high-voltage (HV) battery. Tesla sold approximately 61,781 subject vehicles in the United States and, through August 2021, the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in approximately 2,062 vehicles. Through December 2020, ODI identified 59 complaints from consumers alleging reductions in battery capacity (52) or charging speed (7) in the subject vehicles. Log data from these vehicles showed that the voltage limiting firmware had been enabled in about 58 percent (30 of 52) of the complaints alleging range loss. Subsequent updates have restored some or all of the battery capacity to vehicles affected by the voltage limiting firmware coupled with updates enhancing BMS battery brick monitoring algorithms. None of the complaint vehicles have reported any thermal incidents or other safety hazards related to the HV battery.The five non-crash fires referenced in the petition include two fires that occurred in China in early 2019 involving vehicles that: 1) had recently completed Supercharging sessions; 2) were at a high state-of-charge (SOC) of the HV battery; 3) were parked with the battery cooling system shutoff; and 4) had histories of high-stress usage for the HV batteries. The three fires that occurred outside China did not involve the same fact patterns regarding vehicle state and charging history. The two fires that occurred in the United States include one involving a vehicle with no Supercharging history that was driving when the fire occurred and another in which the origin of the fire was external to the HV battery. The fifth fire, which also originated external to the HV battery, involved a vehicle in Germany that had been parked at a low SOC for an extended period. To date, incidents of fires involving parked vehicles with recent Supercharging and histories of high-stress use have only been observed in China, where high-stress use factors appear to be more common. NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the absence of any incidents in the United States related to fast charging, and the absence of any such incidents globally since May 2019, it is unlikely that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect would be issued due to any investigation opened as a result of granting this petition. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition, and the potential risks to safety, th
On May 7, 2016, a 2015 Tesla Model S collided with a tractor trailer crossing an uncontrolled intersection on a highway west of Williston, Florida, resulting in fatal injuries to the Tesla driver.Data obtained from the Model S indicated that:1) the Tesla was being operated in Autopilot mode at the time of the collision; 2) the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system did not provide any warning or automated braking for the collision event; and 3) the driver took no braking, steering or other actions to avoid the collision.On June 28, 2016, NHTSA opened PE16-007 to ?examine the design and performance of any automated driving systems in use at the time of the crash.?The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) analyzed the following subjects as part of NHTSA?s examination of the design and performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system:1) Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system design and performance in the subject Tesla and peer vehicles; 2) human-machine interface issues related to Autopilot operating mode; 3) data from crash incidents related to Tesla?s Autopilot and AEB systems; and 4) changes Tesla has implemented in the Autopilot and AEB systems.NHTSA?s examination did not identify any defects in the design or performance of the AEB or Autopilotsystems of the subject vehicles nor any incidents in which the systems did not perform as designed.AEB systems used in the automotive industry through MY 2016 are rear-end collision avoidance technologies that are not designed to reliably perform in all crash modes, including crossing path collisions.The Autopilot system is an Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) that requires the continual and full attention of the driver to monitor the traffic environment and be prepared to take action to avoid crashes.Tesla's design included a hands-on the steering wheel system for monitoring driver engagement.That system has been updated to further reinforce the need for driver engagement through a strike out strategy.Drivers that do not respond to visual cues in the driver monitoring system alerts may strike out and lose Autopilot function for the remainder of the drive cycle.A safety-related defect trend has not been identified at this time and further examination of this issue does not appear to be warranted.Accordingly, this investigation is closed.The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists.The agency will monitor the issue and reserves the right to take future action if warranted by the circumstances.For more information about the analysis, see the attached report.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
Bars are owner complaints, dots mark years with recalls. Select a year to open its report.