2021 Tesla Model 3
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model 3 › 2021
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2021 Tesla Model 3. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
22 recalls name the 2021 Tesla Model 3. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2023 Model 3 and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. The headlight low beams may be too bright and exceed the maximum light output. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment."
Headlight low beams that are too bright can reduce visibility for oncoming drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will replace the headlights, free of charge. Interim owner notification letters explaining the safety risk were be mailed October 3, 2026. Another notice will be sent once the repair becomes available. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-17-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017, 2021-2023 Model 3, 2020-2023 Model Y, 2021-2023 Model S, and Model X vehicles operating software version 2026.8.6. The rearview camera image may be delayed when the vehicle is placed in reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 111…
A delayed rearview image reduces the driver's view behind the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 3, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2024 Model Y vehicles. The hood latch assembly may fail to detect an unlatched hood condition after the hood has been opened.
An unlatched hood can fully open, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 24, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-012.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 Model S, 2020-2021 Model X, 2018-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A factory reset muted the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 141, "Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 27, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The second-row left seat belt buckle and second-row center seat belt anchor may have been incorrectly reassembled during vehicle service.
An incorrectly reassembled seat belt anchor can impair the performance of the seat belt during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and reassemble the seat belt anchors as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-20-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3, 2020-2022 Model Y, and 2021-2022 Model S and Model X vehicles. The window automatic reversal system may not react correctly after detecting an obstruction. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 118, "Power-Operated Window…
A closing window may exert excessive force by pinching a driver or passenger before retracting, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update of the automatic window reversal system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 31, 2032. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-013.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2021 Model 3 and 2021 Model Y vehicles. The fisheye and narrow camera cable terminals were incorrectly installed in the cable harness connector, resulting in swapped camera views.
Swapped camera views can prevent the vehicle's cameras from detecting crossing objects and high-curvature lane lines, impairing the Autosteer and Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) performance, and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will correct the swapped terminals and recalibrate the cameras, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 8, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-17-007.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2022 Model 3 Performance vehicles. The unit of speed (mph or km/h) may fail to display on the speedometer while in Track Mode. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 101, "Control and Displays."
The driver may not know how fast the vehicle is traveling without the mph or km/h unit display, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model Y, Model X, Model S, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, including Summon and Smart Summon, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 6, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall supersedes recall 22V-063. Vehicles configured with Summon or Smart Summon and already remedied under 22V-063 will need to have the new remedy software installed.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model S, Model X, Model Y, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed April 5, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall has been superseded by Recall 22V-235. Tesla's number for the new recall is SB-22-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A software error may cause a valve in the heat pump to open unintentionally and trap the refrigerant inside the evaporator, resulting in decreased defrosting performance. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal…
Decreased defrosting performance may reduce the driver's visibility, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-18-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The audible chime may not activate when the vehicle starts and the driver has not buckled their seat belt. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208, "Occupant…
The driver may be unaware that their seat belt is not fastened, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 Model S, Model 3, Model X, and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles operating software version 2021.36.5.2. A communication error may cause false forward-collision warning (FCW) or unexpected activation of the automatic emergency brake (AEB) system.
Unexpected activation of the AEB system may cause the car to stop suddenly, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. The recall began October 25, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2021, 2023 Model 3 vehicles. The left and/or right side curtain air bag may have been improperly secured to the roof rail, which could result in a twisted air bag. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard numbers 214, "Side Impact Protection" and…
A twisted side curtain air bag may improperly deploy, increasing the risk of injury or occupant ejection during a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and realign the left and right side curtain air bag as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-20-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2021 Model Y and 2019-2021 Model 3 vehicles. The front suspension lateral link fasteners may loosen, allowing the lateral link to separate from the sub-frame.
A lateral link separation could shift the wheel alignment, causing instability and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will tighten or replace the lateral link fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-31-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2019-2021 Model 3 and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles. The brake caliper bolts may be loose, allowing the brake caliper to separate and contact the wheel rim.
Contact with the rim may cause a loss of tire pressure, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and tighten, or replace the caliper bolts as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-33-002.
Over the past week when using autopilot the Tesla has jerked to the right and slowed down. I took control immediately every time, and I'm unsure if it thought it was coming to an emergency stop or trying to swerve off the road.
Immediately following the installation of over-the-air software version 2026.32.3, the vehicle's center touchscreen lost all driving visualization capabilities. The backup camera now displays a black/non-responsive screen, removing federally mandated back-over protection. Additionally, the vehicle no longer provides active safety alerts, such as forward collision warnings or blind-spot obstructions, and driver-assist technologies (Autopilot) are entirely unavailable. Official Manufacturer Diagnosis: A physical diagnostic review of the vehicle's alert and signal history by Tesla Service confirmed an internal hardware communication failure directly induced by the software rollout. The official service logs state that the secondary Autopilot processor, designated as "Processor Turbo-B," has suffered a fatal fault and is failing to communicate. Tesla documentation acknowledges that this software-induced hardware lockup prevents the car from completing future software updates and has permanently disabled the safety vision suites. Current Vehicle Status: A subsequent physical replacement of the 12V low-voltage battery failed to resolve or clear the faults, confirming a permanent failure of the primary computing hardware. The manufacturer requires an out-of-pocket Car Computer replacement cost of $2,136.00 to restore federally mandated safety features that were operational prior to the manufacturer's software deployment. The vehicle is currently being operated without active safety overrides, emergency braking, or backup visibility.
2021 Tesla Model 3 with approximately 110,000 miles. Loud creaking/squeaking noise from the front suspension (primarily passenger side) when driving at low speeds over bumps and during slow turns. The noise matches the known front upper control arm ball joint water intrusion issue documented in Tesla service bulletin SB-20-31-006 and widely reported by other Model 3 owners. No warning lights, messages, or other symptoms. The component is available for inspection. I have scheduled a service appointment with Tesla but the vehicle has not yet been inspected or repaired by the manufacturer or any independent shop. While currently only a noise (NVH) issue, progressive wear of this ball joint can lead to play in the suspension, uneven tire wear, degraded steering feel, and potential loss of control if the joint fails.
During a Tesla over-the-air software update, while the vehicle was charging at a Tesla V4 Supercharger, the Hardware 3 Autopilot/car computer failed and entered a permanent boot loop. All cameras became inoperative, including the federally required rearview backup camera, and the vehicle lost Autopilot and automatic emergency braking. Tesla has diagnosed the failure as a car-computer failure, and the failed computer is available for inspection. The vehicle was not in a collision and had no prior damage; the failure occurred during a Tesla-initiated update. A non-functioning rearview camera eliminates the driver's rear view and increases the risk of a backover collision, and the loss of automatic emergency braking removes forward crash protection. This matches numerous existing complaints in this database describing the same Hardware 3 computer failure and camera loss after a software update, one of which reports a resulting collision. Tesla has declined to repair it at no charge despite the failure being caused by its own update, approximately 3,000 miles out of warranty. I am requesting NHTSA open a defect investigation into Hardware 3 Autopilot-computer failures that disable the rearview camera and automatic emergency braking.
Multiple watchdog daemon failures triggering every ADAS system to become unavailable at random. in one instance I had FSD enabled, mid turning a corner to freeway onramp FSD disengaged, provided no warning or alert, and almost caused me to run into another car (thankfully I have a habit of holding onto the steering wheel). I have reported the problem to tesla service which they acknowledge the multiple alerts/warnings on my car however it wont be seen by them for 15 days from 10/18/2026 The vehicle is available for inspection The warnings only appeared after failure occurs. sometimes its right away when car is put in drive, other times it happens without warning mid drive. I have not had back and forth correspondance with Telsa - I have an pending request for service visit, however due to backlog they wont see the vehicle for 15 days minimum.
High Voltage battery BMS error.
The owner reported a grinding noise coming from the front of the vehicle. The vehicle was taken to the Tesla Service Center in [XXX], where it was diagnosed on XXX, at 47,821 miles. Diagnosis found the front suspension required replacement of the front lower lateral links (left and right), the front lower compliance links (pair), and both front upper control arms. The repair was performed onXXX. The owner paid $2,035.20 because Tesla said the basic warranty had expired by time on XXX, although the vehicle was under the 50,000-mile limit. There was no crash, no fire, and no injury. The concern is premature failure/wear of the complete front suspension link set at under 50,000 miles. These suspension links are safety-critical components affecting steering and vehicle control, and failure or detachment could affect handling. The problem was confirmed and repaired by the Tesla service center. The symptom prior to repair was the grinding noise from the front; no warning lamps are known. Whether the replaced components are available for inspection is UNKNOWN. The failed components are the same front suspension lateral links addressed by NHTSA recall 21V835 (this vehicle was checked and is NOT in that recall population) and the front lower lateral link detachment under NHTSA investigation PE26006. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The power liftgate strut failed in normal use and bent the trunk liftgate, which now strikes the rear glass every time the trunk opens or closes. The vehicle has not been in a crash and the trunk was not obstructed or misused. The driver-side power strut stopped operating and the trunk would not open or close properly. On XXX Tesla Service ([XXX]) inspected the vehicle. The service record states the liftgate power strut was stuck in the closed position because the liftgate is bent to the right, hitting the glass on opening and closing. Tesla installed a new power strut, then removed it. A service message stated the hinge was replaced and the liftgate remains far out of alignment; the service record does not list a hinge replacement. The visit was marked resolved. The power trunk no longer functions. The bent liftgate contacts the rear glass on every cycle, so the glass can break on anyone standing at the rear of the vehicle while the trunk is opened or closed. Tesla referred the vehicle to a collision center, classified the repair as body damage, and stated its Extended Service Agreement does not cover it. No repair date or loaner was provided, and Tesla gave no guidance on whether the trunk is safe to use in the meantime. Other owners of 2021-2023 Model 3s with the factory power trunk have reported the power strut bending the hinge and liftgate in normal use. I am reporting this as a potential defect in the power liftgate strut and hinge design. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Urgent Safety Concern — Uncommanded Braking During Manual Driving. On October 2, 2026, while driving my 2021 Tesla Model 3 Standard Range manually at approximately 45 mph and slowing to make a turn at an intersection, my vehicle unexpectedly applied very strong braking for approximately 1–2 seconds before releasing. Neither Autopilot, FSD, nor Traffic-Aware Cruise Control was engaged. I am concerned about a possible unintended Automatic Emergency Braking activation or braking-system malfunction. This creates a serious safety concern for my family, including our newborn child. I request that this be urgently reviewed and determine what triggered the braking, including whether AEB, ABS, or another braking-control system intervened in suck similar cases, so many were reported online. Please also provide the diagnostic findings and a written assessment of whether the vehicle is safe to operate.
On [XXX], the Walmart Auto Care Center on Thomasville Rd in Tallahassee, FL installed four Goodyear Reliant All-Season tires, size 235/45R18 94V (standard load), on my 2021 Tesla Model 3 Standard Range Plus (approximately 75,000 miles). The vehicle's door placard specifies 235/45R18 at 42 PSI cold, and the original-equipment specification for this vehicle is 235/45R18 98 XL (extra load). The installed tires carry a lower load index (94 = 1,477 lbs per tire) than the vehicle requires (98 = 1,653 lbs per tire). The tires were delivered underinflated at approximately 35-37 PSI instead of the placard-required 42 PSI cold. After I inflated them to 42 PSI, the right-rear tire initially would not hold pressure and dropped to approximately 31 PSI, indicating a bead-seating or valve defect from installation; it later accepted 42 PSI but requires monitoring. My normal commute involves sustained highway driving at 70+ mph. Operating at highway speeds on tires rated below the vehicle manufacturer's specified load index, combined with underinflation and a suspected bead/valve installation defect causing pressure loss, creates a risk of heat buildup, tread separation, or sudden blowout and loss of vehicle control. Walmart did not correct the installation: staff attempted to install only three of the four correct replacement tires and later told me to purchase an additional tire at my own expense. I declined both. No crash, fire, injury, or police report resulted. The tires remain on the vehicle pending resolution. This complaint documents the safety hazard created by the incorrect tire fitment and defective installation. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
I have a model 3 2021 Tesla. I noticed that several times it gives me the alert for steering wheel malfunction when it rains. In these instances the car will completely froze in the middle of the highway. I noticed Tesla had a recall for the 2023 Tesla’s for the same issue but failed to inspect the 2021 that also has similar issues. I think this is a huge safety issue that’s a manufactured issue that could have cost me my life
I am reporting a repeatable safety problem with FSD Lite's end-to-end parking behavior. On July 22, 2026, FSD Lite reversed the vehicle into a solid concrete garage wall while backing into a parking space. The vehicle did not stop before hitting the wall and sustained a scrape. On September 20, 21, and 22, 2026, FSD Lite selected parking spaces and began reversing toward parked cars. I had to intervene each time to prevent a collision. When I select the parking space myself, the maneuver works correctly. A previous software update briefly fixed the problem, but it returned after the vehicle updated to FSD Lite v14.1 Lite, software build 2026.26.6.5. This is a repeatable reverse-parking safety defect that can cause property damage and could injure someone. No one was injured, and no other property was damaged. The vehicle and its logs are available for inspection. Please review the FSD parking-space selection, reverse path planning, obstacle detection, and braking behavior for these events.
The front suspension became loose and produced a clunk while driving. The vehicle was taken in the same day. Two independent shops examined it and neither could perform the repair. One reported that a nut for the lower suspension link fasteners was still loose inside the vehicle structure and could be heard moving, and that the cause was unknown. The vehicle was then taken to a manufacturer service center. Its printed factory invoice diagnosed that the captive nuts for the lower subframe links had failed. The front subframe, both front lower lateral links, the front lower compliance link assemblies and the front aero shield were replaced, followed by a four-wheel alignment and a post-repair test drive. There was no collision, no impact damage and no tampering. The failure occurred at approximately 41,766 miles. SAFETY RISK: the lower lateral and compliance links locate the front wheels. Fasteners securing them backing out or failing can allow a link to separate from the subframe, shifting alignment and affecting steering control. This vehicle is driven regularly at highway speed, often with driver assistance engaged, and by more than one driver in the household. A separation at speed could have caused a loss of control. WARNING SYMPTOMS: an audible clunk from the front suspension and a loose-feeling front end, first noticed shortly before the vehicle was taken in. No warning lamp or message appeared. CONFIRMATION: the failure was diagnosed and repaired by the manufacturer's own service center, and the diagnosis appears as printed text on the factory repair invoice, which is available. The replaced parts may no longer be available for inspection. This vehicle has no open or completed suspension recall. Existing recall campaigns covering front suspension lateral link fasteners on this model did not include it. The repair was paid out of pocket.
After a Tesla-delivered over-the-air software update, my 2021 Tesla Model 3 equipped with Hardware 3 experienced loss of the rear-view camera along with other camera and Autopilot-related functions. The exact date the condition first appeared is unknown, but it occurred after the software update. Camera calibration later became stuck and resets/recalibration did not restore functionality. Tesla Service inspected and reproduced the problem. Tesla documented camera alerts, inability to activate Autopilot, alerts for both pillar cameras and the front-main camera, proper voltage to the cameras, no short to body, and no change after testing a known-good camera. Tesla concluded that the affected cameras share a deserializer path internal to the HW3 car computer and diagnosed an internal car-computer failure requiring complete computer replacement and camera calibration. The safety concern is loss of the rear-view camera and multiple camera-based driver-assistance functions, reducing rear visibility and eliminating features that rely on those cameras. Tesla did not identify the root cause of the internal HW3 failure or establish that the preceding software event could be excluded as a cause, trigger, or contributing factor. Tesla has separately acknowledged in NHTSA Recall 26V283 that software on certain HW3-equipped Model 3 vehicles can prevent camera streams from reaching the MCU and result in loss of the rear-view camera image. I am not claiming that recall necessarily applies to this specific failure; I am reporting the similar sequence so NHTSA can determine whether there may be a broader defect pattern. The vehicle remains unrepaired and is available for inspection upon request.
Interior camera circuit failed in the main computer as diagnosed by Tesla, it disables most safety features of the car, no collision warning or avoidance, no automatic emergency breaking, no lane departure warning or correction, no reverse cam, no cruise control or self driving, and probably more. Only Tesla can replace it because it's vin matched to the car, for $2400. This part should be more durable
As we were normally driving, the car lost power immediately with no warning sign. After the power is lost, brake does not function, electrical door button doesn't function, hazard light doesn't function. Car was able to scroll to a complete stop to the side of the road. The steering wheel is locked. Again, BRAKE DID NOT FUNCTION after the power is lost. No button works, no screen turns on, car is not able to turn to neutral. There was no collision prior and no warning prior. Tried to file a police report. But Officer [XXX], badge # XXX, refused due to there was no collision and no accident. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
The contact owns a 2021 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that the trunk strut failed, and the lift fractured, causing the rear glass to crack. There was a long crack from the edge to the top of the glass. The contact's husband cut the strut because the vehicle could not be driven with the truck ajar. A service appointment was scheduled on the App by text with the local dealer. A message was sent to the Tesla manufacturer. The failure mileage was approximately 82,000.
Tesla replaced the windshield on my 2021 Model 3 at the Tesla Service Center in Schaumburg, IL. Days after the installation, following a light rain, a film appeared on the exterior surface of the glass. In the presence of moisture the film hazes over and substantially obscures forward visibility from the driver's seat. The first occurrence was on 8/22/2026 while leaving a venue in heavy pedestrian traffic. Forward visibility was significantly degraded. During that drive the vehicle's driver-assist system issued a take-control prompt and returned control to the driver. The system did not display a reason for the prompt, so I cannot attribute it; I am reporting that it occurred while visibility through the windshield was degraded. The condition is not removable by normal means. Windshield wipers and washer fluid do not clear it. The defroster/defogger does not clear it, which rules out interior condensation. It required manual scrubbing to reduce, and it has recurred repeatedly since. It presents only in high humidity or after precipitation; in dry conditions the glass appears normal. The condition did not exist prior to the windshield replacement. I have photographs taken from the driver's seat showing the obscured view. I reported this to Tesla on 8/22/2026 through two in-app channels; both were closed without a response. I escalated by email on 8/24/2026. The service manager responded and scheduled an inspection. As of this filing the substance has not been identified, no cause has been determined, and no correction has been made. The condition remains active. I am filing because a windshield that intermittently obscures forward vision under ordinary weather conditions is a driving hazard, and because the vehicle has been operated in that condition while awaiting resolution. No crash, injury, or fire has occurred.
My 2021 Tesla Model 3 with approximately 70,000 miles developed front suspension problems. It began with squeaking, creaking and groaning, similar to a rusty playground swing, especially while turning or when the suspension moved. The noise was worse in hot weather and progressively became extremely loud and constant during normal driving. I also began hearing intermittent knocking/"bonking" or clunking. I could even hear the suspension when the vehicle compressed as I sat in the driver's seat. There were no warning lights or messages. Tesla inspected the vehicle and diagnosed both front lower lateral links and both front lower compliance links as needing replacement, along with an alignment. Tesla estimated approximately $1,960. CPR EV Repair replaced the diagnosed lower suspension components. After removal, the bushings showed significant visible deterioration, including cracked, torn and separated rubber around the inner sleeves. CPR EV also advised that the front upper control arms were worn and would need replacement. I was concerned for my safety because failure or separation of a deteriorated front suspension component while driving could affect steering or vehicle stability and potentially cause loss of control. Although I did not experience a complete separation or crash, the rapidly worsening and eventually constant symptoms made me concerned about continuing to drive. I have Tesla's estimate, CPR EV documentation and photographs of the deteriorated components after removal.
my 2021 tesla model 3 required replacement of both front upper control arms due to premature wear. the vehicle developed suspension noise, and an inspection determined both upper control arm assemblies with ball joints needed replacement. the repair cost was $1,845, including a wheel alignment. i am aware of numerous similar owner reports involving premature front suspension component failures in tesla model 3 vehicles and am submitting this complaint because i believe this may represent a broader safety-related issue.
I was driving down Interstate 635 Lane Departure Assist on my 2021 Model 3 pulls me into the lane it senses im departing into when system is set to "assist" (if vehicle sense im straying into the left lane as an example, it will pull me further towards the left lane markings and requires an abnormal amount of effort into recentering the vehicle within the lane I am in). Vehicle has since been driven in "warning" setting since this event with no further issues.
The adaptive cruise control on Tesla vehicles is dangerous. The model in question is a 2021 Model 3 but its an issue with many model years. The cruise control tends to get confused and applies the brakes during normal driving leading to very unsafe conditions for the Tesla and anybody behind it. The issue can happen in any environment and from 1-2 times per drive. There are no warnings or indications that the car is about to apply the brakes. The car has not been inspected by a service center but is in good working condition.
Passenger side view mirror intermittently gets stuck in the "reverse" position while in drive gear. I have the side view mirrors settings to where they are in a certain position when in reverse gear, and then a different position when in drive gear. I will reverse out of a parking spot and then proceed on my drive. Every now and then, the passenger side mirror will still be in the "reverse" position while driving and I only notice it when making a lane change and looking at the mirror and its pointed down at the ground in its reverse position. This has distracted me a few times as I expect the mirror to be in the normal drive position and I'm unable to see any cars in my blind spot. The issue has never occured on the driver side mirror, and has happened for the past few months. I have to correct this each time it does this by going into the mirror settings and hitting the reset position button.
I am reporting a safety concern regarding the glovebox fascia on my Tesla Model 3. The material on the glovebox trim is peeling and separating, which appears to be caused by prolonged exposure to heat inside the vehicle. The peeling fascia creates concerns about the durability and integrity of the interior component, as the material may continue to deteriorate over time. Loose or damaged trim could potentially interfere with the proper use of the glovebox, create sharp edges, or become a distraction while driving. I am requesting that Tesla inspect the affected area and determine the appropriate repair or replacement to ensure the vehicle remains safe and maintains proper interior component quality.
Front Seatbelt On March 13, 2026, at approximately 7:51 PM EST (23:51 UTC), the driver of a 2021 Tesla Model 3 was killed in a head-on collision on SR 741 in Warren County, Ohio. Two people died in this crash — the Tesla driver and the driver of the oncoming vehicle. Tesla's own telematics data (provided to the family post-crash) reveals that the driver's seatbelt unlatched at Row 5115 / 23:51:03.269 UTC — exactly 14.15 seconds before the collision. The driver was actively driving at the time, as confirmed by 66 separate steering torque readings between the seatbelt unlatch and the crash, ranging from −1.59 Nm to +2.15 Nm in constantly alternating directions — the signature of active lane-holding. The seatbelt released on its own while the driver was actively steering based on tesla data at approximately 66 mph. No rational driver unbuckles their seatbelt while driving 66 mph on a busy two-lane road. The telematics data proves continuous active driving before, during, and after the seatbelt event. The seatbelt failure is a separate and independent defect from the Emergency Lane Keeping (ELK) system failure that caused the collision (which is the subject of a separate NHTSA complaint). Even if the collision was unavoidable, a functioning seatbelt may have saved the driver's life. The seatbelt failure independently contributed to the fatality. The following data is from Tesla's own telematics file provided to the family: Timestamp (UTC)RowEvent 23:51:03.269 5115 Driver seatbelt status changes from LATCHED to UNLATCHED 23:51:03.269 – 23:51:17.420(row 5115–5311)66 steering torque readings confirm active driving (−1.59 to +2.15 Nm) 23:51:17.4205311ELK system activates (separate defect) ~23:51:19.0—Head-on collision — driver unrestrained — two fatalities Pattern of identical complaints from other 2021 Model 3 owners (ODI 11713076, 11738583, 11684327)
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both NHTSA and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
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