2026 Tesla Model 3
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
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Vehicles › Tesla › Model 3 › 2026
These records cover every 2026 Tesla Model 3. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
Recalls
1 recall names the 2026 Tesla Model 3. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2026 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles. The fasteners attaching the seat back to the seat bottom may have been improperly tightened.
Risk and remedy
Risk
The seat may not properly restrain the occupant, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Remedy
Tesla Service Centers will inspect and tighten or replace the seat assembly fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed August 16, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-25-13-003.
Owner complaints
30 complaints10 involved a crash3 injuries
What owners report most
Latest complaints
- Back over prevention › Warnings · Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking · Forward collision avoidance › Warnings
• forward collision warning and automatic emergency breaking failed to work and are still currently an ongoing problem and not functioning. They are and have always Been enabled and can be inspected upon request. • my safety and those in my car and around me put at risk, by the system and software…
• forward collision warning and automatic emergency breaking failed to work and are still currently an ongoing problem and not functioning. They are and have always Been enabled and can be inspected upon request. • my safety and those in my car and around me put at risk, by the system and software not functioning as intended and providing extra alertness and reaction to avoid collision. •the earliest service date I could get from Tesla is Nov 11. I have requested they preserve all data from dates Oct 20-27 2026 •no, my car has not been inspected yet. I have taken, Videos and have saved in car camera footage to show the ongoing defect. •no warnings lights or alerts prior to the incident. The problem first became apparent and clear Oct 26, 2026. I had FSD subscription that ended Oct 24, 2026 and the system warnings worked just fine during that time even while driving manually.
- Unknown or other
On [XXX], the owner of a 2026 Tesla Model 3, left the garage of her house in the Tesla, and engaged the self-driving as the driver has done dozens of time in the past. The car proceeded down the driveway, as it has always done in the past. However, in an instant, before the driver had time to…
On [XXX], the owner of a 2026 Tesla Model 3, left the garage of her house in the Tesla, and engaged the self-driving as the driver has done dozens of time in the past. The car proceeded down the driveway, as it has always done in the past. However, in an instant, before the driver had time to react, the car went straight where the driveway curved, and the car hit a tree. The video from the Tesla cameras was saved and confirms that the car was in self driving mode, there was no driver intervention causing the accident, and the driver did not have time to react and prevent the accident. This accident was due to a failure of the Tesla self-driving. The encrypted dashcam video was copied from the USB drive named [XXX], from the folder [XXX], and then accessed by logging into [XXX] and dragging and dropping the video file into the dashcam app. That was saved to our PC as [XXX}. Since the saved video did not show the telemetry data, the video was loaded into [XXX] and saved with the telemetry information visible. Another video was saved capturing the whole ExportDash.cam interface. That has bars showing where the car was actively steering, braking, or applying acceleration (“gas pedal”). This shows that the car was actively steering a second before the collision, but then stopped. There was no time for the driver to react to the car's failure to properly steer. The video showing the car in self-driving mode and failing to navigate a turn on the driveway can be accessed at this youtube link: [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
- Service brakes · Steering
The contact owns a 2026 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 65 MPH, the steering wheel independently turned to the left and the right. The brake pedal was depressed; however, the vehicle failed to stop as intended. The contact stated that the vehicle was shaking and uncontrollable.…
The contact owns a 2026 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 65 MPH, the steering wheel independently turned to the left and the right. The brake pedal was depressed; however, the vehicle failed to stop as intended. The contact stated that the vehicle was shaking and uncontrollable. The contact depressed the brake pedal down, unbuckled, the seat belt and opened the door and the vehicle came to a stop. The Police was contacted and arrived on the scene. The Police removed the vehicle from the roadway onto the shoulder of the road. The contact was advised to tow the vehicle to the dealer. The vehicle was towed to the dealer, but the diagnostic test report was not provided to the contact. The contact was informed that the information was reported to the engineers. The contact was advised to contact the NHTSA Hotline to report the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 450.
- Steering
Car was in self-driving and struck a piece of concrete. The car was in hands free and was being monitored by me, the driver. This obstruction was in the left side of the lane, about 2" tall, a foot wide and 6" across. I thought the car would see it and miss it but I was wrong, it clipped the…
Car was in self-driving and struck a piece of concrete. The car was in hands free and was being monitored by me, the driver. This obstruction was in the left side of the lane, about 2" tall, a foot wide and 6" across. I thought the car would see it and miss it but I was wrong, it clipped the concrete, punctured the tires side wall and damaged the tire rim. Tesls'a position was that I shouldn't have trusted the car abilities to avoid the obstruction. This is a basic for collision avoidance, and this system should not be allowed to run in self-drive without hands on the wheel unless the car is capable of avoidance of obstructions large enough to disable the car. This car is dangerous if it can operate at freeway speeds, hands free, and not have the ability to avoid obstructions that could cause it to be out of control.
- Electrical system › Adas › Autonomous/self driving
The contact owns a 2026 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving 35 MPH with the Autonomous Self-Driving feature enabled, the vehicle was driving in the left-turn lane and jerked over into the oncoming traffic. The failure mileage was approximately 9,999.
- Unknown or other
I had FSD (Full Self Driving) (Supervised) enabled. The navigation map and turn instructions (which appear on the right side of the touchscreen) indicated that my car was to make a left turn at the upcoming intersection. After a full stop (at the Stop sign), my car crept out into the intersection…
I had FSD (Full Self Driving) (Supervised) enabled. The navigation map and turn instructions (which appear on the right side of the touchscreen) indicated that my car was to make a left turn at the upcoming intersection. After a full stop (at the Stop sign), my car crept out into the intersection, preparing to make an unprotected left turn (UPL) onto a major street (2 lanes of traffic in each direction). My car stopped (creeping out) when FSD “realized” that it was not yet safe to make the turn. My car, however had crept out far enough so that other vehicles coming from my left (in the right lane) had to swerve left to avoid hitting my car. There was another car behind my car so I could not “manually” back up (taking over from FSD) to remove the front of my car from the path of vehicles coming from my left. (If just one of the drivers of those vehicles coming from my left had been distracted, a likely collision with the front of my car could have occurred!) Eventually, there was a sufficient gap that I could (manually) make a right turn instead. Since this incident, I have had to preview the navigation map for every trip (before enabling FSD) and be prepared to route around any UPLs. After driving this car over 6500 miles (98 % on FSD), I have found FSD to be very safe overall! My only notable “risk of collision” event was the above-described UPL attempt! I have contacted Tesla Customer Service (via phone calls and online) on several occasions to report this hazard, but nothing has been done; (although on a live phone call, the representative acknowledged that others had also voiced my concern!) During a chat with Tesla’s “Grok” chatbot, Grok stated that a ‘Prefer Protected Turns’ option would be a low complexity addition that could coexist with continued UPL improvement”. Given this information, I think Tesla is being negligent by not adding the “Prefer Protected Turns” option to the vehicle user interface.
- Unknown or other
On Sept 22 2026at approximately 10:26 AM, my Tesla vehicle was involved in a low-speed, 5 -10 mph rear-end collision while the Full Self-Driving (FSD) Supervised automation system was engaged. The vehicle failed to initiate a timely braking sequence for a lead vehicle, resulting in an impact. There…
On Sept 22 2026at approximately 10:26 AM, my Tesla vehicle was involved in a low-speed, 5 -10 mph rear-end collision while the Full Self-Driving (FSD) Supervised automation system was engaged. The vehicle failed to initiate a timely braking sequence for a lead vehicle, resulting in an impact. There was a sudden accleration right before the hit along with a sudden braking. Critical Safety Failures & Discrepancies: 1. Unwarned System Degradation: Following the incident, Tesla Service technicians reviewed my vehicle diagnostics and explicitly stated that internal logs flagged the FSD system performance as degraded or "suspect" since the beginning of September 2026. However, prior to the crash, the vehicle provided zero driver-facing warning messages, dashboard alerts, or mobile application notifications indicating that the automated safety systems were compromised or operating with a defect. 2. Telemetry Log Contradiction: Tesla's initial internal review claims that the vehicle's telemetry indicates an accelerator pedal override by the driver. I explicitly state that my foot was not on the accelerator pedal and no such override was physically made. There is an active sensor tracking or system logging discrepancy regarding driver inputs during this FSD failure. Evidence Maintained: I have preserved the complete, 4-angle synchronized TeslaCam dashcam footage of the incident on my computer as visual proof of the vehicle's un-accelerated 5 mph forward creep. Furthermore, I have submitted an official Data Privacy Request to Tesla to force the extraction of the raw, unredacted vehicle telemetry logs (DI_accelPedalPos) to legally dispute their pedal position claims. I am filing this report to assist NHTSA's active investigations into Tesla Autopilot/FSD traffic safety violations, specifically concerning automated braking failures and inaccurate driver-override telemetry classification.
- Visibility/wiper
The front windshield camera for FSD gets hazed and obstructs the front camera. Tesla say it’s from the gases that come from the interior from the vehicle being hot temperatures. My problem why did they not design the cameras like they did in the side puller protecting it from the interior gases. Now Tesla says they’ll clean it for 65.00. I just bought the car in March
- Steering
I was using the self driving feature and all of a sudden the steering wheel went haywire and was spinning. the car was swerving very aggressively in between lanes. putting my foot on the brake and hands on the wheel did not do anything.
- Vehicle speed control
When using Tesla's Full Self Driving (supervised) speed control is erratic and not subject to the driver's control, such as it would be when using adaptive cruise control. As a result, the available speed modes (sloth, chill, standard, hurry and Mad Max) can cause the vehicle to dangerously exceed…
When using Tesla's Full Self Driving (supervised) speed control is erratic and not subject to the driver's control, such as it would be when using adaptive cruise control. As a result, the available speed modes (sloth, chill, standard, hurry and Mad Max) can cause the vehicle to dangerously exceed speed limits and at times to drive well below the posted speed limit, causing confusion and frustration to following drivers. There is no reason why the software cannot be changed to a safer method that would permit the driver to select the speed at which the car will travel, i.e. the speed limit, similar to adaptive cruise control found in most modern vehicles. When the operator of a vehicle is not in charge of the vehicle's speed, this is inherently dangerous.
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control · Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking
My Tesla was operating under FSD at 9pm on a dark country road. I was traveling at 45mph and vehicle randomly applied hard emergency braking and I had to take over. It appeared that the vehicle may have been responding to a dark oil stain or possibly a mailbox. Had another vehicle been closely behind me, there would’ve been a collision.
- Back over prevention › Warnings · Steering · Unknown or other
On August 26, 2026, at approximately 8:56 AM, I entered a public parking garage in Washington, DC. Full Self-Driving (Supervised) was engaged and controlling the vehicle during a reversing maneuver. I remained attentive to the vehicle's surroundings, including pedestrians and surrounding traffic.…
On August 26, 2026, at approximately 8:56 AM, I entered a public parking garage in Washington, DC. Full Self-Driving (Supervised) was engaged and controlling the vehicle during a reversing maneuver. I remained attentive to the vehicle's surroundings, including pedestrians and surrounding traffic. While reversing under FSD (Supervised), the vehicle's right rear corner collided with the corner of a stationary structural pillar in the parking garage. I did not command the vehicle to steer into the pillar. Upon becoming aware of the impact, I immediately applied the brake. There were no injuries. The collision resulted in damage to the right rear area of the vehicle. After the incident, I photographed and recorded the scene and vehicle damage and saved the available Tesla Dashcam footage. I also requested the vehicle data from Tesla. I am reporting this incident because the vehicle collided with a stationary structure while FSD (Supervised) was engaged and controlling the reversing maneuver. I do not know the specific technical cause of the incident. The vehicle and available recorded data can be made available for inspection upon request.
- Unknown or other
“The affected system was Tesla Full Self-Driving (FSD) (Supervised). FSD correctly selected the northbound left-turn lane but, while executing the left turn to westbound Pecan Street, intermittently directed the vehicle into the eastbound lanes carrying opposing traffic.”
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control
Driving on a 2 lane road going 65 with Traffic-Aware Cruise Control enabled at 65 MPH with a car behind and no car in front of us. the car phantom braked for no reason going from 65 to 40 mph in a matter of seconds. Luckily we were able to accelerate to avoid being rear ended
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control
The vehicle is experiencing severe, unpredictable software and hardware regressions related to the Full Self-Driving (Supervised) system (v14.3.7, Software build 2026.21.5) that create an immediate, active traffic hazard and a high risk of rear-end collisions. Primary Safety Issues: 1. TRAFFIC…
The vehicle is experiencing severe, unpredictable software and hardware regressions related to the Full Self-Driving (Supervised) system (v14.3.7, Software build 2026.21.5) that create an immediate, active traffic hazard and a high risk of rear-end collisions. Primary Safety Issues: 1. TRAFFIC STALLS UPON DISENGAGEMENT: When Full Self-Driving (FSD) is engaged, auxiliary sensors malfunction, causing the headlights to cycle on/off and windshield wipers to run at full speed in clear, dry, midday daylight. When attempting to manually disengage FSD to correct these malfunctioning systems, the vehicle fails to smoothly transition control. Instead, it triggers critical red flashing alert lights, sounds severe warning chimes, and initiates an immediate, aggressive brake application—stopping the vehicle dead in active, live traffic. 2. PHANTOM BRAKING: The vehicle routinely experiences sudden, severe, and unprovoked phantom braking events while driving at speed, without any forward obstacles or environmental hazards present. 3. STEERING INSTABILITY: When navigating parking lot entrances, the vehicle exhibits extreme "indecisive behavior," resulting in violent, rapid shaking of the steering wheel before completing the maneuver. Tesla customer service was formally notified of these dangerous system behaviors on August 14, 2026. A formal remote engineering log review has been requested from the manufacturer, as these sudden braking actions in active traffic pose an immediate threat to public safety.
- Steering · Suspension · Wheels
I purchased my car on 3/23/26. Since delivery I have noticed that the car bounces at low speeds 20-30mph and the steering wheel vibrates at highway speeds 65 - 80mph. I have had the car to tesla service center 6 times since march. They have replaced all 4 tires, found and replaced a bent wheel…
I purchased my car on 3/23/26. Since delivery I have noticed that the car bounces at low speeds 20-30mph and the steering wheel vibrates at highway speeds 65 - 80mph. I have had the car to tesla service center 6 times since march. They have replaced all 4 tires, found and replaced a bent wheel (rim) on the passenger side. Then this last visit they replaced the passenger right wheel hub. They claim that when comparing it to the 1 other car available to road test my car was the same even though it still has the wheel vibration at highway speeds. they claim it falls within specs and is safe. I do not feel this is acceptable because they dont know what else to do. Now if I want them to check the car they say I must pay for any diagnosis and repairs if needed because they say they fixed the car. I do not feel safe driving at highway speeds as I am not sure what may happen which could endanger myself or passengers
- Unknown or other
The horn system on the new Tesla are not effective. Other drivers cannot hear The unit is facing the ground, and a high speed. Other drivers. Can I hear it specially when it’s raining. The use of the original point was effective and never had a problem on my previous last Tesla, or any other car for that matter. Please help before a serious. Ask her that happens.
- Forward collision avoidance › Adaptive cruise control · Unknown or other
After a recent Tesla software update, a mandatory Full Self-Driving disengagement feedback window appears every time I disengage FSD while the vehicle is still moving. The feedback window covers a large portion of the display with a black overlay, noticeable enough something popped up. There is no…
After a recent Tesla software update, a mandatory Full Self-Driving disengagement feedback window appears every time I disengage FSD while the vehicle is still moving. The feedback window covers a large portion of the display with a black overlay, noticeable enough something popped up. There is no setting to disable it, dismiss it immediately, or postpone the response until the vehicle is stopped. I am required to select a disengagement reason before I can access the controls and information behind the overlay. While this window is displayed, I cannot properly view or control functions such as music and other touchscreen features behind the area. This is especially dangerous because it appears immediately after I take manual control from FSD—a moment when my full attention should be on the road and the vehicle. The system effectively requires me to look away from the road and interact with the touchscreen before I can make another needed adjustment. This occurs every time I disengage FSD and is consistently reproducible. This behavior began after software version FSD v14.3.3. My vehicle is a 2026 Model 3. The problem occurred everytime while traveling at any speed. I believe this mandatory, non-dismissible overlay creates a serious driver-distraction hazard by obstructing the center display and requiring touchscreen interaction while the vehicle is in motion. Tesla should allow the feedback request to be dismissed, delayed until the vehicle is parked, or disabled entirely.
- Suspension
Air Suspension Failure - Damping Control Disabled (Code TAS_a313)" Description: "Vehicle is 2 days old. Suspension control module lost communication with CAN bus. Vehicle is in 'fail-safe' mode. Tesla Service Center has refused to assist. Safety risk due to loss of adaptive ride control." Manufacturer Response: "No response / Ignored."
- Lane departure › Assist · Lane departure › Warning · Steering
Firstly, we were driving in the center lane on I-84W (three lanes), with Full Self Driving (FSD) at 55 mph. The car veered left on it owns (under FSD) into the center median with the front driver side of the vehicle struck the metal beam guardrail causing both air bags to deploy on the driver and…
Firstly, we were driving in the center lane on I-84W (three lanes), with Full Self Driving (FSD) at 55 mph. The car veered left on it owns (under FSD) into the center median with the front driver side of the vehicle struck the metal beam guardrail causing both air bags to deploy on the driver and left rear passenger sides. The car continued to move forward in the next 4-6 seconds under FSD (approximately 10-20 feet range) and then came to a complete stop with flashing warning screen asking driver to take over the steering wheel immediately.
- Electrical system · Unknown or other
Complaint Title: Defective Horn System on 2026 Tesla Model 3 - Ineffective in Rain or Highway Conditions Description: The horn on my 2026 Tesla Model 3 Highland is dangerously inadequate. It uses a single pedestrian warning speaker instead of a proper horn, which is easily overpowered by road…
Complaint Title: Defective Horn System on 2026 Tesla Model 3 - Ineffective in Rain or Highway Conditions Description: The horn on my 2026 Tesla Model 3 Highland is dangerously inadequate. It uses a single pedestrian warning speaker instead of a proper horn, which is easily overpowered by road noise, tire noise from large trucks, and especially rain. I cannot reliably alert other drivers, including 18-wheelers, when they are drifting into my lane or failing to yield. This creates a serious safety risk in wet conditions and highway driving. Traditional horns have been effective for decades — this design fails basic safety expectations. I am requesting immediate investigation and a fix.
- Back over prevention › Warnings · Forward collision avoidance › Automatic emergency braking · Lane departure › Blind spot detection
Incident involving my 2026 Tesla Model 3 equipped with HW4 hardware and the latest FSD (Supervised) software. During a garage reverse maneuver performed under FSD supervision, the vehicle had sufficient time to assess the surrounding environment before initiating the maneuver. There were no…
Incident involving my 2026 Tesla Model 3 equipped with HW4 hardware and the latest FSD (Supervised) software. During a garage reverse maneuver performed under FSD supervision, the vehicle had sufficient time to assess the surrounding environment before initiating the maneuver. There were no pedestrians or moving obstacles nearby. An adjacent parked vehicle was present next to the intended reversing path. During the maneuver, the vehicle made initial contact with the adjacent vehicle. At no point did the vehicle provide any collision warning, alert, or indication that a collision had occurred. After the initial contact, the vehicle continued moving and a second impact occurred shortly afterward, resulting in additional damage. Immediately after the second impact, the driver intervened and took control of the vehicle to stop the maneuver, before further damage is caused. My main concerns are: 1. Why did FSD fail to identify the adjacent vehicle before the maneuver? 2. Why was no collision warning provided before or after the initial contact? 3. Why did the vehicle continue the reversing maneuver after the first impact instead of stopping till driver intervention? 4. What if is pediatrician who qualify ADA, children, elder was in the position of the adjacent vehicle, this failed sensing would cause imparable result. I would appreciate a technical review of this event and a detailed explanation of Tesla’s findings.
- Lane departure › Assist
Lane keeping assistance turns on with every drive no matter how many times I set it to off. Where I live there are many potholes and poorly paved roads, along with poorly marked roads. As I am swerving around obstacles the car will fight the steering inputs I am giving it, trying to steer me back…
Lane keeping assistance turns on with every drive no matter how many times I set it to off. Where I live there are many potholes and poorly paved roads, along with poorly marked roads. As I am swerving around obstacles the car will fight the steering inputs I am giving it, trying to steer me back into whatever I was avoiding. This is a safety issue, and is not a problem on our older Tesla model 3 performance, as once that vehicle is set to off, it stays off. Now, as I start every drive I am navigating through a couple screens to turn off this "safety" feature.
- Structure › Body
While the vehicle was parked outdoors and the powered rear trunk lid was fully open, I leaned/bent forward into the trunk to retrieve an item. The edge of the trunk lid near the taillight assembly made contact with my scalp, causing a laceration. The wound bled significantly。The trunk lid’s…
While the vehicle was parked outdoors and the powered rear trunk lid was fully open, I leaned/bent forward into the trunk to retrieve an item. The edge of the trunk lid near the taillight assembly made contact with my scalp, causing a laceration. The wound bled significantly。The trunk lid’s fully-open position, combined with the geometry/edge of the liftgate near the taillight, creates a head-strike hazard for an average-height adult bending into the cargo area. I am requesting that NHTSA investigate whether the powered trunk lid’s open-position geometry presents an unreasonable risk of head injury to vehicle occupants/owners during normal use.
- Unknown or other
Tesla Model 3 Full Self-Driving (Supervised) feature I was using Self-Driving mode in my Tesla Model 3 while traveling on [XXX]. The vehicle suddenly turned right without warning, struck a mailbox, broke the right-side mirror, and came to a complete stop. There were no vehicles in front of or…
Tesla Model 3 Full Self-Driving (Supervised) feature I was using Self-Driving mode in my Tesla Model 3 while traveling on [XXX]. The vehicle suddenly turned right without warning, struck a mailbox, broke the right-side mirror, and came to a complete stop. There were no vehicles in front of or behind my car at the time of the incident. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Defect investigations
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
- FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway…
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
- Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)"…
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
- Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved…
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
Every Tesla Model 3 model year
Bars are owner complaints, dots mark years with recalls. Select a year to open its report.