2022 Tesla Model 3
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
Vehicles › Tesla › Model 3 › 2022
Safety record from NHTSA: recalls, owner complaints, investigations and service bulletins.
These records cover every 2022 Tesla Model 3. To see whether one car still needs a recall repair, decode its VIN or check it with NHTSA.
18 recalls name the 2022 Tesla Model 3. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2023 Model 3 and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. The headlight low beams may be too bright and exceed the maximum light output. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment."
Headlight low beams that are too bright can reduce visibility for oncoming drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will replace the headlights, free of charge. Interim owner notification letters explaining the safety risk were be mailed October 3, 2026. Another notice will be sent once the repair becomes available. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-17-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017, 2021-2023 Model 3, 2020-2023 Model Y, 2021-2023 Model S, and Model X vehicles operating software version 2026.8.6. The rearview camera image may be delayed when the vehicle is placed in reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 111…
A delayed rearview image reduces the driver's view behind the vehicle, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 3, 2026. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-26-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2024 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2024 Model Y vehicles. The hood latch assembly may fail to detect an unlatched hood condition after the hood has been opened.
An unlatched hood can fully open, obstructing the driver's view and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed September 24, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-012.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 Model S, 2020-2021 Model X, 2018-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A factory reset muted the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 141, "Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 27, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The second-row left seat belt buckle and second-row center seat belt anchor may have been incorrectly reassembled during vehicle service.
An incorrectly reassembled seat belt anchor can impair the performance of the seat belt during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and reassemble the seat belt anchors as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-20-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3, 2020-2022 Model Y, and 2021-2022 Model S and Model X vehicles. The window automatic reversal system may not react correctly after detecting an obstruction. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 118, "Power-Operated Window…
A closing window may exert excessive force by pinching a driver or passenger before retracting, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update of the automatic window reversal system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 31, 2032. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-013.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model S, Model X, and 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles operating certain firmware releases. The infotainment central processing unit (CPU) may overheat during the preparation or process of fast-charging, causing the CPU to lag or restart.
A lagging or restarting CPU may prevent the center screen from displaying the rearview camera image, gear selection, windshield visibility control settings, and warning lights, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will improve CPU temperature management, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-009.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2022 Model 3 Performance vehicles. The unit of speed (mph or km/h) may fail to display on the speedometer while in Track Mode. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 101, "Control and Displays."
The driver may not know how fast the vehicle is traveling without the mph or km/h unit display, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model Y, Model X, Model S, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, including Summon and Smart Summon, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 6, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall supersedes recall 22V-063. Vehicles configured with Summon or Smart Summon and already remedied under 22V-063 will need to have the new remedy software installed.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model S, Model X, Model Y, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed April 5, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall has been superseded by Recall 22V-235. Tesla's number for the new recall is SB-22-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model 3, Model S, Model X, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A software error may cause a valve in the heat pump to open unintentionally and trap the refrigerant inside the evaporator, resulting in decreased defrosting performance. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal…
Decreased defrosting performance may reduce the driver's visibility, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-18-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The audible chime may not activate when the vehicle starts and the driver has not buckled their seat belt. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208, "Occupant…
The driver may be unaware that their seat belt is not fastened, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
There are hundreds of reports regarding Tesla HW3 computers overheating following the software update to Full Self-Driving (FSD) Lite V14. On 19 SEP 2026, I was required to replace the HW3 computer on my 2022 Model 3 Performance; the total price was approximately ($2,700.00). As the computer was perpetually stuck in a reboot status, the car's safety and security systems weren't functioning properly (e.g. forward collision assist, lane-keeping assist, cameras, Sentry Mode, etc.). Additionally, while parked overnight, the car drained 2-3 times more power as the computer remained stuck in the reboot loop. The computer clearly failed following a software update that increased the performance outside of the design tolerances. However, because my vehicle was out off warranty (both years and mileage), Tesla required me to pay out of pocket for the repair as it was deemed to be normal wear & tear. Of note, we bought the vehicle brand new in June 2022 and it had 62,652 miles at the time that the computer was replaced; Tesla's New Vehicle Limited Warranty is 4 years / 50K miles. I, like many other owners across multiple forums, believe that Tesla needs to take accountability for this failure and reimburse the owners who lost critical safety capabilities as a result of a poorly designed software update that was rushed through production. Additionally, leading up to the failure, I had not used FSD for more than a one month trial period, but I did regularly use Autopilot. Also, Tesla replaced the failed HW3 computer with another HW3 computer, which has me stressed that this issue is likely to happen again in the near future.
In a rented 2022 TESLA MODEL 3 entering a right veering on-ramp, the vehicle failed to respond to driver steering inputs at normal speed. I released the accelerator and there was no degenerative braking. I applied brakes, but the ABS was violently shaking without stopping and I noticed something illuminate on the computer screen. Unable to turn the steering wheel at all, we made severe impact with the left guardrail injuring both my wife([XXX]) and I. The Steering Assist Reduced warning light remained illuminated after the accident and I took a picture. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
On [XXX], at approximately [XXX] in Baker, California, my 2022 Tesla Model 3 contacted charging equipment and protective barriers while moving slowly into a charging space during what I observed to be an Autopark maneuver. I was watching the vehicle camera display and was not manually steering or accelerating. The car did not show or sound any warning before impact. It was not raining. No one was injured, there was no fire, and no police report was filed. There was visible damage to the side of the vehicle. No one has inspected the damage yet. The vehicle will be available for inspection after my trip. I reported the incident to Tesla and requested preservation and review of available records. The data export I received did not contain incident-specific camera recordings, Autopark/control logs or EDR data that I could identify. No recording USB drive was located. I have damage photographs and a charging-session record. The cause has not been independently determined, and I have not received a substantive engineering finding. I am reporting a possible safety issue with Autopark for investigation. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
My Tesla was operating with Full Self-Driving (FSD) (Supervised) engaged when it initiated a left turn across the path of an oncoming vehicle traveling in the opposite direction, resulting in a collision. During the incident, FSD was controlling the vehicle's driving behavior and initiated the left turn despite the presence of oncoming traffic. The Tesla collided with the approaching vehicle while executing the turn. I am concerned that the FSD system failed to properly recognize or respond to oncoming traffic, failed to determine whether the left turn could be safely completed, or made an unsafe decision to turn across the path of another vehicle. This incident created a significant safety risk for the occupants of both vehicles. I believe the collision may indicate a safety-related problem involving FSD's intersection handling, left-turn decision-making, detection of approaching vehicles, or collision avoidance capabilities. I request that NHTSA review this incident as a potential FSD safety defect and obtain relevant FSD engagement records, vehicle telemetry, camera footage, steering commands, and collision data from Tesla to determine why the vehicle initiated the left turn into oncoming traffic.
FSD failed to completely stop. I have video footage from Tesla showing the FSD stayed active and never disengaged yet the Tesla disengaged the brake. I can text or email the video pricing the car was actively using FSD until impact. I had the self driving enabled the vehicle decelerated from about 45 mi down to 0 MI but when the vehicle reach 1 mile it disengage the brake allowing the car to roll into the car in front of me I literally had less than one second to react I really believe the car will stop on its own. I have video proof the video was in full self driving mode and we all know the Tesla's are designed not to run into the back of any vehicle. I posted the video online and received numerous comments saying that the gas pedal and the brake were pressed at the same time however per Tesla you cannot press the gas and brake at the same time on any Tesla. My car has also pulled off from Red light intersections if I'm the first one at the light with the light still being read the car just accelerates on it's on it goes right through the intersection this is also messed up and I'm sure Tesla is aware of this as well. I'm terrified to drive this car with the self-driving engage. I want Elon musk to respond to me personally and apologize. PLEASE follow up with me so I can send y'all the video.
The contact owns a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving at 65 MPH with Autopilot engaged, another vehicle cut in front of the contact's vehicle and applied the brakes, but the contact's vehicle failed to decelerate and required manual driver intervention. The failure mileage was 30,000.
The contact owns a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while driving at various speeds during peak sunlight, FSD failed to operate as intended, causing the contact to drive manually in daily traffic. The message "Full Self-Driving Not Available" was display with an audible chime. In addition, the contact stated that while the FSD feature suddenly deactivated independently, causing the contact and his family passengers to violently jerk forward while transition into manual Hands-On driving. The failure mileage was approximately 82,573.
"Subject vehicle (2022 Tesla Model 3, VIN: [XXX]) was deployed for commercial rideshare passenger transportation by fleet operator Hertz/Uber with active catastrophic life-safety system failures. Onboard Tesla Service Mode telemetry confirmed: (1) Restraints Control Module (RCM) is powered OFF with status 00, leaving primary front and knee airbags and seatbelt pretensioners completely inoperative during public commercial transit; (2) Master Cylinder Hydraulic Brake Pressure telemetry is registered as 'Unavailable' under iBooster (IBST) and Electronic Stability Program (ESP); (3) Steering torque calibration offsets of -97 Nm and -14° angular pulling bias were applied to compensate for structural suspension collision damage; (4) Active diagnostic trouble code VCFRONT_a611 radiator heat rejection failure causing severe battery and powertrain thermal throttling; and (5) Non-functional windshield wipers and blocked camera sensors violating FMVSS 104 and FMVSS 208." INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
When the chair automatically moves to the easy in and out setting it does so without any safety measure to stop it moving when blocked. It is so strong that it crushed my hydroflask water bottle when it was stuck beneath. If that had been a foot or arm of a person, or if they were just unable to move away then it could cause serious injury like broken bones or crushing.
At approximately 32,916 miles, the powered trunk lift strut on my 2022 Tesla Model 3 separated from its mounting ball stud during normal use. There was no collision or external impact. When the strut separated, it struck the rear glass and caused the glass to break. Tesla inspected and repaired the vehicle. Tesla’s final service invoice states: “Strut failure was responsible for breaking back glass.” I am concerned that failure of the powered trunk strut attachment on a relatively low-mileage vehicle can cause broken glass and may create a safety risk.
My 2022 Tesla Model 3 Long Range has developed a failure of the Autopilot/ADAS computer. The AP computer remains installed in the vehicle and is available for inspection. The vehicle operated normally before software update 2026.26.6. Following the update, Driving Visualization and Autopilot began going offline, along with automatic headlights, automatic turn signals, emergency braking, collision and traffic warnings. The failures have continued despite software/firmware reinstall, DAS reset, camera calibration, and hard reset. Tesla Service inspected the vehicle and confirmed that the AP computer is defective and recommended replacement at approximately $2,600. I paid $120 for Tesla's diagnostic assessment. Service Mode has recorded repeated AP watchdog/kernel-panic events, including APS_w169_TurboA_SCS_LKUP, APS_w134_appMIA, APS_w135_appCritical, and PM_a041_dasMIA. The vehicle has also recorded simultaneous exits of multiple camera streams, sometimes causing camera feeds to go black while driving. Service Mode has shown the AP ECU in Coreboot/INIT, intermittent loss of communication between the AP ECU and infotainment ECU, missing GNSS Ethernet communication, and unavailable AP temperature telemetry. This creates a safety concern because multiple safety-related driver-assistance and camera-dependent systems can unexpectedly become unavailable while driving. The vehicle remains manually drivable, but the driver must unexpectedly operate without previously available functions. The failure can also affect automatic headlights and turn signals, requiring manual operation. I am reporting this as a potential safety defect because multiple ADAS/camera systems fail simultaneously and the AP computer repeatedly crashes/reboots. The failure began after a software update, although Tesla has stated that some alerts predated the update. Due to the GPS board contacting the autopilot first before the infotainment, precise location is off and navigation is unavailable.
With its latest upgrade, 2026.20.6.11 with full self-driving V14 Light, Tesla no longer allows users to set a max speed. This is very dangerous, especially in school zones where the vehicle, with Full Self-Driving, consistently misreads the speed limit. There is no way to revert this "upgrade." Many people have posted about this concern, but Tesla is ignoring it.
The Tesla service center in San Antonio Texas installed new tires and a new wheel on my vehicle and one of the tires was installed inside out based on the manufacturer’s specifications. I’ve been driving this vehicle for about 4 months /5k miles with the risk of this tire malfunctioning and causing an accident.
To Whom It May Concern, I am reporting what I believe is a foreseeable child-safety risk involving Tesla’s Toybox feature. Tesla allows parents to PIN-restrict Arcade, Theater, and the web browser, but Toybox remains accessible. Recently, I briefly went inside my home to use the bathroom, and my child slipped outside and climbed into my parked Tesla specifically to use the touchscreen and Toybox. Fortunately, I discovered him quickly. In hot weather, however, a child remaining unnoticed inside a parked vehicle could face serious injury or death, particularly if climate control were disabled, changed, or failed. Tesla already has the software infrastructure to restrict entertainment features. Adding Toybox to Parental Controls appears to be a straightforward safety improvement. I believe this omission creates an unnecessary and foreseeable risk to children and warrants review as a potential vehicle safety concern. Sincerely, [XXX] Tesla Model 3 Owner INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
My 2022 Tesla Model 3 has experienced recurring intermittent loss/reduction of power steering assistance. The vehicle displays “Steering assist reduced – Steering may require increased effort.” The problem has occurred multiple times over a period of months and may disappear after the vehicle is power cycled or the alert clears. Tesla previously evaluated the vehicle for this condition. On July 8, 2026, Tesla documented the steering-assist-reduced complaint and recommended replacement of the RWD steering rack/steering gear, with an estimated repair cost of approximately $3,018. On August 20, 2026, the warning occurred again. Tesla Service Mode recorded fault EPAS3S_a005_sent2Mia, described as “Torque Sensor 2 signal not received,” with the potential impact listed as “Steering assist reduced.” The vehicle simultaneously generated UI_a020_SteeringReduced. The warning subsequently cleared again, but this is a recurring intermittent failure involving the vehicle’s electronic power-assisted steering system. I am concerned that the steering assistance could become reduced or unavailable while driving. Tesla has already determined that replacement of the steering rack is required, but the repair is customer-pay. I am reporting this because this appears to be a recurring safety-related steering defect and I am concerned that other vehicles may experience the same failure.
the suspension lower lateral links bushings are wearing down without much usage. my car had 31k miles and the bushings already need to be replaced. this is very dangerous.
I am the owner of a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The front control arms on this vehicle are defective as manufactured. From the factory, these components have demonstrated premature failure, abnormal noise, loosening, and/or separation risk that is not consistent with normal wear on a low-mileage vehicle of this age. Symptoms experienced include [describe your exact symptoms clearly and factually — examples: progressive clicking, clunking, popping, or creaking from the front suspension/wheel area; especially noticeable during low-speed turns, reverse, or over bumps; any feeling of looseness, pull, or change in handling; any actual detachment or near-detachment]. These symptoms began at approximately 75000 miles on July 27th 2026. This is not isolated wear. Front control-arm and related suspension-link failures (including lower lateral links that can detach from the subframe) have been the subject of multiple owner complaints, prior Tesla recalls (including NHTSA campaign 21V-835 for improperly torqued lateral-link fasteners on certain Model 3/Y vehicles and the later 23V-235 expansion), technical service bulletins addressing water intrusion and noise in upper control arms, and a current NHTSA preliminary evaluation (opened 2026) into front lower lateral-link detachment on a large population of Model 3 and Model Y vehicles. Owners report that failures can occur with little or no prior dashboard warning, only possible audible cues, and can render the vehicle undrivable or cause sudden changes in alignment and directional control. A sudden separation or failure of a front control arm/lateral link while the vehicle is in motion creates an unreasonable risk of loss of vehicle control, crash, or injury to the driver, passengers, and other road users. Because the condition appears to originate from factory assembly, design, or component durability issues rather than owner abuse or ordinary high-mileage wear, and because similar failures are widely reported across Tesla owners.
The contact owns a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that the vehicle experienced a loss of camera and safety feature functionality for eight hours daily. The message "Adaptive Headlights Feature Unavailable" was displayed. The manufacturer was notified of the failure, and a complaint was filed. The contact was referred to a service center that was over an hour away. The vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired due to the cost. The failure mileage was approximately 100,000.
The horn on the steering wheel rarely works UNLESS it is pressed directly in the middle. I have tried to honk the horn when there is a safety event but it rarely works. This is definitely a safety issue. This has been going on since I bought the car June 2022. Full self drive is also unsafe and it will make sudden turns, accelerate too quickly, or have phantom braking. This can be unsafe for other drivers. I heard that this is improved with newer models, but if it is unsafe for older models like my 2022, it should not be available.
The contact owned a 2022 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while the vehicle was unoccupied, the vehicle independently started while parked in the driveway and caught on fire. No warning lights were illuminated prior to the failure. The contact stated that the fire spread to the residence and the residence burned down. The contact's daughter and her significant other were able to exit the residence safely. The local Fire Department arrived on the scene to extinguish the fire. The contact stated that the fire had started near the charging port. A Police Report was not filed. In addition, the contact stated that his daughter and her significant other suffered severe mental distress. Medical attention was not sought. A Fire Report was filed. The local dealer was not contacted. The vehicle was deemed a total loss by the insurance company. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 33,000.
My car randomly gave me alerts that my steering alignment fault then came the following two days later Automatic Emergency Braking is unavailable Feature may be restored on next drive 20:55 | DI_a246 Automatic vehicle hold disabled Use brake pedal when stopping 20:55 | DI_a223 Traction control disabled Drive with caution 20:55 | APP_W264 Lane Departure Avoidance features unavailable Features may be restored on next drive 20:55 | DI_a222 Stability control disabled. I take my car to a mechanic and they show me that my lower control arms are damaged. Tesla is more than 2 weeks out for something that has caused my car to act completely unsafe and not normal.
I own a 2022 Tesla Model 3 that is just past the 5-year/60,000-mile warranty. I bought it used from Tesla inventory and picked up my vehicle on June 1st, 2026 with ~32,000 miles on the odometer. The front passenger safety restraint system alert (RCM2_a636) first appeared on June 5, 2026. On June 15 at 64,008 miles, Tesla Service confirmed the airbag alert and front passenger OCS issue. They found the occupant classification system module damaged and exposed, replaced it, and noted the passenger-side module shorting was also causing a driver-side error. Both cleared after the repair and test drive. Cost: $363.23. The same alert came back. On July 30 at 66,475 miles they found an open in the passenger seat cushion self-capacitance trace wire and the driver occupancy sensor voltage out of range. They replaced the front passenger seat cushion trim and the driver seat occupancy sensor. Alerts cleared and the self-driving button now worked from park again which never did prior showing the issue was never fixed the first time. Cost: $930.36. No crash or injury, but this is a real safety risk. The restraint system may not work as designed and airbags could fail to deploy properly. This exact RCM2_a636/OCS fault keeps happening to other Model 3 owners both before and after warranty on forums, and Tesla has service bulletins on the same parts, yet people still end up paying for the repairs who are out of warranty and also have their safety and life at risk. Please investigate this as this is a severe safety defect.
U.S. registered Tesla operating in [XXX]. Full Self-Driving engaged. Dark, nighttime conditions. Vehicle was traveling toward low traffic zones near the edge of [XXX] when the system made a severe mistake. The car went off the main road. Driver was forced to take control off-road after the system lost control. Damage to the rims occurred. At the time of this incident, manual speed control was still available. The driver could cap the speed. That capability has since been removed by a software update. The current version is more dangerous. If the same incident happened today, the driver would have no way to limit speed or prevent the system from repeating the error. The defect is the progressive removal of driver control from the Full Self-Driving system. Earlier versions allowed manual speed caps. Current software does not. This vehicle is U.S. registered and runs U.S. software on American roads. The same defect that caused this off-road incident in Mexico now exists without the safety net of manual speed control. The software is dangerous. The removal of driver overrides makes it worse. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Tesla software update 2026.20.6.11 v14 Lite NA-2025.44 removed manual speed control for Full Self-Driving. The driver can no longer set a maximum speed. The vehicle chooses its own speed and it is frequently wrong and dangerous. Curves are the worst failure. The car enters curves too fast. It accelerates through curves. It does not slow to a safe speed before the curve begins. The driver has no way to cap the speed. The scroll wheel is dead. There is no override. Posted speed limits are ignored. The vehicle uses bad map data instead of reading visible signs. It will do 65 in a 55. It will not slow down when the sign says 55. The driver cannot force it to obey the posted limit. Speed control is gone. The driver is a passenger watching the car make bad decisions. This is not safe. This is not driver assistance. This is loss of control. NHTSA must require Tesla to return manual speed control immediately. A human driver must be able to cap the speed at all times. The current software removes that ability and creates a clear safety hazard.
On XXX, while Full Self-Driving (Supervised) was engaged, my 2022 Tesla Model 3 RWD abruptly decelerated without any visible vehicle, pedestrian, debris, or other obstacle requiring braking. Based on my best recollection, this occurred on approximately five separate occasions in clear daylight with clean cameras. On XXX, the first event occurred near XXX while traveling from [XXX] toward the [XXX]/[XXX] area. I took manual control for about 30 minutes. After I re-engaged FSD, a second event occurred and included approximately three rapid braking pulses. The occupants lunged forward during both episodes. On XXX, the drive from [XXX] to the Ukiah Costco was normal. On the return toward [XXX], FSD suddenly braked hard at approximately 63 mph and reduced the vehicle's speed by about 25 mph, to approximately 38 mph. Family members and friends in the vehicle were startled and moved forward. Later that day, there were two additional unexpected braking episodes while traveling from XXX toward XXX. I used accelerator input to override the unwanted braking. The unexpected highway-speed deceleration created a risk of being struck from behind and made the system unpredictable to supervise. No crash, fire, injury, or property damage occurred. I do not recall a warning message before the braking. The vehicle has not been inspected or diagnosed for this issue and is available for inspection upon request. As of XXX, the vehicle reports Tesla software 2026.20.3 and FSD (Supervised) v12.6.4; it has Hardware 3. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a defect petition received on November 24, 2025, requesting an investigation into the emergency mechanical door release in 2022 Model Year (MY) Tesla Model 3. The petition alleges that the controls for the emergency mechanical door release are not accessible and clearly identifiable and thus fail to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206. A vehicle equipped with electric door handles without an accessible mechanical door release creates a risk to safety when the electric door handle becomes inoperative due to loss of power and occupants are unable to easily locate the mechanical door release to exit the vehicle in case of an emergency. A concealed or hard to locate emergency door release could prevent an operator or occupant from exiting the vehicle in the event of an emergency, such as a crash or fire. The potential risk for entrapment can result in a severe injury or death of the operator and other occupants of the vehicle. As of March 13, 2026, out of the population of 179,031 subject vehicles, NHTSA has identified one (1) consumer complaint, in NHTSA’s databases alleging that the mechanical door release is concealed and unlabeled, resulting in a risk of entrapment in the event of an emergency, as cited in the Petition. The complaint is for the same Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) as the subject vehicle of the Petition. The allegation describes a front impact collision, where the vehicle lost electrical power, and the electric door mechanism stopped working. The 2022 MY Model 3 has a mechanical release for the front doors, located in front of the window switch on the door's interior and consists of a lever that can be pulled up to open the door. The subject vehicle does not have a mechanical release for the back doors. The owner’s manual for the 2022 MY Tesla Model 3 includes a section labeled “In Case of Emergency” that details how to open doors from the interior when the vehicle has no electrical power. The owner’s manual refers to the mechanical release as a “manual door release.” The owner’s manual instructs the operator to “pull up the manual door release located in front of the window switches.” The owner’s manual includes an illustration showing the mechanical door release lever and its location on the door. The illustration depicts an image of the door with the window switch and lever, including a blue arrow pointing to the location of the lever to demonstrate the upward movement required to operate the lever. The lever shown in the illustration does not contain a label to identify it. Although they vary in design and location, mechanical releases for the front doors are available on all Tesla models. The location and operation of the mechanical release is described in the owner’s manual for each Tesla model. Further, the owner’s manual cautions the operator that the mechanical door release should only be used when the subject vehicle has no power or if otherwise necessary. If the subject vehicle has power, the button located at the top of the interior door handle should be used to open the doors. The Petition also stated the lack of an accessible mechanical emergency door release is a violation of the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206 (49 CFR § 571.206). FMVSS 206 specifies performance requirements for vehicle door locks, latches, hinges, and attachment components to prevent passenger ejection during crashes. It applies to passenger cars, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 lbs.) or less, focusing on maintaining latch engagement under inertial loads and structural integrity. No requirements exist in the standard that address the Petitioner’s concern regarding the labeling and location of an emergency mechanical door release in passenger cars. On November 4, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Rulemaking received a petition to initiate the issuance of a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) to mandate a robust and obvious door egress system in all motor vehicles. The request has been granted, and the Agency will accordingly commence a rulemaking proceeding. See 49 CFR § 552.9. A decision as to the issuance of a rule will be made on the basis of all available information developed in the course of the rulemaking proceeding, in accordance with statutory criteria. Id. The Agency has thoroughly assessed the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA’s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency. NHTSA does not believe that the issues presented by the Petitioner indicate the likelihood of a safety related defect that would warrant a defect investigation, and the issue is best addressed through the rulemaking process. After full consideration of the available information and the commencement of the related rulemaking proceeding, the Petition is denied. Further specifics can be found in the Federal Register Notice. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11701894 and the Defect Petition can be viewed under ODI Number 11698174.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both NHTSA and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
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