2018 Tesla Model 3
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model 3 › 2018
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2018 Tesla Model 3. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
19 recalls name the 2018 Tesla Model 3. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2023 Model 3 and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. The headlight low beams may be too bright and exceed the maximum light output. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment."
Headlight low beams that are too bright can reduce visibility for oncoming drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will replace the headlights, free of charge. Interim owner notification letters explaining the safety risk were be mailed October 3, 2026. Another notice will be sent once the repair becomes available. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-17-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 Model S, 2020-2021 Model X, 2018-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A factory reset muted the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 141, "Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 27, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2019 Model 3 vehicles. The front suspension lateral link fasteners may loosen, allowing the lateral link to separate from the sub-frame.
A lateral link separation could shift the wheel alignment, causing instability and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will tighten or replace the lateral link fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed May 30, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-31-001. This recall is an expansion of previous recall number 21V-835.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The second-row left seat belt buckle and second-row center seat belt anchor may have been incorrectly reassembled during vehicle service.
An incorrectly reassembled seat belt anchor can impair the performance of the seat belt during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and reassemble the seat belt anchors as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-20-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3, 2020-2022 Model Y, and 2021-2022 Model S and Model X vehicles. The window automatic reversal system may not react correctly after detecting an obstruction. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 118, "Power-Operated Window…
A closing window may exert excessive force by pinching a driver or passenger before retracting, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update of the automatic window reversal system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 31, 2032. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-013.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2022 Model 3 Performance vehicles. The unit of speed (mph or km/h) may fail to display on the speedometer while in Track Mode. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 101, "Control and Displays."
The driver may not know how fast the vehicle is traveling without the mph or km/h unit display, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model Y, Model X, Model S, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, including Summon and Smart Summon, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 6, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall supersedes recall 22V-063. Vehicles configured with Summon or Smart Summon and already remedied under 22V-063 will need to have the new remedy software installed.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2019 Model S, Model X, and 2017-2020 Model 3 vehicles equipped with Autopilot Computer 2.5 and operating certain firmware releases. The rearview image may not immediately display when the vehicle begins to reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
A delayed rearview camera image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed May 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model S, Model X, Model Y, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed April 5, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall has been superseded by Recall 22V-235. Tesla's number for the new recall is SB-22-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The audible chime may not activate when the vehicle starts and the driver has not buckled their seat belt. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208, "Occupant…
The driver may be unaware that their seat belt is not fastened, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling all 2017-2020 Model 3 vehicles. The rearview camera cable harness may be damaged by the opening and closing of the trunk lid, preventing the rearview camera image from displaying.
A rearview camera that does not function reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and install a guide protector and new cable harness as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 24, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-17-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 Model S, Model 3, Model X, and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles operating software version 2021.36.5.2. A communication error may cause false forward-collision warning (FCW) or unexpected activation of the automatic emergency brake (AEB) system.
Unexpected activation of the AEB system may cause the car to stop suddenly, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. The recall began October 25, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2020 Model 3 and 2019-2021 Model Y vehicles. One or both fasteners that secure the front seat shoulder belt to the b-pillar may not be properly attached.
An improperly attached fastener may prevent the seat belt system from performing as designed, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and repair both fasteners if necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-20-001.
Following Tesla's over-the-air deployment of FSD 14.1 Lite, the HW3 Autopilot computer in my 2018 Tesla Model 3 failed. FSD / Autopilot worked normally before the update and stopped working immediately afterward. Tesla Service diagnosed the vehicle XXX and verified the alerts APP_W207, APP_W462, APS_W182, APS_W188 and APS_W185. The technician attempted hard and soft resets and a firmware reinstall, and verified power and ground to the car computer. All attempts failed. The technician's notes state the secondary autopilot processor is no longer communicating and "a new car computer is needed." The failure has disabled Automatic Emergency Braking, Forward Collision Warning and Lane Departure Warning, as well as FSD / Autopilot. Tesla denied a goodwill replacement in writing on XXX, stating there was no evidence linking the failure to a software update, after the technician confirmed the computer had failed. Tesla provided a written estimate for the replacement of $2,616.37 total (invoice dated XXX). I have not authorized the repair. Tesla also confirmed in writing that my vehicle is not currently eligible for the HW4 upgrade. I sent a formal Notice of Dispute to Tesla at [XXX] on XXX and received no response; I sent a follow-up on XXX. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
I drove over a bump in the road and all of a sudden the car started making a very loud clunky noise in the front suspension. I was close to home so I turned around and drove it back home for inspection. I found the lower control arm on the suspension is completely disconnected because the bolt is backed out of the joint. The steering had occasionally made some creak sounds in the past but it never felt loose. Seeing the lower control arm disconnected could have severely limited the steering of the vehicle thus this seems like a serious safety issue. I have scheduled an appointment for repair with Tesla Service.
The front left and right lower link assemblies suffered premature structural failure and required immediate replacement at 74,068 miles due to a loss of steering stability. The repair was completed at a Tesla Service Center out-of-pocket for a total cost of $1,564.04
While driving, the vehicle suddenly accelerated on its own and began operating without my control. Despite my attempts to steer away from surrounding traffic, the vehicle continued to self‑propel, crossed the median, and entered oncoming lanes, resulting in a head‑on collision with another car.
This is to serve as a registered complaint in conjunction with the premature component failure and degradation of front lower lateral links and suspension parts under NHTSA investigation PE26006. In August 2026 while operating my 2018 Tesla Model 3 while driving at all speeds experienced a failure of the front suspension system. There was an intense creaking/groaning/clunking noises from the front wheels and/or front suspension that we felt extremely uncomfortable operating the vehicle fearing for the safety of the passengers. Upon taking the vehicle to the Tesla Service Center, technicians diagnosed the vehicle with severely degraded and failing front lower arms, compliance links, and control arm bushings. My vehicle only had a little over 29,000 total miles on the odometer. This premature degradation represents a critical component failure rather than standard wear and tear. A failure or detachment of the lower lateral link at highway speeds presents an immediate safety risk due to potential loss of directional steering control. This failure is directly identical to the conditions outlined in the NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation Preliminary Evaluation PE26006, opened on July 29, 2026, targeting front lower lateral link failures on 2018–2020 Model 3’s. The issue has since been repaired by Tesla Service on October 6, 2026. I am filing this complaint to formally document this premature safety component failure for the ongoing PE26006 federal investigation. We stopped driving the vehicle and used our other cars, waiting for appointments at Tesla, as well as waiting for the parts to arrive, which took quite a while. Thankfully, we had a couple other cars that we were able to use while we were waiting for the repair to be performed.
Component Affected: SUSPENSION: FRONT: LOWER ARM: LATERAL LINK / COMPLIANCE LINK Description of Defect and Incident: I am reporting an issue regarding my Tesla Model 3's front lower suspension components, specifically the front lower lateral link and the compliance link. The vehicle experienced an out-of-warranty failure requiring immediate replacement of both lower arms to restore structural integrity and driving safety. Due to the failure, I was forced to pay entirely out of pocket for the replacement parts and labor. This specific failure mirrors the exact conditions currently being monitored under the active NHTSA preliminary evaluation into Tesla Model 3 and Model Y front lower lateral link detachment. Despite the severe safety risk associated with sudden structural failure or detachment of these critical suspension components while driving, my vehicle’s specific VIN is not currently covered under Tesla's existing, highly limited recall campaigns (such as Recalls 21V-835 or 23V-235). I am submitting this complaint to request that NHTSA expand the scope of its current suspension investigation to ensure owners who have already paid out of pocket for these premature structural failures are officially included in a mandatory manufacturer recall and eligible for retroactive reimbursement.
There was a clicking noise that was heard as my wife (along with our [XXX] son) was driving on the freeway. She reached her destination and once she parked and tried to move out of the parking lot, she could not turn the wheel. The suspension control arm (specifically, the inner mounting eyelet and bushing of a front lower link) has detached and dropped down beneath the underbody shield. After taking it to Tesla Collision, it is reported that the front lateral link completely disconnected from the subframe while driving. Tesla has acknowledged this as there is an active bulletin (Service Bulletin SV-23-31-001) for torque check on this component. This issue is also identical to the HTSA Recall 23V-235, however, our VIN is not included in the batch. Tesla is quoting around $7k for repairs. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The contact owns a 2018 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 35 MPH, several unknown warning lights illuminated and the engine seized. The contact stated that the failure had occurred in heavy traffic. The Police arrived and assisted with traffic control. The contact stated that while attempting to start the vehicle, the vehicle failed to start. The contact stated that after several attempts to start the vehicle, the vehicle started. The vehicle was driven to the shoulder of the roadway and was left at the location overnight. The contact stated that the following day, while attempting to start the vehicle, the vehicle started and was driven to the residence. The dealer was contacted by phone and made aware of the failure. The vehicle was towed to the dealer, where the contact was informed that the failure was because of a software glitch. The vehicle was repaired. In addition, the Mobile App produced a fault code indicating the vehicle was parked and unable to start. The manufacturer was contacted by phone and made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 62,000.
My suspension is the issue that was under recall 23V-235. Suspension could completely fail at any time. Currently I hear creaking when turning. Tesla has confirmed the problem but said my car is out of recall which is very narrow and should include my car
The passenger seat back Occupant Classification System (OCS) sensor (Part #1920673-01-A) failed 3 times in under 22 months (Dec 2024, Dec 2025, Sep 2026), disabling the front passenger safety restraint system and airbag deployment logic
While operating 2018 Tesla Model 3(Odometer: ~174,489 miles)the vehicle experienced a catastrophic mechanical failure when the front suspension lateral link detached/separated from the subframe. The collapse of the right upper/lower suspension immediately rendered the vehicle non-drivable and non-rolling, Tesla quoted $4803 in customer-pay repairs, specifying complete replacement of the front subframe structure, front compliance links and front lateral links. Prior Service & Warning Symptoms Presented to Tesla:On XXX (Invoice #XXX; Odometer: 89,939 miles), I brought this exact vehicle to the Tesla Service Center in [XXX], specifically complaining of a front-end steering issue (Clicking noise when steering wheel turns right)Tesla technicians noted could not duplicate and performed no diagnostic torque checks or structural inspections of the lateral link fasteners Correlation to Known Safety Defect / Recall 23V-235 (SB-23-31-001) Safety Recall 23V-235 (Tesla Bulletin SB-23-31-001)Tesla acknowledges that front suspension lateral link fasteners on 2018–2019 Model 3s can loosen and back out over time, leading to lateral link separation from the subframe while driving. Crucially, Tesla’s defect report explicitly highlights that "abnormal noise from the front suspension when steering" is the primary early warning indicator of loosening fasteners before total separation occurs Defect Summary & Remedy Denial:We previously brought the vehicle to Tesla Service reporting the exact warning symptom front-end steering noise associated with loosening lateral link fasteners The issue was left uncorrected, directly resulting in eventual fastener detachment lateral link separation and severe consequential damage to the front subframe structure Tesla Service management refused recall remedy or goodwill coverage on the grounds that this specific VIN was excluded from the narrow VIN list for Recall 23V-235 despite the vehicle exhibiting the identical defect INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U
Possible ineffective recall remedy – NHTSA Recall 21V-00D / Tesla SB-21-17-008. My Model 3 received the trunk harness recall remedy in 2023. Tesla inspected the original harness, determined it was within specification, left it installed, and added the guide protector. Tesla’s recall documentation states the guide is intended to prevent further wear caused by trunk movement; if wear is beyond specification, the harness is replaced. In 2026, my rearview camera began intermittently failing. I found that I can reproduce the failure by operating the trunk and provided Tesla video evidence. Tesla has now diagnosed an internal fault in the same original trunk harness and says the harness requires replacement. This appears consistent with the safety condition addressed by 21V-00D: repeated trunk movement can damage the harness/coaxial cable and cause loss of the rearview camera. I repeatedly asked Tesla what diagnostic evidence shows this is a different failure mechanism. Tesla has not identified one. Instead, Tesla has repeatedly stated that it considers this separate because approximately 3 years have passed since the recall remedy. I asked whether this three-year distinction comes from a NHTSA requirement or written Tesla policy; Tesla could not identify one. My concern is that vehicles considered successfully remedied by retaining the original harness and installing the guide may remain susceptible to the recalled failure after additional trunk-use cycles. Original harness retained → recall guide installed → continued trunk use → internal harness fault → rearview-camera failure. I am reporting this so NHTSA can evaluate whether this represents a potential durability/effectiveness issue with the 21V-00D guide-protector remedy and whether similar post-remedy failures are occurring in other affected vehicles. Tesla correspondence and service documentation are attached.
- When I start my car, I see the following error message appear: Front Left Safety Restraint System Fault. Also, the air bag disabled alert is displayed. Since the air bag is disabled, it puts me at grave risk if I were to get into an accident. - Many other Tesla owners have reported the same exact issue (RCM_a021 Front Left Safety Restraint System Fault). - Today, I took the car into the Tesla Service Center, they had to replace the entire harness. - No other symptoms were apparent...just all of a sudden the alert appeared.
Clunking noise when in reverse and turning.
AMENDMENT / SUPPLEMENT TO VOQ #11763975 regarding PE26006. Following my initial report of a catastrophic lower lateral link detachment, Tesla Service Center Santa Rosa has provided a highly sanitized and misleading repair report. The official invoice completely omits the physical structural detachment and missing subframe nut, recharacterizing a severe mechanical failure as a simple 'steering alignment adjustment.' Furthermore, the technician took misleading photographs (omitting the damaged side of the vehicle or using obscuring angles). I possess dated photographic evidence of the complete link separation prior to tow-in on a flatbed, which directly contradicts Tesla's service records. This is submitted to alert investigators that field incidents for PE26006 are actively being mislabeled and obscured in Tesla's internal repair databases.
On August 6, 2026, my spouse was driving our 2018 Model 3 at low speed while making a U-turn out of The Village at Pacific Highlands Ranch when she heard a clunk from the front of the car and the car felt as though it had dropped down. Steering was not affected. The car began to slow, and she drove it at low speed into a nearby parking lot, where it stopped and would not move forward even with the accelerator pressed. It had to be towed. She did not strike a curb, pothole, debris, or any other object, and there was no impact of any kind. Inspection at the scene showed that the driver's side front lower lateral link had separated at its inboard, subframe end. The link was hanging down and resting on the pavement, still attached at the wheel end. A close-up photo shows the bushing inner core with two bolt ears and empty bolt holes: no fastener present and no broken fastener remnant. The link is not bent, gouged, or scraped. The left front wheel was pushed rearward in the wheel arch and was pressed against the rear edge of the fender, which damaged the fender and a brake line. The tire and wheel have no curb rash or impact marks. The vehicle was not included in recall 23V-235, and Tesla's VIN recall lookup shows all recalls issued for it as completed. Mileage at the time was approximately 108,043 miles. The vehicle was declared a total loss and has since gone to salvage. This failure appears to match Preliminary Evaluation PE26006.
The contact owns a 2018 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while reversing approximately 5 MPH, there was a loud screeching sound coming from the vehicle without warning. Upon inspecting the vehicle, the contact became aware that a bolt had detached from the subframe. The vehicle was towed to the residence. The dealer was contacted. The manufacturer was made aware of the failure by telephone. The approximate failure mileage was 82,678.
Vehicle Information: Year/Make/Model: 2018 Tesla Model 3 Mileage at Incident: 45,000 miles Description of Safety Defect: A sudden and persistent "Safety Restraint System Fault" / "Front Passenger Safety Restraint System Fault" warning illuminated on the vehicle's primary touchscreen interface, indicating a complete compromise of the supplemental restraint and airbag system. Upon inspection by Tesla Service, the root cause was identified as physically broken/severed internal copper wiring within the first-row passenger seat harness assemblies. This breakage occurred purely due to the mechanical wear-and-tear of normal fore-and-aft seat tracking (including the standard vehicle "Easy Entry" setting). Because the electrical line cleanly severed, communication to the Occupant Classification System (OCS) sensor was totally cut off, preventing the vehicle from accurately detecting passenger occupancy or correctly configuring front passenger airbag deployment logic in a collision. Tesla has addressed this known design vulnerability internally via Service Bulletin SB-23-20-002, replacing the weak early-production parts with ruggedized components. However, because the vehicle was past its calendar warranty period despite having only 45,000 miles, I was forced to pay $1,322.00 out of pocket to restore critical safety systems. Because a severed seat harness disables essential airbag safety constraints through normal everyday use, this represents a systemic manufacturing defect that should be escalated from a Technical Service Bulletin to a mandatory Safety Recall to protect all owners. Specific Component Part Numbers Replaced: First Row Seat Harness Assemblies: P/N 1489060-02-G & 1489060-03-G Passenger Airbag Assembly Module: P/N 1077323-00-G Seat Position / Occupancy Sensor Module: P/N 1099592-00-F
The contact owns a 2018 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 4 MPH, the front sway bar detached from the vehicle, and the contact lost steering control. The vehicle was towed, and a service center was contacted but informed the contact that the repair was not covered because the VIN was not included in a recall associated with the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 81,000.
Vehicle: 2018 Tesla Model 3 Safety Issue: The rearview camera display has failed and shows a black screen when the vehicle is shifted into reverse. This reduces rearward visibility and creates a safety concern while backing up. Recall History: My vehicle was previously repaired under the Tesla Model 3 trunk lid harness recall on March 31, 2023. The recall addressed wear and damage to the trunk harness wiring that could result in loss of the rearview camera display. Tesla installed recall retrofit components during that repair. The current failure presents the same symptom that the recall was intended to correct: loss of the backup camera image. Current Problem: In September 2026, the rearview camera again began displaying a black screen. Tesla Service has diagnosed the vehicle and quoted approximately $439 for repair. Tesla advised that the recall was completed in 2023 and that the repair warranty has expired, therefore the current repair is not covered. Reason for Complaint: I believe this may be a recurrence of the same safety-related defect addressed by the original recall. Although the recall repair was completed, the same safety condition has reoccurred. I am requesting that NHTSA review whether the recall remedy adequately resolved the defect and whether owners should be responsible for subsequent repairs involving the same failure mode.
My 2018 Tesla Model 3 suffered a catastrophic detachment of the right front lower lateral link from the subframe, while merging on the freeway, causing an immediate risk of a collision or injury. My VIN is not listed under the Recall 23V235000, but this failure matches the exact safety risk currently being investigated by the Office of Defects Investigation under Active Investigation PE26006. The manufacturer must extend the recall coverage to this VIN block.
Driving tghe 2018 Model 3 with around 75K miles, the warning "FRONT LEFT SAFETY RESTRAINT SYSTEM ISSUE" keeps popping up and staying on the center console. Tesla said car is out of warranty and have to pay upto $2000 to fix it.
Tesla Full Self Driving (FSD) failed us, resulting in a side swipe with a tractor trailer and the likely total loss of our Model 3. We were under FSD for much of our trip from [XXX] to [XXX]. We were in [XXX], traveling north on [XXX] in the right lane with a tractor trailer in the center lane. The car made a sudden, violent turn to the right. The startled driver grabbed the wheel to bring the car back to the lane center, which resulted in a major grinding noise. The driver then brought the car to a safe stop on the shoulder. It became clear the left side of our vehicle had contacted the trucks right front wheel. The truck left the scene. I believe the truck either came close to its lane right line or actually was changing lanes. The car took evasive action. However, the car failed to communicate the situation to the driver, which is the reason for filing this report. It is possible that had FSD activated the horn, both driers would have acted more appropriately and the loss of our car might have been avoided. Other possibilities are for FSD to have some method to communicate what was happening or had refused to permit the driver to bring the car into contact with the truck. It may be beneficial for NHTSA to request a copy of the car’s data before it is deleted after the car is declared a total loss; especially since there isn’t any Dash Cam video of the incident. The dash cam’s most recent video was several weeks previous and includes GB of video taken in our garage. But nothing from the trip. I believe Tesla will record this as driver fault rather than FSD’s fault. Technically, at the time of contact, the driver was in control because, from the drivers point of view, FSD acted randomly. The real cause, in my opinion, was a failure of communication and poor handoff of control. There is a Pennsylvanian State Police report and we have filed with our insurance company, but I don’t expect either to investigate FSDing’s role in this incident. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOI
The exterior door handles are made of a thin metal top cover over a plastic door handle. The exterior door handle metal begins to peel, and does so in a manner that isn't clear to see. This has resulted in me cutting my hand on the door handle. I had to remove the metal from the door handles to prevent my family from also being injured. I asked Tesla to fix it, and they quoted $1,275 to fix the issue on all four doors.
During a routine inspection by an independent mechanic, it was discovered that the front lower compliance link (control arm) bushings are severely cracked on both the left and right sides of my 2018 Tesla Model 3. Both the compliance links and the lateral links require immediate replacement to prevent a catastrophic structural failure. Tesla Service has provided a repair estimate of $2,012.00 to fix the issue, which they are refusing to cover under warranty or past recalls. Safety Consequence: Cracked and failing compliance link bushings compromise the structural integrity of the front suspension. If these suspension links completely separate or fail while driving at highway speeds, it could cause an immediate loss of steering control, severe wheel misalignment, or a wheel detachment, creating an extreme risk of a high-speed crash. Relevance to Active Investigations: I am filing this complaint specifically to be included in the NHTSA's active Preliminary Evaluation (PE26006) regarding front lower suspension link detachments on 2018–2020 Model 3 vehicles. The failure of my vehicle's compliance links demonstrates that the front suspension components on early Model 3 production units are experiencing premature structural degradation and wear that goes well beyond the scope of Tesla's previously limited lateral link recalls (23V-235 and 21V-835).
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur. Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both NHTSA and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of SUA in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the Agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints ODI added to its evaluation can be viewed at NHTSA.gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by ODI are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the Federal Register.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
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