VIN 5YJ3E1EA7KF317000
Sedan/Saloon · BEV (Battery Electric Vehicle) · Electric
1 - Check Digit (9th position) does not calculate properly
Recalls here cover every 2019 Tesla Model 3. Whether this exact car still needs a repair depends on its VIN: check it with NHTSA or a dealer.
22 recalls name the 2019 Tesla Model 3. Newest first.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2023 Model 3 and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. The headlight low beams may be too bright and exceed the maximum light output. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 108, "Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment."
Headlight low beams that are too bright can reduce visibility for oncoming drivers, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will replace the headlights, free of charge. Interim owner notification letters explaining the safety risk were be mailed October 3, 2026. Another notice will be sent once the repair becomes available. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-17-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2024 Cybertruck, 2017-2025 Model 3, and 2020-2025 Model Y vehicles. The tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) warning light may not remain illuminated between drive cycles, failing to warn the driver of low tire pressure. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
Driving with improperly inflated tires increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 15, 2025. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-018.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2024 Model S, 2015-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles. In the event of an unbelted driver, the seat belt warning light and audible chime may not activate as intended. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208…
A seat belt warning system that fails to alert occupants of an unbelted seat belt can increase the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update. Owner notification letters were mailed July 26, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2013, 2018-2021 Model S, 2020-2021 Model X, 2018-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. A factory reset muted the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 141, "Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are muted, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, release 2023.44.30.14, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 27, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-006.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2024 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, 2019-2024 Model Y, and 2024 Cybertruck vehicles. An incorrect font size is displayed on the instrument panel for the Brake, Park, and Antilock Brake System (ABS) warning lights. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Warning lights with a smaller font size can make critical safety information on the instrument panel difficult to read, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla began releasing an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-24-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling 2012-2023 Model S, 2016-2023 Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with all versions of Autosteer leading up to the version(s) that contains the recall remedy. In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, the prominence and scope of the feature's controls may not be sufficient to prevent…
In certain circumstances when Autosteer is engaged, and the driver does not maintain responsibility for vehicle operation and is unprepared to intervene as necessary or fails to recognize when Autosteer is canceled or not engaged, there may be an increased risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed February 10, 2024. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2019 Model 3 vehicles. The front suspension lateral link fasteners may loosen, allowing the lateral link to separate from the sub-frame.
A lateral link separation could shift the wheel alignment, causing instability and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will tighten or replace the lateral link fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed May 30, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-31-001. This recall is an expansion of previous recall number 21V-835.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2023 Model S, Model X, 2017-2023 Model 3, and 2020-2023 Model Y vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving Beta (FSD Beta) software or pending installation. The FSD Beta system may allow the vehicle to act unsafe around intersections, such as traveling straight through an intersection while in a turn-only lane…
FSD Beta software that allows a vehicle to exceed speed limits or travel through intersections in an unlawful or unpredictable manner increases the risk of a crash.
Tesla will release an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 15, 2023. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-23-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The second-row left seat belt buckle and second-row center seat belt anchor may have been incorrectly reassembled during vehicle service.
An incorrectly reassembled seat belt anchor can impair the performance of the seat belt during a crash, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and reassemble the seat belt anchors as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-20-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2022 Model 3, 2020-2022 Model Y, and 2021-2022 Model S and Model X vehicles. The window automatic reversal system may not react correctly after detecting an obstruction. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 118, "Power-Operated Window…
A closing window may exert excessive force by pinching a driver or passenger before retracting, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update of the automatic window reversal system, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 31, 2032. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-013.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2022 Model 3 Performance vehicles. The unit of speed (mph or km/h) may fail to display on the speedometer while in Track Mode. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 101, "Control and Displays."
The driver may not know how fast the vehicle is traveling without the mph or km/h unit display, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model Y, Model X, Model S, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, including Summon and Smart Summon, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed June 6, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall supersedes recall 22V-063. Vehicles configured with Summon or Smart Summon and already remedied under 22V-063 will need to have the new remedy software installed.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2019 Model S, Model X, and 2017-2020 Model 3 vehicles equipped with Autopilot Computer 2.5 and operating certain firmware releases. The rearview image may not immediately display when the vehicle begins to reverse. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety…
A delayed rearview camera image reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed May 17, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2022 Model S, Model X, Model Y, and 2017-2022 Model 3 vehicles. The Boombox function allows sounds to be played through an external speaker while the vehicle is in motion, which may obscure the Pedestrian Warning System (PWS) sounds. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor…
Pedestrians may be unaware of an approaching vehicle if the PWS sounds are obscured, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that will disable the Boombox functionality when the vehicle is in Drive, Neutral and Reverse modes, free of charge. Owner notification letters are expected to be mailed April 5, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-003. Note: This recall has been superseded by Recall 22V-235. Tesla's number for the new recall is SB-22-00-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2021-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The audible chime may not activate when the vehicle starts and the driver has not buckled their seat belt. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard number 208, "Occupant…
The driver may be unaware that their seat belt is not fastened, increasing the risk of injury during a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 1, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2016-2022 Model S and Model X, 2017-2022 Model 3, and 2020-2022 Model Y vehicles. The "rolling stop" functionality available as part of the Full Self-Driving (Beta) software may allow the vehicle to travel through an all-way stop intersection without first coming to a stop.
Failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash.
Tesla will perform an over-the-air (OTA) software update that disables the "rolling stop" functionality, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed March 28, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-22-00-001.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling all 2017-2020 Model 3 vehicles. The rearview camera cable harness may be damaged by the opening and closing of the trunk lid, preventing the rearview camera image from displaying.
A rearview camera that does not function reduces the driver's rear view, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and install a guide protector and new cable harness as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed April 24, 2022. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-17-008.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2017-2021 Model S, Model 3, Model X, and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles operating software version 2021.36.5.2. A communication error may cause false forward-collision warning (FCW) or unexpected activation of the automatic emergency brake (AEB) system.
Unexpected activation of the AEB system may cause the car to stop suddenly, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service has released an over-the-air (OTA) software update, free of charge. The recall began October 25, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-00-004.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2020-2021 Model Y and 2019-2021 Model 3 vehicles. The front suspension lateral link fasteners may loosen, allowing the lateral link to separate from the sub-frame.
A lateral link separation could shift the wheel alignment, causing instability and increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will tighten or replace the lateral link fasteners as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed December 20, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-31-003.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2019-2021 Model 3 and 2020-2021 Model Y vehicles. The brake caliper bolts may be loose, allowing the brake caliper to separate and contact the wheel rim.
Contact with the rim may cause a loss of tire pressure, increasing the risk of a crash.
Tesla Service will inspect and tighten, or replace the caliper bolts as necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-33-002.
Tesla, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2018-2020 Model 3 and 2019-2021 Model Y vehicles. One or both fasteners that secure the front seat shoulder belt to the b-pillar may not be properly attached.
An improperly attached fastener may prevent the seat belt system from performing as designed, increasing the risk of injury.
Tesla Service will inspect and repair both fasteners if necessary, free of charge. Owner notification letters were mailed July 23, 2021. Owners may contact Tesla customer service online by visiting www.tesla.com/support/contact or by calling 1-877-79-TESLA (or 1-877-798-3752). Tesla's number for this recall is SB-21-20-001.
Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) is recalling certain 2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles. The driver-side sun visor may not have the required air bag warning information. As such, these vehicles fail to comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) number 208, "Occupant Crash Protection."
Failure to provide the air bag warning information increases the risk of injury.
Tesla will notify owners, and Tesla Service Centers will inspect the visor and replace it, as necessary, free of charge. The recall began December 6, 2019. Owners may contact Tesla customer service at 1-877-798-3752. Tesla's number for this recall is SB-19-15-003.
The contact owns a 2019 Tesla Model 3. The contact stated that while operating the vehicle, the service controller warning light illuminated and the vehicle was taken to the local dealer service center and was diagnosed with steering rack, wiring harness, and control module failure caused by corrosion from water. The steering rack, control module, and wiring harness were replaced and the vehicle was repaired. The manufacturer was not contacted. The failure mileage was 13,721.
1. Component/System Failed: Supplemental Restraint System (SRS) — Front Passenger Seat Occupant Classification System (OCS) / Occupant Sensor. Component intact and available for inspection upon request. 2. Safety Risk: Failure disables or compromises front passenger airbag deployment and seat belt pretensioner logic. In a crash, the vehicle may fail to deploy the airbag/pretensioner for an adult passenger or deploy improperly, creating severe risk of serious injury or fatality. The passenger seat cannot be safely occupied. 3. Problem Reproduced/Confirmed: Yes. Tesla Service confirmed an active SRS/OCS fault (OCS1P_w127_seatbackSelfOpen). The technician acknowledged this failure is widespread on 2018–2020 Model 3s and noted their own personal Model 3 experienced the exact same issue unaddressed for years. Technicians stated company guidelines require recommending the fix due to liability, though many owners decline due to high out-of-pocket costs. 4. Manufacturer Inspection & Design Defect: Inspected and repaired by Tesla Service. Resolving the faulty OCS sensor required replacing the seat cushion/sensor assembly AND upgrading the front passenger airbag. Tesla redesigned the SRS signaling on newer revisions in a backwards-incompatible manner. This forces out-of-warranty owners to pay for a mandatory airbag replacement simply to achieve physical/electrical compatibility for a failed sensor pad. 5. Warning Messages & Timeline: Persistent "Front Passenger Safety Restraint System Issue" alert on touchscreen and illuminated red SRS/airbag warning lamp on instrument panel. First appeared at ~50,000 miles without physical impact, seat modification, or liquid spill. Remains continuously active. System was ultimately repaired at owner expense.
I’ve been seeing lots of similar front safety restraint issues from other Tesla owners on different sites. This safety restraint issue is regarding the wiring under the seat that get Pinched or Loose Wires: Movement of the front seat can pinch wires or dislodge connectors underneath, triggering errors like RCM_A028 or RCM_a033. If you’re out of warranty, Tesla charges a lot of money to have them fixed but I would say it is a safety issue that they should recall and fix without charge.
My 2019 Tesla Model 3 (approx. 95,000 miles) displays a persistent 'Front passenger safety restraint system' alert. The car drives normally and there has been no crash, fire, or injury. Tesla Service's estimate lists $631.60 for the alert diagnosis, $458.50 to replace the front passenger seat Occupant Classification System (OCS), and $699.44 to update the front passenger airbag for compatibility, an update Tesla's own service bulletin SB-23-20-001 requires alongside the OCS repair. The total is about $1,790 before tax. Tesla declined goodwill coverage and said the supplemental restraint system warranty expired in 2023. The alert means the front passenger airbag and seat belt pretensioner may not work correctly in a crash. This appears common: NHTSA's database already holds over 100 complaints on the 2019 Model 3 describing the same alert and repair path. I am asking NHTSA to review whether this is a defect in the occupant classification system. I have the Tesla estimate and will keep it.
There's a faulty connector for the drivers seatbelt pretensioner. The car is reporting RCM_a021_pretenLabFrontLeft and internet searches show this is a somewhat common error for a faulty connector that fails under normal usage.
On September 22, 2026, my 2019 Tesla Model 3 was involved in a very low-speed front collision. The Tesla Vehicle Data Report records the front collision event at approximately 23:21:26.933 and shows vehicle speed of approximately 2–3 mph at the time of the recorded collision. Despite the extremely low recorded vehicle speed, the vehicle’s airbags deployed. The airbag deployment caused an eyebrow/facial laceration that required six stitches and medical treatment. The Tesla vehicle data also shows an accelerator pedal position of approximately 70–75% around the collision event, while brake pressure was essentially zero at the recorded collision timestamp. Significant braking appears in the data after the collision event. I am concerned that the restraint system may have deployed the airbags during an unusually low-speed collision. I am requesting that NHTSA review whether the airbag/restraint system in this vehicle may have a safety defect or an inappropriate deployment threshold. I have retained the Tesla Vehicle Data Report, photographs of the vehicle and injury, and medical documentation. I am also requesting that Tesla preserve the vehicle’s crash data and all deployed airbag/restraint components for investigation.
The vehicle reported an error with steering. I brought the vehicle into tesla service. Upon inspection the connector to the steering rack was heavily corroded from water intrusion and had broken clean off upon removal. Confirmed with dealer that corrosion had caused the issue. If the connector had failed while driving the vehicle would have lost all power steering immediately and placed myself and others on the road in danger. The connector was corroded enough that the spade connector detached completely upon inspection. The steering rack is not easily accessible by the consumer and could not have been impacted by circumstances outside of normal driving.
On September 12, 2026, at approximately 2:05 PM, while operating on Full Self-Driving (FSD v14.1 Lite) on Hardware 3 (HW3), the vehicle experienced a critical, unprompted loss of path control. While traveling on the highway, the vehicle sharply veered off the left side of the roadway, caught air, and violently impacted an emergency barrier, resulting in the destruction of 9 steel poles and causing physical injuries to both the driver and front passenger. Despite the severe frontal impact and structural collision, neither the front nor knee airbags deployed, raising serious concerns regarding the vehicle's crash-sensing algorithms, structural impact detection, and restraint system integration under this software version. This incident highlights major safety risks associated with running computationally heavy FSD stacks on legacy HW3 architecture: 1. Uncommanded Steering Deviations: The system abruptly executed a violent, unprompted hard turn away from the path of travel, indicating severe lane-detection or path-planning failure. 2. Restraint System / Safety Failure: Critical secondary safety systems (front and knee airbags) failed to deploy in a high-impact structural collision involving multiple steel barrier poles. 3. Hardware Constraint Risks: The compounding computational and thermal load on HW3 hardware running v14.1 Lite continues to manifest in erratic vehicle control, latency, and hazardous tracking behavior. This severe safety defect requires an immediate federal investigation into both FSD trajectory control on legacy hardware and secondary restraint deployment failures.
Tesla FSD made Left Turn on Red Left-Turn arrow: On August 12, 2026, at approximately 4:30 PM, my 2019 Tesla Model 3 was operating in Full Self-Driving (FSD) mode at the intersection of US-71 West and Pedernales Summit Parkway in Austin, Texas, 78738. The vehicle proceeded to make a left turn while the left-turn traffic signal was displaying a red arrow. This was an unsafe traffic-control violation and created a potential collision risk. I had to monitor the vehicle and be prepared to intervene. I am reporting this as a safety issue with the vehicle’s automated driving/Full Self-Driving system. I also reported this issue to the Tesla through my Tesla APP but no action was taken from them. They have not even called and asked for this issue. I would request you to investigate this matter promptly and provide a detailed report on how this simple mistake could happen with the software.
The Restraint Control Module (RCM) fault code RCM_a056 intermittently appears and disappears on the vehicle's display. This code indicates a fault in the front passenger Occupant Classification System (OCS) — the sensor responsible for detecting passenger presence and weight to determine whether and how the passenger airbag deploys in a crash. Because the OCS sensor is malfunctioning, the passenger airbag may fail to deploy, deploy incorrectly, or deploy with wrong force in a collision, putting any front passenger at serious risk of injury or death. The fault is intermittent — it appears and disappears without any change in vehicle configuration or seating — which is consistent with a failing OCS sensor or degraded wiring harness connection under the passenger seat. No collision or injury has occurred. The vehicle has not yet been inspected by a dealer or service center. No independent inspection has been performed. Tesla has issued Service Bulletin SB-23-20-002, which has been revised at least seven times, acknowledging a known OCS sensor defect across multiple Model 3 vehicles. Despite this, no safety recall has been issued. The repair cost quoted by Tesla service is approximately $800–$2,000 out of pocket for what appears to be a widespread manufacturing defect in a critical safety system. Numerous other Model 3 owners have reported the identical fault code. The component is available for inspection upon request.
Safety restraint system tsb technical service bulletin, a known problem with my 2019 Tesla model three
Front passenger safety restraint system issue requiring replacement of Occupant Classification System and updating front passenger airbag to maintain compatibility with front passenger seat. Costing almost $2000. Many others have reported of multiple repairs
Alert RCM_a021pretenLapFrontLeft. Caused by the seat harness wires being pinched and stretched when moving the seat back/forward/up/down. Eventually the wires are damaged by the seat movement. Tesla has touted a feature called "Easy Entry" which moves the seat to a preset position to allow the driver to get in and out of the car more easily. This moves the seat lower and farther back and then moves the seat back up to the driver's position when ready to drive. This increased seat movement, every time the driver gets in and out of the car, causes the wires to wear prematurely and the above fault to trigger. In the event of an accident the driver side airbag may not deploy and/or the seat belt pretensioner may fail to lock the seat belt in place, leaving the driver exposed to serious potential injury risk. This issue can be seen in 2019 Tesla Model 3s and I believe an investigation by the NHTSA is warranted, at the very least.
To Whom It May Concern, I am logging a safety defect complaint regarding my 2019 Tesla Model 3, which displays active fault code RCM_a056 – Front passenger safety restraint system fault. This error deactivates the front passenger airbag and seatbelt pretensioners, creating an immediate, severe safety hazard. The Defect: The failure involves the Occupant Classification System (OCS) seat sensor and affects passengers in two ways: 1. Children (Current Stage): The fault triggers primarily when a child sits in the front seat. The degraded sensor mat cannot process lighter weight accurately, throwing an "implausible voltage" error that disables the airbag system. 2. Adults (Advanced Stage): online data shows this same code eventually locks out for adults due to internal wiring harness fraying or sensor circuit failure. Manufacturer Response: Tesla is aware of this fleet-wide defect and issued Service Bulletin SB-23-20-002 to address it. However, because my vehicle is out of warranty, Tesla refuses to cover this critical safety repair. Service centers are quoting owners $1,300 to $1,500+ out-of-pocket to fix an inherent manufacturing flaw in a federally mandated safety system. I urge the NHTSA to investigate the 2019 Tesla Model 3 OCS system and compel Tesla to issue a safety recall to fix this hazard at no cost to consumers. Sincerely, [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Tesla recently introduced auto parking as part of its FSD technology (Software 2026.20.6.11). Whenever we set the car destination to “home”, the auto parking has been able to gradually maneuver the car and self park in our garage. On 8/11, around 8:30pm, the car made a mistake during the auto parking. During the auto reverse into garage, the car came too close to the side of the garage and the driver side mirror hit the wall and partially broke. The driver was monitoring the car. If the car has kept its angle, it would have made it through correctly. But looks like it miscalculated and in a fraction of a second, the car’s side mirror hit the garage wall. Given the “ park” feature is new, looks like it hasn’t been tested well. It should be recalled until it is fixed and impacted drivers should be compensated for their repairs.
Noise came from front left wheel while driving around a turn. Later the same day another noise when turning the wheel when leaving a parking spot. Steering felt strange. It was late at night, so left the vehicle until the morning. In the morning, discovered a large bolt in front of the vehicle. The front left wheel was turned differently than the right front wheel. Had to spend almost $400 to get the vehicle towed to a Tesla service center. They later confirmed, "The cause was detached links from the bushings and bolts. Technician replaced the front lower lateral links, front lower compliance links, and front stabilizer bar bushing brackets. Total cost for those repairs was $1,902.90. This could easily have resulted in an accident and even a fatality if we were not so lucky.
Over a period of several weeks, the front suspension increasingly made noise (squeaking and groaning) and felt loose when turning and going over bumps. The front control arms were replaced 10/31/24. The problem has begun recurring over the last few months, with the same noise occurring and progressively worsening.
I am writing to report a serious safety incident involving my 2019 Tesla Model 3. My goal is not to assign blame, but to make Tesla aware of an incident that I believe warrants review from a safety perspective. While the vehicle was parked, my children were sitting inside watching TV, we were standing 5 ft from the vehicle. My younger son was seated in the front passenger seat, and my older son, not realizing his brother had leaned over the top of the seat, adjusted the passenger seat upward. As the seat moved up, it trapped my younger son's neck against the seat and obstructed his airway. Fortunately, we were a couple of feet away and heard the sound of glass breaking. We were able to free him, and he began breathing again and no serious injury occurs. It was an extremely frightening situation that could have had a much more serious outcome. During the incident, the panoramic glass roof also shattered from the pressure of my youngest son's head. I understand this may have occurred because of the force involved, but I wanted to include it as part of the overall event. I recognize that children should not play inside vehicles unsupervised, but they are 8 and 10 and were not rough housing just watching Netflix in the Telsa. However, this incident made me question whether additional safeguards could help prevent a similar situation in the future. Specifically, I wonder if there are opportunities to improve obstruction detection or pinch protection when a seat encounters resistance near a person's head or neck or making the seat unable to get so close to the ceiling an continue to rise. I wanted to bring this incident to your attention so safety teams can review it. If there is any additional information that would be helpful, including photographs, the vehicle VIN, or other details, I would be happy to provide them.
The vehicle has quite a bit of noise coming from the suspension during normal driving. Creaks and groans.
Between 2023 and 2026, I have had several clunking and creaking sounds from the suspension. These were then found isolated to "lateral and compliance link detachments" and Tesla noted these were "serious safety issues" and fixed them out of warranty at a cost of roughly $2500. When I pointed out that vehicles within this model range (manufactured April 2019 at the Fremont, CA plant) were flagged for a recall, they mentioned my vehicle was outside that range and insisted on an out-of-pocket repair. Further, I have similarly had to have the front left driver's side seat belt harness replaced because of a restraint control module failure. I have owned 3 other vehicles and have never had a restraint control module/seatbelt fail over just 82000 miles of use.
Honestly since I took delivery the vehicle I did notice a clunking sound every time I would turn into a steep driveway. I reported the problem to Tesla on multiple occasions and they either could not replicate the sound or find the problem when they inspected the vehicle. So I lived with the on and off clunking sound. Years later while driving on the freeway I heard a really hard clunk and I began to lose control of the car luckily I was close to home and I was able to make it to my street. Upon arrival my tires completely fell off the control arm and I could move the steering wheel at all. I had to get it towed to the body shop. Long story short the lower control arm bolt completely fell off. I just happy this didn’t result in a major accident. But I had to get the car towed. I am pretty upset that Tesla pretty much said there is no issue. My family has Teslas and in all of them I hear the same clunking sound.
About one month ago, my 2019 Tesla Model 3 developed a suspension issue that caused a noticeable vibration in the rear of the vehicle whenever I drove above 40 mph. At first, we suspected the problem was related to a tire. However, after the technicians at the Tesla Service Center lifted the vehicle for inspection, they discovered a much more serious issue. They brought me into the service area to show me that the right rear suspension was being held together by only the front portion of a bolt. The retaining nut had completely come off, leaving the bolt barely in place. Had that bolt shifted even a few millimeters while I was driving, it could have resulted in a catastrophic suspension failure and a serious accident. Tesla determined that the loose bolt had caused damage to the right rear (passenger-side) suspension assembly. The necessary repairs totaled approximately $1,800, which I paid to restore the vehicle to safe operating condition.
My brake lines have corroded to the point where half a liter of brake fluid has leaked out rendering the vehicle unsafe. Tesla admits that this is a design flaw but says that it does not affect this particular VIN number but the damage is exactly as described: [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)
Tesla rolled out FSD 14 Lite to hardware, including to my vehicle and it’s become extremely unsafe.The past several days the vehicle will suddenly slow down/break causing people to almost crash into me, make sudden and indecisive lane changes, and constantly rocking the steering wheel left and right. I hope someone takes this seriously and has Tesla revert back to the old software or make changes before someone is killed.
The Front Passenger Safety Restraint System failed prematurely on my 2019 Tesla Model 3 at only 23,105 miles, triggering the alert 'Alerts - Seats - Front passenger safety restraint system issue/Service is required' and disabling passenger airbag functionality. Upon inspection, Tesla Service quoted $1,285.13 out-of-pocket to repair the system. While the root failure involves a $12 occupant occupancy sensor (Part #1099592-00-F), Tesla's mandatory service procedures require a full subsystem revision cascade to fix it. Specifically, under 'Replace Occupant Classification System (OCS) of Front Passenger Seat while Servicing Subcomponents' and 'Update Front Passenger Airbag to Maintain Compatibility with Front Passenger Seat,' Tesla requires replacing the right-hand seat harness assembly (Part #1489060-03-G) and the complete Front Passenger Airbag (Part #1077823-00-G) solely to maintain hardware compatibility with the revised sensor. Because Tesla redesigned subcomponent hardware without offering a backwards-compatible replacement sensor for earlier Model 3 production units, restoring a critical primary safety system creates an exorbitant financial barrier, forcing the vehicle to be operated with disabled airbags.
NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation opened these reviews into vehicles including this one.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur. Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary. The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.
The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1
On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.
On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.
On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.
NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.
The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.
On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.
On December 19, 2019, NHTSA received a petition from Mr. Brian Sparks requesting that the Agency recall all [Tesla] Model S, Model X, and Model 3 vehicles produced from 2013 to the present due to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA). In his petition and follow-up submissions, the petitioner identified a total of 232 non-duplicative complaints to NHTSA, including 203 reporting crashes. On January 13, 2020, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Defect Petition DP20-001 to evaluate the petitioner?s request. ODI's evaluation included reviews of all complaints and supporting information referenced by the petitioner, as well as 14 additional complaints to NHTSA related to SUA crash allegations that were either not selected by the petitioner or were submitted after the petitioner's most recent submission. The review also included analyses of available crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or video data) the Agency acquired as part of the evaluation.After reviewing the available data, ODI has not identified evidence that would support opening a defect investigation into SUA in the subject vehicles. In every instance in which event data was available for review by ODI, the evidence shows that SUA crashes in the complaints cited by the petitioner have been caused by pedal misapplication. There is no evidence of any fault in the accelerator pedal assemblies, motor control systems, or brake systems that has contributed to any of the cited incidents. There is no evidence of a design factor contributing to increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. The theory provided of a potential electronic cause of SUA in the subject vehicles is based upon inaccurate assumptions about system design and log data.NHTSA is authorized to issue an order requiring notification and remedy of a defect if the Agency?s investigation shows a defect in design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle that presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 49 U.S.C. ?? 30102(a)(9), 30118. Since the information before the Agency is not indicative of a vehicle-based defect, it is unlikely that any investigation opened because of granting this petition would result in an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect. Therefore, upon full consideration of the information presented in the petition and the potential risks to safety, the petition is denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists based upon additional information the agency may receive.The reference numbers for the complaints to NHTSA cited by the petitioner can be found in the petition submission documents in the public file for DP20-001. Those complaints and the 14 complaints ODI added to its evaluation can be viewed at NHTSA.gov. The reference numbers for the complaints added by ODI are: 11385350, 11383955, 11383233, 11383180, 11378492, 11378458, 11302076, 11299698, 11290006, 11190595, 11174504, 11115496, 11096644 and 11000097. The attached report, further detailing NHTSA?s reasons for denial of the petition, will be published in the Federal Register.
Technical service bulletins and other communications the manufacturer sent dealers about this vehicle. Ask a dealer for the full document by its number.
Bars are owner complaints, dots mark years with recalls. Select a year to open its report.