2023 Tesla Model S
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model S › 2023
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2023 Tesla Model S. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
13 recalls name the 2023 Tesla Model S. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017, 2021-2023 Model 3, 2020-2023 Model Y, 2021-2023 Model S, and Model X vehicles operating software version 2026.8.6. The rearview camera image may be delayed when the vehicle is placed in reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 111…
A delayed rearview image reduces the driver's view behind the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 3, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model S and 2021-2025 Model X vehicles. An air bag with the incorrect horn pad may have been installed, preventing the horn from sounding.
An inoperative horn may prevent the driver from alerting other drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla service will inspect and install an air bag with the correct horn pad as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed May 20, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-20-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2025 Model S and Model X vehicles. The driver's air bag could tear during deployment. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) numbers 208, "Occupant Crash Protection" and 212, "Windshield Mounting."
A torn air bag may not adequately protect an occupant in a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla service will replace the air bag assembly, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 21, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-20-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2024 Model Y vehicles. The hood latch assembly may fail to detect an unlatched hood condition after the hood has been opened.
An unlatched hood can fully open, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 24, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-012.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2023 Model S, X, and Y vehicles equipped with full self-driving computer 4.0 and running a software release version 2023.44.30 through 2023.44.30.6 or 2023.44.100. Software instability may prevent the rearview camera image from displaying.
A rearview image that does not display while in reverse decreases the driver's visibility and increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 22, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2023 Model S and X vehicles. The cabin doors can be unlocked during a crash. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 214, "Side Impact Protection."
An unlocked door may unlatch and open during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 17, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-009.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model S and Model X vehicles. An incorrect air bag may have been installed when the steering yoke or round steering wheel was replaced with a different style of yoke or steering wheel.
An air bag that is not designed to function with the replacement steering yoke or wheel may deploy incorrectly, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and replace the driver air bag as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed January 2, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-20-005.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2023 Model S and Model X vehicles. The front-row seat belts may not be connected properly to the pretensioner anchors, which can cause the seat belts to detach.
A detached seat belt may not properly restrain an occupant during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect the front-row seat belts and connect the seat belts to pretensioner anchors, or replace the seat belt assemblies, as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 12, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-20-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2023 Model S, Model X, and Model Y vehicles. The forward-facing camera may be misaligned, causing some of the active safety features such as emergency braking, forward collision warning, and lane assist to become unavailable without alerting the driver.
Safety features that are unavailable without any warning to the driver may increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and adjust the pitch angle, as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 12, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-17-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
While driving at freeway speed at about 9:15 PM with Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged, the car suddenly jerked and told me to take over. Several safety systems then failed at once: ABS disabled (ESP_a025), stability control disabled (DI_a222), traction control disabled (DI_a223), Automatic Emergency Braking unavailable (APP_w009), Vehicle Hold disabled (DI_a245, DI_a246), steering assist reduced (UI_a020), and lane departure avoidance unavailable (APP_w264). Steering became very heavy and regenerative braking stopped, so the car coasted freely and would only slow with the brake pedal. I exited the freeway and drove slowly home. The alerts stayed active after a reboot. The car was towed to the Tesla service center under warranty and is available for inspection. There were no warning signs before the failure. No crash or injury. This is the second event like this. In April 2026 the car showed safety fault alerts and, with automatic braking disabled, rolled forward twice at a red light. Tesla service reviewed the logs, called it a false sensor reading, and made no repair. A service advisor later acknowledged in writing that these were intermittent problems. My children ride in this car regularly. I no longer consider it safe to drive.
Tesla removed speed control from their "full self-driving" product. They have removed the ability to conveniently switch to normal cruise control (have to pull over on freeway or get off freeway to park first) and speed profiles use outdated map data and frequently suddenly change speeds. Sometimes they go away faster than the speed limit and sometimes the car suddenly drops 20mp less in the middle of freeway traffic.
Catastrophic structural failure of the rear driver-side (LH) brake caliper assembly on a 2023 Tesla Model S Plaid at approximately 18,036 miles. While driving normally on a public roadway, the factory-installed rear LH brake caliper bolts backed out completely due to improper assembly torque or a latent material defect. The unbolted caliper detached entirely from its mounting bracket and collapsed into the spinning wheel barrel. The caliper became violently wedged between the wheel rim and the rotor, instantly puncturing the wheel, flattening the driver-side rear tire, damaging the passenger-side (RH) rear tire, and causing an immediate loss of vehicle control. The loose caliper acted as an unconstrained projectile inside the wheel assembly, severing the hydraulic brake line, shredding the electronic parking brake harness, destroying the suspension links (rear lower fore/aft links), and destroying the ABS sensor/module. This failure created an extreme, life-threatening hazard of a sudden high-speed wheel lockup and total brake system failure. An independent Pre-Purchase Inspection (PPI) was completed just 263 miles prior to this incident. The certified inspector completed an 85-mile test drive and verified the braking and suspension systems were operating in normal factory condition with zero abnormal vibrations or loose hardware. This establishes the failure as a sudden, latent assembly torque failure of factory hardware during normal operational stress. The manufacturer's authorized service center confirmed via technician notes that the caliper came entirely loose and lodged into the wheel. Despite this being a severe assembly workmanship failure within the active factory warranty window, the manufacturer is refusing to cover the repair, alleging third-party tampering without physical or forensic proof. The failed hardware is being retained for forensic inspection.
My 2023 Tesla Model S has a horn activated by a small button on the right side of the steering wheel rather than by pressing the center of the steering wheel. During a recent dangerous traffic situation, I needed to use the horn immediately to warn another driver, but I could not locate and activate the horn button quickly enough while concentrating on avoiding the hazard. No collision occurred. The incident occurred approximately on August 23–24, 2026; I do not recall the exact date. I reported this to Tesla as a safety concern. Tesla confirmed that my vehicle can be converted to the newer steering wheel configuration with a mechanical center horn. Tesla initially quoted $1,177.34 for the replacement. After further diagnostics, Tesla determined that the conversion also requires replacement of the driver airbag and revised the customer-pay estimate to $1,748.50. Tesla declined to cover the conversion under warranty or goodwill. After I escalated the matter through Tesla Customer Support, a Tesla Service Manager also declined the request and advised me that if I believe this presents a safety issue, I should report it to NHTSA. The existing horn is operational. My safety concern is that the location and method of horn activation can make this essential warning device difficult to access instinctively and immediately during an emergency.
My Tesla Model S has a touch-sensitive horn button on the right side of the steering wheel. In urgent situations, I've often had difficulty quickly locating it to get another driver's attention. Tesla quoted me $1800 to replace the steering wheel with a model that has the horn in the center, like most other cars. This is a safety concern because owners shouldn't have to pay to move the horn for safety reasons. Tesla should be required to retrofit any model with a touch button for the horn to one with the horn in the center of the steering wheel.
The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while exiting a supercharging station with the Full Self-Driving (FSD) feature engaged, the message "Take Over Immediately" was displayed. The contact stated that the vehicle abruptly accelerated into an intersection and crashed head-on with another vehicle. The air bags deployed as needed. The contact stated that a Police report was filed; however, the report number was not provided. There were no injuries sustained. The vehicle was towed to an independent mechanic, where it remained undiagnosed and unrepaired. The manufacturer was notified of the failure but provided no assistance. The failure mileage was 150,332.
The driver's seat assembly on the vehicle suffers from a critical mechanical and software tracking defect that causes the seat to permanently jam into a mechanical lock, creating an immediate and severe safety hazard. The electronic calibration soft-stops for the driver's seat allow the mechanism to travel past the safe limits of the track when indexed or operated. When the seat reaches the absolute mechanical limit of the rear rail, the lead screw/worm gear mechanism binds tightly, resulting in a total mechanical lock where the motor lacks the breakaway torque to reverse direction. This causes the driver's seat to become permanently stuck in the fully rearward position. This defect directly compromises vehicle safety by potentially preventing a driver from safely reaching and operating the brake and accelerator pedals. The vehicle has been taken to the manufacturer's service center on three separate occasions for this exact issue. During these three visits, technicians physically replaced the seat motor, checked track alignment, and attempted recalibration. Despite these repeated hardware interventions, the defect persists, and the seat continues to travel past safe limits and bind into a mechanical lock. The manufacturer has now refused to correct the underlying track/assembly defect under warranty, incorrectly dismissing the recurring, hazardous mechanical failure as "customer education." The vehicle lacks a safe physical fail-safe to prevent the seat from self-destructing into a permanently jammed state.
Repeated warning of failure of Front left safety restraint system. Now also a seatbelt warning light. Have already bright car to service three times. Tesla acknowledges inability to resolve recurrent issue. I think this was a recall issue for previous years of this model, Model S. Most recent yesterday, Friday, June 12, 2026.
I feel Tesla has introduced two safety issues with a recent version of software relating to the "Full Self Driving (Supervised)" feature. Issue #1. When disengaging the Full Self Driving ("FSD") software, Tesla positions a dialog box over the main center display screen. The box takes up a fairly large portion of space. The purpose of the box is to provide feedback on the reason for disengaging FSD. This dialog box does not dismiss by itself. The only way for the user to dismiss it is to tap one of the 4 options presented or leave a voice message. This is an unnecessary distraction that in no way is required for the user to operate the vehicle. Tesla is mandating feedback and introducing distractions when users take over control of the vehicle for their sole benefit. It is also akin to a penalty for disabling FSD, as it a generally negative experience for most people. Issue #2. Tesla has introduced a mandatory "FSD Streak" counter. This number appears on the smaller instrumentation screen for the S & X models. The counter counts the number of miles consecutively traveled by FSD. When a driver disables FSD for any reason, the counter resets to 0. The gamification of keeping FSD enabled is a major safety issue. Some people are highly susceptible to increasing this number as high as possible as if it were a video game. In situations where they should likely disable FSD and make manual control, there are inevitably users that will hesitate or maybe even not take control at all because they do not want to reset the counter. Tesla does not have any options to disable or remove this counter, so even people who know they are susceptible to this cannot remove it. This is akin to placing an open beer in the car and saying people will not drink it because they have self control... only - as we know, addiction is a disease, and games are just as addicting as many substances.
The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model S. The contact stated that the horn button on the right side of the steering wheel was not easily accessible. The contact was concerned that the issue could prevent the driver from beeping the horn during emergencies, increasing the risk of a crash. The manufacturer was notified of the failure and advised the contact to purchase the improved steering wheel designed with a center horn. The vehicle was not repaired. The failure mileage was unavailable.
Tesla just sold me a car with defective front half shafts axles. The car makes a reproducible and very concerning accelerator pedal shudder that makes the entire vehicle front vibrate, including the steering wheel and brake pedals while the car is accelerating between 30-60mph. This interferes with safety features like, lane departure assistance and blind spot steering wheel feedback, Confusing the driver and creating a distracting scenario where an accident can happen. Upon bringing this to the attention of the service center in Fort Myers Florida, the service center manager took a drive test with me, and was able to replicate the issue, but immediately started dismissing it as "normal" and within Tesla specs. This is becoming a regular practice at that service center, where they deem warrantable issues as normal and within (their tolerance). I insisted that this issue is not to be taken likely by Tesla, because it is something that involves a safety hazard. Upon further research, I was able to find that this issue is happening to many Teslas model S and X, where the front axles bend due to the weight and high torque of the vehicles. The issue falls completely under warranty and the half shafts should be replaced, but apparently Tesla has instructed their service centers to dismiss and disregard the symptoms, and just tell the customers that no warranty replacement will occur, because it is not necessary, we just have to drive the cars like this, until the car completely fails, or an accident happens because one of the bent axle shafts breaks on a highway during normal drive. I recording this report as evidence that the issue has been reported to the highest vehicle safety authorities, and I expect a corrective action so Tesla can fix my car under the existing unexpired warranty.
I have been consistently at risk since I picked up my car in late December 2023. The Horn icon which is impossible for older people to see, especially at night, is located in a place that is very hard to find on the steering wheel and unintuitive. Just yesterday, a large truck was coming around the corner near my house in my lane in the opposite direction and I could not find the horn to honk. It was another near miss. Interestingly, Tesla changed the design and put the horn in the middle of the steering wheel where it belongs starting in January 2024 just a few days after I picked up my car. I need the Horn in an intuitive place in the middle of the steering wheel for my safety and the safety of the other people on the road I believe Tesla should pay to change out the steering wheel
My car had a software update last night. This morning, there is now a forced "feedback" prompt that comes on the information screen whenever I disengage the autopilot. This prompt grays out the rest of the screen and does not disappear until I manually select a feedback option. This forced prompt is very distracting, requiring manual user input to get rid of, which makes driving distracting and dangerous.
The vehicle is over reporting it's speed by 5% this is a large discrepancy which effects safety by causing people drivers around you to change lanes because you are traveling under the speed limit. Tesla is unable to calibrate the speedometers are the service center. They have documented the failure. It also adds miles to the odometer prematurely. This problem started after Tesla upgraded the car with a Track Package which is a $24,000 upgrade
The horn is a little button on the steering wheel. Tesla has since switched to a center horn. I assume this is due to safety concern that accessing the horn during a panicked situation is difficult. I have almost been in a few accidents as it is impossible to find the horn while evading a potential accident. Tesla will not modify my vehicle as a safety related issue and instead wants to charge almost 2,000. This should be a recall. Tesla switched back to a center horn, a clear admission that there is a design flaw. How they can't modify a vehicle under a recall is ludicrous.
Auto emergency braking is occurring when vehicle recognizes leaves as people. This has happened on three occasions. It is startling to say the least and a matter of time that I am rear ended due to this. Service center acknowledged these events but said they can't do anything about it.
While operating my 2023 Tesla Model S Long range using Full Self Driving Supervised and software version 14.2.1.25, the speed control no longer is available and has been replaced by speed profiles. When operating the vehicle on Interstate 77 Southbound around Statesville, NC and on or about December 22, 2025, I set the speed profiles to standard in a 55 mph zone in which the Tesla recognized and displayed that it was operating in a 55 mph zone in Standard profile mode, the car varied in speed (with no traffic ahead) from about 57 mph to over 76 mph. This is highly unsafe and I had to repeatedly move back to Chill or Sloth mode at which time the vehicle strongly and unsafely braked causing cars behind me to close on me quickly and have to make strong and unplanned braking maneuvers to avoid hitting me. This was not the case when I bought the car and FSD when operating under 13.2.9. The removal of max speed control is extremely unpredictable and unsafe for me and those around me.
needed to honk the horn to alert another driver of impending collision but the small button, now located to the right of the center of the steering wheels, is too hard to locate in a quick emergency situation. you look away , miss the button and set off wipers instead.,... shd be put back as pushable center
Without prior incident or warning all ADAS systems stopped working, including adaptive cruise control, AP, FSD, automatic emergency breaking, blind spot warning, forward collision warning, lane departure warning, lane keeping assistance, parking collision warning. There were no alerts displayed on either driver’s display (other than ‘park assist unavailable’). Also there was no visualization of surrounding traffic, roads etc that is normally visible. The cameras were clean. Rebooting the MCU did not resolve the issues.
The steering wheels on these Tesla Model S vehicles have a horn button instead of depressing the center of the wheel. This button is difficult to find when turning the wheel or when an incident is happening.
The contact owns a 2023 Tesla Model S. The contact stated that while attempting to reverse the vehicle, the Collision Avoidance Assist system failed to operate as designed while reversing from the garage. A dealer was contacted. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired by a dealer or independent mechanic. The manufacturer was notified of the failure and stated that a representative would be sent to the residence to inspect the vehicle. The failure mileage was 16,000.
The horn being a button is a safety hazard, and Tesla should replace it at no cost. On many occasions my steering wheel was upside down and I had to press the horn button and couldn’t find it. I expressed my concerns to Tesla and they said I have to pay to get the steering wheel with the horn in the center.
For 2023, Tesla has put the horn on the steering wheel. It's a tiny button on the right side. When you are in a very precarious situation and you have to honk without thought, it is impossible to find it quickly. I have been almost hit several times because I couldn't honk. I am scared and it is dangerous. In 2024, they moved it back to where it belongs because they knew it was an issue. I have asked to have my steering wheel replaced to have the correct and safe horn and they said that they wouldn't unless it was a recall. I think this should be recalled. It is unsafe.
To Whom It May Concern, I am writing to formally report a significant safety concern with the design of the steering wheel horn mechanism in my Tesla vehicle. The horn is not activated by pressing the center of the steering wheel, as is standard in most vehicles. Instead, it is operated via a small button located on the wheel itself, measuring approximately 1/2 inch by 1/4 inch. This design poses a serious safety risk. In emergency situations that require an immediate and instinctive response—such as warning another driver or preventing a collision—locating and pressing this small button requires visual attention. This necessitates taking my eyes off the road during critical moments, thereby increasing the likelihood of accidents. I have experienced multiple near-miss incidents and one collision directly related to the inability to quickly locate and activate the horn. When I contacted Tesla to request a replacement with the newer steering wheel design (which addresses this issue), I was quoted approximately $3,000 for the replacement. Upon calling to discuss the concern, I was told that I "knew about the design when I purchased the vehicle" and was advised to simply "get used to it." I believe this is an inherent design flaw that compromises driver safety. The horn is a fundamental vehicle safety feature and should be intuitive and instantly accessible without requiring the driver to divert attention from the road. I respectfully request that this issue be investigated as a potential violation of basic vehicle safety standards. I also urge Tesla to provide a remedy to owners affected by this unsafe design without imposing prohibitive costs. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. Sincerely, [XXX] [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The left turn signal is intermittent, it works most of the time, but many times the button on the yoke will not turn on the turn signal. Tesla wants $265 to fix it even though I still am under the factory warranty. After a quick internet search this appears to be a known problem. Because there is no turn yoke (which is a very poor design and that should be recalled) I have to rest my finger on the detent for the left and right switch. If I do not I am turning on the incorrect signal. This is either a button problem or software issue, I had to have my first yoke replaced on 4/22/24 as it was defective.
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
On March 24, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) after receiving 2 consumer complaints alleging the front seat belts had suddenly detached from the outboard lap pretensioner anchor while in motion in model year (MY) 2022-2023 Tesla Model X vehicles. In its June 19, 2023 response to ODI’s May 4, 2023 Information Request letter of the PE, Tesla reported that its review of field repair data identified 12 additional warranty claims of the subject condition in the affected vehicles. On July 14, 2023, Tesla filed a safety recall (NHTSA No. 23V-488) of 15,869 MY 2021 - 2023 Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles. The recall remedy is an inspection of the 1st row seat belts for proper connection to the pretensioners. Service personnel will resecure the pretensioners or, if necessary, replace the seat belt retractor assembly. In its recall filing, Tesla stated that effective June 22, 2023, it had updated procedures requiring a first-row seat belt to be disconnected from- and reconnected to- its pretensioner anchor to include additional visual aids to assist technicians and require a pull test-step to confirm that the seat belt was reconnected to the pretensioner anchor to specification. In view of the recall action and process updates taken by Tesla, ODI is closing this PE. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
Bars are owner complaints, dots mark years with recalls. Select a year to open its report.